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SUMMARY
This thesis develops an Hegelian philosophy of education by presenting
the concept as the comprehension of the dialectic of enlightenment. It
begins by examining recent critical theory of education which has
employed Habermas's idea of communicative action in order to reassess
the relationship between education and political critique. It goes on
to expose the flaws in this approach by uncovering its uncritical use
of critique as the method of enlightenment. Enlightenment as overcoming
presupposes enlightenment as absolute education. The philosophical
issues raised here are then substantially examined by returning to
Habermas in order to trace the presupposition of critique as method in
his theorizing. It is argued that Habermas also presupposes critique as
absolute enlightenment, or overcoming, in both the emancipatory
knowledge-constitutive interest and in The Theory of Communicative
Action, and further, that it is this presupposition which returns as
the contradiction of the dialectic of enlightenment in his work.
Horkheimer and Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment is then itself
examined along with Adorno's Negative Dialectics. Here it is argued
that although this work marks an educational and philosophical
development over Habermas, nevertheless its authors also presuppose the
identity of enlightenment, this time in the claim that the dialectic of
enlightenment, and negative dialectics, are not a determinate negation.
The thesis shows how Habermas and Adorno, in their respective views of
the dialectic of enlightenment, repeat but do not comprehend the self-
determination which is the actual in Hegelian philosophy. The final
chapter of the thesis employs Hegelian philosophy to re-examine the
aporia of education as method. It argues that the dialectic of
enlightenment is actual when it is recognized as the self-education of
philosophical consciousness, and is the identity and non-identity which
is the concept. The implications of Hegelian philosophy of education as
the recognition of misrecognition are then explored, first with regard
to rethinking the identity of the teacher in civil society and
developing the concept as ethical pedagogy; and then to recognizing
critique as comprehensive education with regard to the state in civil
society.
INTRODUCTION.
Hegel is not recognized as a philosopher of education. Works which are
variously concerned with the history of western education, of western
educational philosophy, and of educational theory and theorists, do not
include Hegel's philosophy as a significant contribution. Even where
Kant and Fichte are included, Hegel remains a notable absentee. [1]
This thesis, however, argues that Hegel's philosophy is not only a
philosophy of education, it is philosophy as education. Moreover, it
shows how the key ideas in Hegel, in particular those of the concept,
the actual and absolute ethical life, are themselves ideas which can
only be comprehended as this (philosophical) education.
It achieves this by reading Hegel against recent Habermasian critical
theory of education, and then more substantially against the
interpretations of the dialectic of enlightenment found in the work of
Habermas, and of Horkheimer and Adorno. It reveals how these critical
theorists employ as their method an uncritical presupposition of the
identity of education, or absolute education, in their own critiques of
bourgeois society. [2] In exposing the social determination of
knowledge, of truth and of the identity of objects, they do not
recognize the social determination of the method by which they are
themselves carrying out these investigations. It is in the
comprehension of this presupposition of education as method that
Hegelian philosophy of education is realized.
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To develop Hegel's educational philosophy it is not necessary to begin
with Hegel; indeed, to do so would be to misunderstand the education
which is his philosophy. It differs from traditional educational
philosophy in that much of his work does not immediately appear to be
about education at all. Rousseau's Emile, for example, can easily be
identified as both about education and as educational. It has a subject
being educated, a clearly demarcated process which is its educational
activity, and a goal which would be the result of that activity. Our
reading the work is intended to be our education with regard to what
education is, and what it should be. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, a
work whose educational import forms a large part of this thesis, is not
at all clear in the same way with regard to who is being educated, how,
or for what, or by whom. It is by no means clear either whether the
work is intended as our education, and if so what the desired result is
to be.
The differences between Hegelian educational philosophy and the more
traditional presentation of educational theory are themselves part of
the content which constitute the educational significance of Hegel's
work. Hegel's system is concerned with education as experience,
therefore, an abstract presentation of experience would not itself be
the activity which is being referred to. It would be a presentation
about education, but it would not be that education itself. Thus a
description of what education is, is the experience for us of what
education in itself is not. This contradiction is the substance of the
educational philosophy of Hegel, a contradiction which, if it is to
appear as our education, cannot simply be abstractly stated. The
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presentation of education according to this contradiction, that is
according to its own identity and non-identity as the experience of
what education is not, is the characteristic which sets Hegel's
philosophy apart as a philosophy of education. In order, therefore, to
understand Hegel's philosophy of education to be philosophy as
education, it is necessary to begin by recreating the experience of
contradiction, to realize it for ourselves, so that its education is at
the same time our experience, and our activity. The return to Hegel can
then be made in order to comprehend that education as the movement and
result, the actuality, which is the concept.
The production of this experience is both the recognition of education
in civil society promised in the title of the thesis, and accounts for
the overall structure of the thesis. On the first point, it is
important to note that throughout the work, the terms civil society and
the state are used in a strictly Hegelian manner. Civil society is what
Hegel describes as the external state,
an association of members as self-subsistent individuals
in a universality which, because of their self-subsistence,
is only abstract. Their association is brought about by
their needs, by the legal system - the means to security
of person and property - and by an external organization
for attaining their particular and common interests. [3]
The idea of the state in the Philosophy of Right is distinguished from
civil society, or the merely external state. 'The state is the
actuality of the ethical idea', [4] or is the recognition of the self-
subsistent person and its external state as abstract. Therefore, in
this thesis, civil society refers to bourgeois private property law,
which is the abstract universality and guarantee of the rights of
individual persons, and to capitalist relations of commodity
production, in which persons relate to each other as things; in both,
activity is abstracted from result, and appears to be a property which
is inherent in the result. Thus, activity becomes unknowable, an
abstraction which is reproduced by the activity itself, and which
determines the identity of things and persons as they appear to natural
consciousness. What is therefore a social relation or activity is
dominated by the appearance of its abstract result as the external
state, private property law, the person, the commodity, or analytical
thought. With regard to Hegelian philosophy of education, the
separation of the educational activity of both the teacher and of
critique from their appearance as result in civil society is examined
in chapter IV.
On the second point, that of the overall structure of the thesis, the
work is divided into four chapters. The first three chapters are
designed to produce for the reader the contradiction of education as it
appears in recent critical theory of education based on Habermas,
Habermas himself, and in Horkheimer and Adorno. In chapter IV, the
comprehension of that contradiction as the educational import of
Hegelian philosophy is presented. This introduction now outlines in
more detail the various stages of the argument.
Chapters I - III raise the problem that the contradiction of the
identity and non-identity of education noted above, is reproduced
whenever education or enlightenment is presupposed as method. Education
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is held to be the process by which one becomes enlightened regarding an
object. But how, then, is one to become enlightened with regard to the
process of becoming enlightened? There is in such an inquiry the
contradiction that one uses as the method of investigation the very
process that is the object of the investigation. To overcome ignorance
regarding enlightenment and the identity of education, by becoming
enlightened or educated, is to use education as a method in order to
produce the truth of education as result. The presupposition of
education as method only reproduces the experience that such a method
cannot be education in itself, or unconditioned self-activity and
result. The contradiction of education as method is already the
experience of enlightenment as negative. It is with this experience of
education as method in critical theory of education, rather than with
Hegelian philosophy of education, that this thesis begins.
Chapter I examines this presupposition of enlightenment as it appears
in recently developed Habermasian critical theory of education. [5]
This work is of particular importance because it seeks to reveal the
relationship between education and politics in modern society, arguing
that critique is the political development of a rational will, and that
genuine intersubjective relations, the idea of the ethical community,
result from this rational self-education. This critical theory of
education has based itself on Habermas's distinction of three
knowledge-constitutive interests [6] and attempts to produce a critique
of the determination of education in bourgeois society. Critical
theorists in education have tried to show how the technical knowledge-
constitutive interest determines and distorts education, so that its
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import as political development and self-formation is lost behind its
appearance as a merely technical activity. Their work relates both to
the political aspects of social enlightenment, and to the politics of
the process of formal schooling and educational research in civil
society. In this sense, it is part of a wider tradition of critical
sociology of education which has been concerned to develop a critical
and marxist perspective on formal schooling, curriculum knowledge and
the teacher/student relationship. [7] What is specific about this
critical theory of education within the tradition is its attempt to
employ Habermas's emancipatory knowledge-constitutive interest as the
unification of both enlightenment and political activity, and to apply
the theory of communicative action to educational philosophy as an
educational philosophy.
However, despite the importance of this work in highlighting the
relationship between politics and education, a Habermasian critical
theory of education can ultimately only reproduce the contradiction of
education in its presupposition of critique as the method of
enlightenment. This is briefly examined in the final section of chapter
I. The contradiction is manifest in the idea of enlightenment as
overcoming; it employs critique as the method (and self-identity) of
enlightenment, assuming that enlightenment is already known in itself
to be that which emancipates the subject from the abstract and the
illusory.
The contradiction of education in critical theory of education cannot
be resolved internally. Each attempt to overcome the impasse of the
contradiction merely reproduces the presupposition of enlightenment as
method, and repeats the contradiction that enlightenment as method is
already not the identity of education as unconditioned activity and
result. Consequently, critical theory of education finds that its own
aporias of educational reasoning produce for it a philosophical
experience, one where it has its own thinking activity as object.
However, critical theory of education has not yet developed its own
thinking into a philosophical self-consciousness; as such, its
philosophical aporias require to be examined within a tradition in
which the contradiction of education is known, and in which the
relationship between education and politics is also maintained.
This task is begun in chapter II. Here the presupposition of
enlightenment as overcoming is examined in Habermas's own work, from
Knowledge and Human Interests to The Theory of Communicative Action. It
is argued that Habermas employs the idea of overcoming as the
unconditioned unity of the emancipatory knowledge-constitutive
interest, of ideology-critique, of communicative competence, and of the
lifeworld. Each of these notions contains the assumption that the
identity of enlightenment as reason and interest can be known and
reconstructed as the condition of the unconditioned. The unconditioned
unity of this rational activity and result is the lifeworld, its
conditioned appearance is discourse or communicative action.
Chapter III reads Habermas and Adorno against each other to reproduce
the aporia of the contradiction of education which has been the subject
of the first two chapters. Their respective contributions to critical
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theory are presented here as two halves of the contradiction of
education. Chapter III is therefore divided into the enlightened view
of Habermas and the dialectical view of Adorno to produce an overview
of the dialectic of enlightenment as a whole. For Habermas, the
negative and nihilistic dangers of the dialectic of enlightenment are
overcome in the emancipatory activity which is critique, and which
later becomes the theory of communicative action. For Adorno, the
negativity of the dialectic of enlightenment is not overcome, and
enlightenment does not produce a positive result which can overcome
abstract identity thinking. In both, enlightenment regarding the
identity of the absolute is presupposed, a presupposition which in each
case can only be made by remaining uncritical with regard to the
abstract idea of education on which each relies.
The relationship between the absolute and education now becomes clear:
to know the absolute, or to know that it is not known, is already to
have assumed enlightenment with regard to its (non) identity. The
identity and non-identity of enlightenment, or the dialectic of
enlightenment, therefore both necessarily precedes and results from
knowledge regarding the absolute. It is itself the activity and result
which is the inquiry into, and the aporia of the knowing of the
absolute. The dialectic of enlightenment is the contradiction which is
the activity and result of our education regarding the absolute. The
absolute is this education, and it is this recognition, of education in
civil society as misrecognition, which is Hegel's philosophy of
education. This is developed in chapter IV of the thesis, which is
divided into three sections.
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The first section of chapter IV examines the idea of recognition as it
appears in the Phenomenology of Spirit. It is shown how the
master/slave dialectic is the experience of determinate negation and is
the recognition of misrecognition comprehended as self-activity and
result, or self-education. This education for us regarding the unity
and non-unity of thought as activity and result then enables a reading
of subjective substance as determinate negation; a reading in which the
abstract universality of substance and the illusory independence of
subjectivity in civil society are recognized as misrecognition, or as
the contradiction which is the self-activity of subject and substance.
The second section of chapter IV examines the actual as it results from
the contradiction of the identity of the teacher in civil society. The
teacher in civil society is both the master of what is to be taught,
and the presupposition that what is to be taught can be taught, or of
enlightenment as method. Yet at the same time as the teacher has that
knowledge, he is also required to perform it, that is to teach it for
the unenlightened student. The truth of the teacher lies in his
activity, not in his knowledge. The contradiction of the teacher,
therefore, is that in his very person he is already the presupposition
of the activity which has yet to be realized. The identity of the
teacher is a self-contradiction; but one which, as in the dialectic of
enlightenment, is itself educational when that contradiction is
recognized as self-work.
Working with the idea of education as the recognition of
misrecognition, Hegelian philosophy of education can comprehend the
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contradiction of the teacher to be the self-work which is its own
activity and result. The identity of the teacher as contradiction in
civil society is not overcome, but that aporia is comprehended as the
actuality of the teacher. The section ends by examining this actuality
in Hegel's own teaching practice whilst a teacher in the Nuremberg
gymnasium. The phrase ethical pedagogy is introduced to show how the
actuality of the teacher is the re-creation of the contradiction of the
teacher. His education for his students produces the experience of the
negation and loss of the teacher, and at the same time the realization
that it is the teacher whose truth this negation and loss is. Such a
pedagogy is philosophical because it has as its 'method' the
contradiction that it can only begin methodologically, or with what is
abstract, that is, with the teacher, and thus not begin at all. It is
ethical because it does not suppress the negation of (absolute)
education, rather it has that negation as its own educational self-
activity.
The final section of chapter IV examines the actual as it results from
the contradiction of critique. Formal education in civil society is
examined as socialization, and the experience of this for subjectivity
is seen as giving rise to the (moral) self-consciousness which is
active in critique. But critique, when it presupposes its own activity
as realizing the unconditioned, misrecognizes the abstraction which is
that presupposition. The recognition of critique as misrecognition is
the unity of the concept, or what in this thesis is examined as the
philosophical activity and result of a comprehensive state education.
The recognition of critique as misrecognition is traced from its
immediacy in paideia, through the period of die Bildunq as its own
separation and division, up to its unification as the work and result
which is philosophy. The actuality of the state in the Philosophy of
Right is briefly examined before, in the final section of chapter IV,
the idea of philosophy as comprehensive state education is introduced.
The phrase deliberately conjoins terms which are Hegelian and
educational, in an attempt to hold together the identity and non-
identity of education and the state in civil society. It is developed
by showing how education as socialization is merely the abstract
principle of universal education, and further, that moral education can
only repeat the separation of subject and substance. Critique is
comprehensive, or philosophical, when its presupposition of education
as method is recognized as misrecognition.
CHAPTER I - BECOMING CRITICAL OF EDUCATION
The Critique of Educational Interests.
This chapter examines the recently developed Habermasian critical
theory of education. It concentrates on two works - Becoming Critical,
by W. Carr and S. Kemmis, and A Critical Theory of Education by R.E.
Young. The chapter shows how these works offer a critique of the
determination of education in civil society.
In Knowledge and Human Interests, Habermas distinguishes between the
technical, practical and emancipatory knowledge-constitutive interests.
Empirical-analytical inquiry has as its basis the technical interest
which is concerned to inform instrumental action. It is the aspect of
human work which aims to dominate nature and is characterized by
measurement and calculation rather than by intersubjective relations.
Enlightenment determined by this technical interest produces knowledge
only in the form of control over objects, human and non-human.
'Action... is reduced to the solitary act of purposive rational
utilization of means. And individualized experience is eliminated in
favour of the repeatable experience of the results of instrumental
action'. [1]
Alternatively, hermeneutic or practical inquiry does not see the object
of knowledge to be control; it takes as its object the necessary social
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presuppositions of its inquiry, and therefore has as its goal the
understanding of that social object. This interest is reflective,
therefore, in the sense that it is an inquiry into the determination of
(the social) self. Whereas the interest in technical control dominates
the object, the practical interest 'constitutes itself in a self-
formative process'; [2] and whereas the technical interest has no
practical self-application, because it is a methodology and therefore
separated from the process of its determination, hermeneutic inquiry
grasps reality 'with regard to possible intersubjectivity of action-
orienting mutual understanding...'; [3] it has immediate practical
import.
The identification of the technical and practical knowledge-
constitutive interests reveals that they are particular to and
dependent upon their social and historical context. To know these
interests as socially determined is to begin to critically undermine
their status as value free or independent (objective). An interest is
already a value; thus the rules of the natural and cultural sciences
no longer possess the status of pure transcendental
rules. They have a transcendental function but arise
from actual structures of human life: from structures
of a species that reproduces its life both through
learning processes of socially organized labour and
processes of mutual understanding in interactions
mediated in ordinary language. These basic conditions
of life have an interest structure. The meaning of the
validity of statements derivable within the quasi-
transcendental systems of reference of processes of
inquiry in the natural and cultural sciences is
determined in relation to this structure. [4]
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Knowledge for Habermas is merely a reflection of the knowledge-
constitutive interest from which it originates and by which it is
determined.
Critical theorists in education have recently tried to adopt this model
in their own critique of the interests which have shaped educational
research, and perspectives in the sociology of education. Carr and
Kemmis devote a chapter to revealing the interests which underpin the
'natural scientific view of educational theory and practice' and
another to the 'interpretive view of educational theory and practice',
whilst Young argues that the technical interest underpins a modern
educational crises.
Carr and Kemmis include in their critique the philosophical foundations
of educational theory which took (technical) form as 'the passive
digestion of chronologically arranged factual accounts of philosophical
doctrines', [5] the behaviourist models which developed a 'technology
of teaching' [6] and which applied methodologies to educational
problems concerned with discipline, control, motivation and assessment,
functionalist sociology of education which regarded the action of
individuals (teachers) 'as something governed by invariant functional
laws that operate beyond the individual actors' personal control', [7]
and to positivist approaches which borrowed for educational research
the aims, concepts and methods of the natural sciences, and assumed
that educational practice could become based on 'objective decisions
about possible courses of action'. [8] The criticism of all these
perspectives from within Habermasian critical theory is that their
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guiding interest is determined by a falsely perceived relationship to
their object, where social mediation remains hidden from view. Carr and
Kemmis have applied Habermas's insight into the presupposition of
knowledge as interest to scientific perspectives in educational
theorizing and not only undermined their claims to value freedom, truth
and objectivity, but also revealed how the interest which motivates
these perspectives is one which perpetuates the structures of human
life which give rise to it in the first place. When the technical
interest dominates theory and research, and when reality is defined
according to this interest as a natural appearance, then 'this kind of
research will always be biased towards prevailing educational
arrangements and its theories will be structured in favour of the
"status quo"'. [9]
Young views the empirical-analytic interest as the cause of what he
sees as the modern educational crises. Positivism, characterized by a
belief in value freedom, cut off from science the realms of ethical and
political commitment. As a result,
positive science leant itself to the further
development of an alienated culture of manipulation.
In the science of education, this led to a view of
pedagogy as manipulation, while curriculum was divided
into value-free subjects and value-based subjects where
values were located decisionistically. The older view of
pedagogy as moral/ethical and practical art was abandoned. [10]
This leads Young to conclude that the crises of education 'is a product
of the one-sided development of our capacity for rational management of
human affairs and rational problem solving'. [11]
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With regard to the hermeneutic or cultural perspectives in education,
Carr and Kemmis make clear how the practical knowledge-constitutive
interest is a development from the technical interest. In Habermas's
own account, in Knowledge and Human Interests, this interest is seen to
include within it the acknowledgement that its mode of enquiry cannot
be merely based on the methods of the natural sciences because its
object is not merely natural, but is social; and moreover is an object
within which its own meanings are formed and agreed upon. This object
exists as the presupposition of the inquiry, not the other way round as
in the technical interest. This is an understanding of the
intersubjective nature of reality, and of the necessarily
intersubjective form of what is now understood as a practical (self)
inquiry. It is not, therefore, an understanding which is deceived by
the modern structure of human life, for it sees that meaning is
collectively produced, and that inquiry is not independent of its
object.
Carr and Kemmis include in this category phenomenological sociology of
education which acknowledges that social reality 'possesses an
intrinsic meaning structure that is constituted and sustained through
the routine interpretive activites of its individual members'; [12]
interpretive sociology which employs Weber's idea of verstehen; and
recent attempts to explore the implications of Gadamer's hermeneutics
for educational research and practice. [13]
In spite of noting the advance which the practical interest represents
over the technical interest, Carr and Kemmis, and Young are highly
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critical of it. Its advance lies in the emphasis it places on the
determined nature of social reality; it is therefore not concerned to
control the social, but rather to understanding the manner in which the
social exerts control over human activity. It is also an advance
because it lays stress on the need to understand the meanings which
actors themselves have in and of any situation, and to uncover the
social forms in which these meanings are produced. Its practical import
consists in the understanding that what is produced by interpretive
research is a self-understanding, and thus produces immanent change.
However, for Carr and Kemmis, as for Habermas, this is not change, but
only reflective contemplation; it is not critique. Understanding the
social context in which meanings and thoughts are produced is not an
explanation of the particular shape of that social context, or of the
historically specific thoughts and meanings which it produces at any
one time. Thus 'the interpretive model neglects questions about the
origins, causes and results of actors adopting certain interpretations
of their actions and social life, and neglects the crucial problems of
social conflict and social change'. [14]
In an inquiry into the social determination of meaning, a criterion by
which to criticize those meanings, which was not itself also
determined, would seem to be an impossibility. In the interpretive
model, a correct understanding is one which is aware of its social
nature, and thus any one understanding or hermeneutical enlightenment
is as legitimate as any other.
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Young also notes the crises of legitimation which results from the
awareness of meaning as a social construction. On the one hand,
education has become the tool by which both the political right and
left seek to portray their own meanings as legitimate and authentic,
and on the other hand, the education system is itself unable to provide
a self-justification of what constitutes educational activity which can
achieve legitimation over and above the crises. Young comments,
the present crises is manifesting itself as a
general social crises in economic, political and
motivational dimensions. It is accompanied by a
sense of loss of meaning. Both the New Right and
the Old Left have turned to cultural and educational
management and manipulation.... The crisis is thus
an educational crises because powerful groups seek to
employ educational means to bring about...a satisfactory
resolution...The school system is in the front line of
loss of motivation and meaning. [15]
Carr and Kemmis, and Young are all critical of the inability of the
interpretive perspective to deal with the transformation of the social
object which they understand to be the horizon within which meaning is
determined. Young points out that it is unable to 'penetrate behind the
facade of the existing culture or system of meaning as a product of
communal or social objectification'. [16] For Carr and Kemmis this
means that the
interpretive approach is always predisposed
towards the idea of reconciling people to their existing
social reality.. .Hence, although interpretive theories
may be able to transform consciousness of social reality,
they...remain indifferent to the need for social theory
to be critical of the status quo. [17]
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Redefining Educational Theory and Practice.
The third of Habermas's knowledge-constitutive interests receives
little direct attention from either Carr and Kemmis or Young because it
is the foundation of a more all-encompassing Habermasian theory, that
of communicative action. [18] It is in the idea of rational mutual
dialogue that critical theory of education is able to unite theory and
practice in active self-critique, where the transformation of subject
and object are one and the same process of enlightenment. It is the
basis also of what Carr and Kemmis refer to as critical educational
science.
In the emancipatory knowledge-constitutive interest Carr and Kemmis
find 'a basic interest in rational autonomy and freedom which issues in
a demand for the intellectual and material conditions in which non-
alienated communication and interaction can occur. [19] Habermasian
critical social science embodies the interest in emancipation. It is
where, as Habermas points out, 'we come upon the fundamental connection
of knowledge and interest'. [20] Habermasian critique is not only a
critique of the determination of social reality, it is a self-critique,
in the sense that it embodies and presupposes that this critique is the
rational enlightenment of that predetermining social object by itself,
with regard to itself. It is therefore a unity of theory and practice
because what is known and what is active (or subject and object) are
one and the same; and this unity itself appears in the movement of
language as the mutual activity of participating individuals who seek
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to obtain collective and therefore valid truth contents through
critical questioning and self-reflective critique. Thus, for Carr and
Kemmis,
Habermas's theory of communicative competence is
an ethical theory of self-realization which transposes
the source of human ideals onto language and discourse.
For the purpose of Habermas's theory is to try and
establish how, inherent in, and established by, everyday
human speech, there is a conception of an ideal form of
life in which the sort of rational autonomy served by the
emancipatory interest can be realized. [21]
It is in this interest, then, that the critical theorists under review
in this chapter attempt to combine critique as social theory with
critique of the social determination of education.
This interest does not repeat the inadequacies of the technical and
practical knowledge-constitutive interests because in communicative
action the mutual or collective basis of knowledge is not only
acknowledged, it is produced in the activity of dialogue which, between
consenting participants, aims at the truth. The interest in
emancipation is directly produced in self-reflective critique because
it both acknowledges its own lack of freedom and produces this
enlightened knowledge freely and as a self-determination. This is not
to suggest that freedom is thereby instantly produced in the world
through rational agreement produced in discourse, but it is to know
that within discourse there exists the conditions of an ideal speech
situation wherein distortions are overcome. It is also to understand
that when actors acknowledge the truth content of a discursively
produced critique of (some feature of) distorted reality, it is their
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new understanding which surpasses their old one, for it overcomes the
separation of knowledge and interest, and therefore constitutes
validity in itself. When theory and practice are united in the
emancipatory activity of rational communicative action, then, for Carr
and Kemmis, a new activity is produced, critical praxis, as are the
beginnings of a critical educational science along the lines of
Habermasian critical social science. Its most important implication is
that the unification of theory and practice in self-reflective critique
is the production of an actvity which is both an understanding of
social relations and a transformation of society at the same time. A
critical social science, founded on communicative action, embodies
a form of practice in which the 'enlightenment' of
actors comes to bear directly in their transformed
social action. This requires an integration of theory
and practice as reflective and practical moments in a
dialectical process of reflection, enlightenment and
political struggle carried out by groups for the purpose
of their own emancipation. [22]
The aim, then, of critical educational science, is to replace technical
and interpretive perspectives in educational research with Habermasian
critical theory, and to develp a praxis-based research process which
has emancipatory import and whose aim is not merely to describe
education but to transform it. Because it accepts the insight into the
importance of the pre-existing social world as determinative, it does
not treat participants in education as objects to be studied, but as
participants in the critical process of overcoming the distortions
produced in and by that determination. Thus it involves 'teachers,
students, parents and school administrators in the tasks of critical
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analysis of their own situations with a view to transforming them in
ways which will improve these situations...'. [23] But critical
educational science is not restricted to the transformation of schools
and educational institutions. Critical theory is implicitly a social
theory, and the self-reflection of participants in education
establishes at the same time 'self-reflective communities' which, claim
Carr and Kemmis, 'foreshadows and engenders a different form of social
organization'. [24] They conclude that 'a critical educational theory
prefigures a more aeneral critical social theory'. [25]
For Young, critical theory of education based on Habermasian social
theory has the same goals. It aims to enlighten those involved in
education by facilitating the production of rational discourse amongst
them such that consensus can be produced between the participants who
genuinely seek truth. He acknowledges that Habermas, in revealing the
link between communication and enlightenment, has surpassed those
critical theorists who merely identified the contradictions of critique
(for example, Adorno), and has provided a vision in the theory of
communicative action which could lead to a higher learning level
altogether. 'We are at the threshold of a learning level characterized
by the personal maturity of the decentred ego and by open, reflexive
communication...'. [26] He also shares the view of Carr and Kemmis that
the implications of a critical theory of education go beyond the
limited field of formal education, to the very core of the organization
of a genuinely democratic society. In Habermas there is the insight
'that it is in the facts of human speech that the possibility of
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freedom and respect for each human beings potential contribution to the
experience of the species rests'. [27]
Carr and Kemmis, and Young are all convinced of the need for a
Habermasian programme of reform in education not only for education
itself, but because realizing this new human potential is an
educational issue. Just as Habermas notes that the emancipatory
interest is evident in 'the critical dissolution of objectivism', [28]
so Young remarks that although 'fragments of a more mature learning
level are all around us', [29] nevertheless
democracy can only move beyond its present half-
developed state if the level of institutionally
permitted learning in society is allowed to be raised,
technical questions distinguished from ethical-
political ones and discursive rather than institutional
or indoctrinatory learning processes allowed to take place. [30]
The activity and identity of education for critical theorists, then, is
not only a matter of the social organization and content of formal
learning, but is the substance of critique and of human emancipation,
and of the development of rational ethical life.
It is on the basis of Habermasian critical theory, that a critical
educational science is based, and from which a programme of reform
emerges in the work of Young, and Carr and Kemmis. Young highlights the
need for a critical reconstruction of teaching, learning, curriculum,
educational research, teacher training, and the organization of
education designed to bring about an 'improvement on the existing state
of affairs'. [31] Carr and Kemmis, following Habermas's own comments in
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Theory and Practice, distinguish three aims of critical science; true
statements produced in rational discourse, the organization of (these)
processes of enlightenment, and following from these the political
conduct appropriate to their truth content. The following section
describes the specific programmes outlined in critical theory of
education by Carr and Kemmis, and Young, which differ in emphasis, but
share the view that it aims at 'the transformation of educational
practice, the educational understandings and educational values of
those involved in the process, and the social and institutional
structures which provide frameworks for their action'. [32] Such a
programme, although aimed specifically at educational research,
schools, teachers, curriculum knowledge and pedagogy, is in general a
programme for emancipation and rational will-formation.
The Educational Reform Programme.
Carr and Kemmis centre their programme around the idea of 'action
research', which they describe as 'a form of self-reflective inquiry
undertaken by participants in social situations in order to improve the
rationality and justice of their own practices, their understandings of
these practices, and the situations in which these practices are
carried out'. [33]
Within the threefold framework of critical educational science referred
to above, Carr and Kemmis examine five particular aspects of action
research in education and argue that, taken as a whole, they satisfy
not only the three aims of a critical science but also embody the
insights upon which Habermasian critical theory is based.
The first criterion of a theory of communicative action is that it
facilitates self-reflective critique amongst individuals in order that
true statements can be arrived at through free and open discourse.
Action research achieves this; first, because objective and empirical
notions of truth are rejected in favour of an understanding of truth as
socially constructed; and second, by treating teachers as subjects in
research rather than objects of research, it is able to undermine
empirical objectivity with the understandings and interpretations of
the individuals concerned. In this way, research becomes praxis for the
subjects whose work it is, and the teacher (for example) is therefore
participant, collaborator and researcher. Third, action research
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enables participants to see through and overcome the ideological
distortions produced by society through which they have up to now
understood themselves, their actions and their institutions. Technical
and empirical distortions of reality are overcome by self-critique in
rational discourse which produces understandings which have a truth
content beyond that which previously was held to be true. Ideology-
critique is just such a questioning and testing of truth content, which
is the first criterion for a genuinely critical programme.
The second feature of the programme is that which Habermas, and
following him Carr and Kemmis, term the 'organization of
enlightenment'. Carr and Kemmis remark that it refers to 'a systematic
learning process aimed at the development of knowledge about the
practices being considered and the conditions under which they take
place'. [34] In action research this criterion is satisfied by its
ability to reveal and expose those aspects of the social order which
prevent rational discourse and the rational transformation of society.
This differs from ideology-critique in the sense that whilst critique
is the emergence of truth, this is the application of that new
understanding to the business of generating critical activity. It is
specifically the organization of the production of enlightenment so
that its own truth with regard to its social determination can emerge
for others.
The self-critical community of action researchers...
creates conditions under which its own practice will
come into conflict with irrational, unjust and unfulfilling
educational and social practices in the institutional
context in which the action research is carried out.
The organization of enlightenment in action research
thus gives rise to conditions under which the organization
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of action can take place as an attempt to replace one
distorted set of practices with another, undistorted
set of practices. Such action is always political
action... [35]
The final feature of critical educational science is that it is able to
offer guidance on decisions requiring action. This is achieved in
action research because it is already the unity of theory and practice
as critical and emancipatory interest. Its own activity is already the
achievement of that unity, and in that activity truth is therefore
practice. Carr and Kemmis remark that
the collaborative nature of action research thus
offers a first step to overcoming aspects of the
existing social order which frustrate rational change:
it organizes practitioners into collaborative groups
for the purposes of their own enlightenment, and in
doing so, it creates a model for a rational and
democratic social order. The practice of collaborative
educational action research envisages a social order
characterized by rational communication, just and
democratic decision making, and fulfilling work. [36]
Young does not follow Carr and Kemmis's model, and indeed is cautious
about adopting an action research paradigm as an exemplar of critical
theory. He notes that Habermas himself expressed suspicion because some
calls for an action research programme originated from behavioural
scientists. Young himself points out that action research is more
suited to research at the 'microscopic or face-to-face level' [37] and
notes that the model of Carr and Kemmis, by not giving sufficient
attention as to how action research might be applicable at a large
scale level, for example in the enlightenment of organizations, 'has
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contributed to the impression of an unnecessarily narrow model of
method'. [38]
However, Young also offers a programme for a critical theory of
education, and by again using Habermas's model of a critical social
science (which Young himself does not explicitly do), it is possible to
clearly identify the proposals which Young puts forward as firmly
within the Habermasian critical project. He states that the purpose of
the book is to present a 'programmatic outline of a possible, and
hopefully coherent, Habermasian critical theory of education'; [39] its
coherence is revealed when viewed as Habermasian critical social
science.
Young places Habermas at the end of a process of development of
critical theory of education in Germany. He notes how an originally
marxist project was replaced by a hermeneutic insight in educational
research, leading to a criticism of positivist epistemology in research
of both the left and the right. Against those who argued at this point
that critical theory of education could proceed only negatively, Young
states that 'a positive moment was needed', [40] and was provided by
the positive theory of communicative action developed by Habermas.
Young notes, 'the lack of a clear normative basis for educational
construction was finally overcome when Habermas's later work on
language and validity, including normative validity, pointed the way to
procedural resolution of the normative problem', [41] although he
comments that the full implications of Habermas's work on language have
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not yet been fully worked through in critical theory of education. His
book represents a contribution to that task.
The first characteristic of a Habermasian critical social science is
its capacity to criticize truth claims by the formation of its own
critical theorems. Young's work includes this aspect in several ways.
First, he argues that critical theory of education must criticize the
appearance of truth in the lifeworld whose assumptions, values and
rules are normally taken for granted and unquestioned. The truth of the
lifeworld is changed through and by a critique which penetrates aspects
(although not the totality) of it which are already in consciousness as
problems or contradictions. This, he suggests, avoids the idealist
approach which would merely replace one lifeworld with another;
critique should make 'an effective job of reconstructing the already
problematic parts of (their) lifeworld through communicative, problem-
solving learning'. [42]
Second, he is critical of traditional theories of knowledge which
present truth as 'a matter of fact' [43] and reduce ethical knowledge
to 'a non-cognitive activity by which knowers may relate to their
knowledge from the outside of it'. [44] These theories of knowledge
then impregnate the curriculum. Thus, it becomes the task of critical
theory of education to reveal this knowledge to be a social and
historical product, to bring the hermeneutic and critical insight to
bear. His critique of traditional knowledge in education is therefore
aimed at the tendency
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towards an ahistorical, value-free view of knowledge
as a finished product, towards a mistaking of the
contemporary surface of things for their full range
of possible states and towards a view that critique
is not a matter of method, but of personal and non-
rational decision... All of these tendencies are
reflected in the selection of what is taught and in
the attitude of teachers towards this content. [45]
Third, he criticizes the interest upon which traditional pedagogy is
based and argues that unless pedagogy is critical, it simply functions
as a justification of the technical interest. He gives the example of
the typical question/answer routine between teacher and student where
the child's frame of reference (knowledge) is recontextualized from lay
vocabulary to technical vocabulary, and from personal vocabulary to
textbook vocabulary. [46]
Added to this is the problem that such distorted communication is often
mirrored in the teachers own technical assumptions about knowledge,
which tends towards a greater or lesser degree of objectivism 'with
little awareness of questions of reflectivity and problems of the
social independence or dependence of knowledge formation'. (471
In these ways Young's programme for the critical theory of education
fulfills the first criterion of a Habermasian critical social science;
it has as its core the critique of knowledge in different aspects of
the educational process such that their truth content is revealed in
its dependent relationship upon its social and historical context. The
modern context is such that the social dimension of knowledge and truth
is masked in the process of its production; 'knowledge is a standard
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commodity which you come to possess' [48] and which therefore hides the
social conditions which determine it.
The second aspect of Habermasian critical social science is the
organization of enlightenment, and this too, plays a large part in
Young's programme. It has two dimensions, based around what he calls
the 'ideal pedagogical speech situation', which is the basis upon which
enlightenment can be organized in the full knowledge that what is being
organized is enlightenment. The first area is pedagogical and concerns
the relationship between teacher and student. He states that 'in
communicative action, the claim made in a speech act may be called
acceptable if it fulfills the conditions which permit the hearer to
take a "yes" position on the claim raised'. [49] This intersubjective
truth content is the basis of Young's ideal pedagogical speech
situation 'in which the student is able rationally to assess views or,
at least, come to hold them in "a manner open to rational assessment"'.
[50] In this communicative pedagogical relationship, enlightenment is
produced between teacher and student, not by the teacher of the
student, since the truth of the relationship is mutual. [51] Thus,
education is organized as enlightenment and not as indoctrination,
although Young acknowledges the problem of applying an ideal
pedagogical speech situation to a world which is marked by differences
in knowledge, power and status between communicative participants.
There are two important implications of this ideal critical pedagogy.
It overcomes the dilemma in radical educational theory of teacher
control or domination because, 'in a discourse model of pedagogy, the
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teacher and the pupils produce and reproduce the rules in discourse,
within a framework of constraints'. [52] It also has implications for
the curriculum. Young has already argued that critique should be
applied to existing contradictions, and many of the aporias discussed
above 'are closely related to topical issues and public debates and
controversies'. [53] Indeed, he suggests that enlightenment could be
organized by reflection upon the pedagogical speech situation which
exists in the classroom for teacher and student. 'By speaking about the
speech rules of participants and about how breaches of protocol are
recognized, felt and dealt with, it is possible to recognize and change
these patterns.. .by the introduction of specific structures designed to
implement "new rules"'. [54]
The second dimension to Young's programme for the organization of
enlightenment relates to institutions, which for critical theory of
education are to be judged according to the kind of pedagogy and
learning which they promote. For the most part organizations, even
those concerned with the education of the mass of the population, are
mostly dominated by technical interests, favouring bureaucratic and
market solutions to the task of widening public discourse. Young is
concerned that critical theory should not seek rapid and wholesale
reform of institutions overnight, and his programme here is therefore
less specific than when dealing with classroom pedagogy. He argues that
administration needs to be decentralized so that ethical work can be
freed from bureaucratic and technical interests, which themselves
appear value-free and neutral. [55]
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He is also critical of the perspectives of educational researchers
whose own technical egocentric interests outweigh the public need for
greater openess. The greatest failure, he says,
is the failure of professional discourse in the
community of educational researchers. For this to
be remedied, there must be a critical re-theorizing
of the role of the educational academic and of the
contribution of educational intellectuals, wherever
situated, to reflection in schools and the public
domain. [58]
This leads directly to the third aspect of Habermasian critical social
science, that of the organization of action, and here Young's comments
are aimed mostly at educational researchers. Critique makes clear what
needs to be done, for critical reflection is already activity in which
appearances of truth and knowledge have been overcome in the
acknowledgement of their underlying interests. Critical research is
therefore emancipatory research or is mutual activity, 'an activity in
which the human species looks at itself'. [57] Thus, there is a need to
reconstruct educational research along critical and communicative
lines, which must therefore involve both teacher and researcher. For
Young, a growth in communicative participation, in research or
elsewhere, is a growth in democracy and is likely to lead to the
production of valid judgements. Action research can be important here;
not only does it increase the participation of teacher, student and
administrator in the production of their own (self) knowledge, but this
new knowledge 'can be systematically incorporated in the process of
change'. [58] However, Young also expresses caution about action
research. He notes that the very term is part of a positivist lexicon
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of research terminology. This echoes Habermas's own concerns; 'the
fashionable demand for a type of "action research" that is to combine
political enlightenment with research, overlooks that the uncontrolled
modification of the field is incompatible with the simultaneous
gathering of data in that field'. [59]
The organization of action is not restricted to researchers. At several
points, Young makes clear his view that critical theory is implicitly
political precisely because its own validity rests on will-formation.
He sums up the relationship between personal, social and political
action embodied in critical theorizing as follows:-
the process of a critique which realizes itself
immanently as changed social practice is one which
involves an interaction among intellectual critique
(which is the fruit of reflection), educational
processes where reflection is shared and criticized,
organizational structures of movements for greater
public and democratic participation in discussion
and decision-making and processes of personal and
inter-personal reflection and critique aimed at
personal development. [60]
Becoming Critical of Habermas.
The development of the relationship between critical theory and
education has, as its ideal, the unity of critical self-reflective
activity and the establishing of an ethical community through the
enlightenment of humankind with regard to its true and genuine
expression. Modernity, however, is characterized by differentiation and
division. The unification of individuals in an ethical community is the
task which critical theory seeks in post-enlightenment society and, for
Habermas, this is undertaken as a reflective, and a self-educative
activity. The unity of theory and practice in the emancipatory
interest, and later in the theory of communicative action, represents
an enlightenment about, and the overcoming of the abstract separation
of subjectivity from activity in civil society. Through critique, a
genuine knowledge of (the social) self is arrived at by a process of
enlightenment about the social conditions which obscure and even
prevent such knowledge, and makes further enlightenment possible, now,
for others.
However, these ideas of enlightenment, of overcoming, of critique, and
of the unity produced, are not themselves subjected to critique by
those who employ them in education as education; and yet they are the
ideas upon which the claims of Habermasian social theory rest. Indeed,
it is the very idea of education itself which critical theorists of
education seem least interested in, preferring simply to accept the
idea of critique as enlightenment, and proceeding from there to produce
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programmes employing this uncriticized educational idea. When one might
expect a critical theory of education to subject the idea of education
to an immanent form of critique, in order to undermine any claims to
identity or unmediated independence, one finds that education as
critique is the one idea which precisely is not subject to such an
inquiry. It is just such an investigation which is the substance of
this thesis.
Following from this observation, there are problems of internal
coherence which a critical theory of education has to face if it adopts
Habermasian critique as its idea of education and its critical tool
for, or method of, emancipation. Of overriding concern is the absence
of an immanent critique of critique itself, something which can only be
carried out by returning to the philosophical roots of the debates in
critical theory which Habermas was addressing.
The acceptvnce of critique as enlightenment immunizes this idea of
education from itself. It is Habermas's claim that all objects are
mediated by a social totality which then hides its influence, giving
the result of that activity the appearance of independence. To what
extent, then, is the idea of critique itself also an object whose
appearance or identity as education, as enlightenment, is the result of
its determination in and by bourgeois society?
Also, Habermas's claim that emancipatory critique represents an
'overcoming' of bourgeois distortion is a presupposition that the unity
of theory and practice represents the genuine expression of
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These issues cannot be dealt with in the literature of critical theory
of education alone, for they are philosophical issues regarding the
identity and non-identity of the experience of critique as aporia. They
are issues which refer to the experience which is the dialectic of
enlightenment. Critical theory of education is as yet only the
application of critical theory in education, it is not self-reflective
critique of the idea of education which lies behind critical theory.
What is required is the raising of its own philosophical consciousness
in immanent self-reflection. Moreover, the problems raised by issues of
presupposition, overcoming, critique, result, and emancipation have
their roots in the philosophical tradition of critical theory, and to
adopt merely a Habermasian perspective is, at the very least, to fail
to recognize the determinative process by which these issues and
problems have developed.
What the three sets of problems mentioned above all point to, is that
the notion of critique as enlightenment, and as emancipatory education
and development, generates antinomies which an uncritical reception and
application only repeat but do not solve. How, for example, can one
learn what enlightenment is without having presupposed it beforehand in
the very idea of knowing how to learn about it; that is, how does one
become enlightened about enlightenment without assuming the solution to
the problem before beginning it? Habermas has a dialectical theory of
the production of objects, and of consciousness. This is clear in his
critique of the instrumental interest. But he does not have a
dialectical theory of critique itself, and cannot therefore 'overcome'
the aporia which is repeated in the presupposition that Habermas is
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already enlightened about critique as (the identity of) enlightenment.
The expression of this aporia of (the dialectic of) enlightenment, an
aporia which Habermas, and Habermasian critical theorists of education,
can only repeat, is to be found elsewhere in the critical philosophical
tradition; such a redirection to that work, and then beyond it, to a
recognition of the contradiction of education in critical theory as
misrecognition, and as the education which is philosophy, is the
substance of what follows.
CHAPTER II - HABERMAS AND CRITIQUE.
From Production to Reflection.
Habermas's discussion of Marx in chapters two and three of Knowledge
and Human Interests establishes the basis for the whole of his social
theory written after it, including the theory of communicative action.
It is significant not least because of the interaction he produces
between himself, Marx and Hegel. [1] In short, he employs Marx's
materialist version of synthesis as a basis for his critique of Hegel's
philosophy of the identity of absolute spirit, and then uses (his own
version of) Hegel's phenomenological method to present a critique of
Marx's reduction of all human activity to social labour. [2] His own
social theory then establishes reflective critique as communicative
action, and represents an attempt to produce a critical phenomenology
which achieves the unification of theory and practice.
Habermas points out that the insight which Marxist materialism gains
over Hegelian idealism is that it exposes the presupposition that
spirit is the absolute knowing and ground of nature. For Marx, the
opposite is the case, that is, it is nature which is the ground of all
human activity. But, as Habermas comments, 'this is no coarse
materialism' [3] on Marx's part, for the nature which appears to
consciousness as objects of experience are understood as produced by
human activity and therefore historically and culturally shaped
according to the level of productive capacity which has been achieved.
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What idealism took as merely an object which could be known,
materialism understands to be already the result of social labour. [4]
Habermas takes this to be an advance on Hegel, who was unable to
disclose 'the mechanism of progress in the experience of reflection'.
[5] His philosophy of identity prevented him from further historical
materialist critique. Marx, states Habermas, 'does not view nature
under the category of another subject, but conversely the subject under
the category of another nature'. [6] This prevents him from assuming
his own materialist critique to be the absolute unity of subject and
nature as opposed to another appearance of the natural subject in
specific historical conditions. Marx avoids the trap of absolutism
because he understands social labour not only to be the means of
sustaining life but also of reproducing life such that it can be known.
Labour determines the shape of the object, but the object upon which
labour is performed is already the embodiment of objectified forms of
previous human labour. Thus the object facing man is that which man
already is, and represents what man knows himself in the world to be.
[7] Epistemology must therefore presuppose specific forms of social
labour as its origin and production. The materialist unity of nature
and human activity is achieved in production itself, and not in a
consciousness which is the result of production and appears only in a
particular historical formation. This unity is therefore synthesis in
the Kantian sense of an a priori set of conditions which are the
possibility of being known.
- 42 -
Habermas points out that Marx never regarded the materialist concept of
synthesis 'as the foundation for the constitution of invariant meaning
structures...'. [8] It was for Marx an understanding of the mechanism
of historical development, and is itself 'an accomplishment relativized
with regard to the sphere of world history'. [9] The synthesis could
never regard itself as absolute ego or spirit, as in Hegel, because its
activity is not that of consciousness but of social labour; and
consciousness itself is only the result of that labour. [10] Thus it
can produce no logics or structures of consciousness, as Hegel had
done, but has only labour itself in which to conduct a self-reflective
examination. In historicizing and undermining the identity of
consciousness, historical materialism prevents the Hegelian
misrecognition of a particular form of consciousness as absolute. What
is revealed in materialist reflection is not an absolute subject, but
the 'fundamental structures of social labour'. [11] Unlike Hegel
therefore, its point of departure, says Habermas, is the economy, 'the
social life processes, the material production and appropriation of
products', [12] for it is here and not in spirit that synthesis is
already to be found. Synthesis is 'both the empirical and
transcendental accomplishment of a species-subject that produces itself
in history'. [13]
In championing Marx against Hegel and revealing the advance over Hegel
which materialist non-absolutism holds, Habermas at the same time
exposes Marx to a different criticism, but one which results in a
similar aporia of presupposition that was found in Hegel. Indeed, it is
the particular strength of Marx, that is, that consciousness is
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understood as a result of human activity (history), which proves at the
same time to be his weakness against the Habermasian version of
phenomenological reflection. The latter points out that in reducing all
consciousness to the result of production, the action of production
becomes unknowable to itself, and thus cannot be known as species
activity. What is available to consciousness as an object to be
understood is the what of production, but not the who which is the
self-producer.
The dialectical content of such propositions as 'men make their own
history but they do not make it just as they please', [14] and
'circumstances make men just as much as men make circumstances', [15]
represents more than production; they are epistemological propositions.
Moreover, the insight into the dependency of epistemology upon history
has to be understood in a way which makes the insight itself self-
validating. If critique, in the form of historical materialism, is only
realized as new productive capacities, then the dialectical
relationship between man and circumstances can itself never be known.
If all knowledge is reduced to production then species activity is
never self-activity.
Habermas's point is that although the Hegelian critique of epistemology
is present in Marx, and is improved upon, nevertheless it is not
sufficiently critical of itself as result to understand its self-
constitution as that critique. This leads Marx to interpret all
activity as production, including the activity which itself is critical
or aware of that production. For Habermas this self-consciousness of
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the historicity of the species-subject is a different type of labour,
one aimed not at control of nature, but at emancipation from an object
formed by that interest alone.
Habermas notes that Marx does not repeat Hegel's presupposition of the
identity of consciousness by absolutizing it outside of the material
conditions which are its genesis. However, in order to establish this
insight, Marx himself has to assume 'something like a nature in itself'
[16] as existing before humanity begins to work on it. This is similar
to Kant's thing-in-itself, in the sense that nature before labour can
never be produced and therefore never known. 'While epistemologically
we must presuppose nature as existing in itself, we ourselves have
access to nature only within the historical dimension disclosed by
labour processes'. [17] Man's relationship to nature in the materialist
concept of synthesis is therefore one of difference, a difference which
is maintained rather than overcome in this concept of synthesis.
Habermas remarks that
the unity of the social subject and nature that comes
into being 'in industry' cannot eradicate the autonomy
of nature and the remainder of complete otherness that
is lodged in its facticity. As the correlate of social
labour, objectified nature retains both independence
and externality in relation to the subject that
controls it. [18]
Any unity brought about by synthesis 'remains in some measure imposed
on nature by the subject', [19] a domination which precisely
characterizes the unreflective positivist view of enlightenment, and is
manifest as the technical knowledge-constitutive interest.
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The problem for Marx is therefore that of a dialectic which has no way
of understanding itself because, having undermined the subject, it is
left with only production itself, and therefore with a 'unity' which
can never be self-unification, because production is always of an
other. A species-subject aware of its production in and by history has
not in that awareness produced itself as synthesis, for its own
historical identity appears again as an object for it.
Each generation gains its identity only via a nature
that has already been formed in history, and this nature
is in turn the object of its labour. The
system of social labour is always the result
of the labour of past generations. [20]
The insight into the dialectic of historical materialism, which Marx
employed against Hegel, thus returns to undermine the identity of its
own critique as synthesis or self-activity. Critique of civil society
is already critique from within civil society, and it cannot claim an
identity which is immune from its own determination. It thus raises the
logically contradictory need for the work of critique to be known
before the activity in which such knowledge is produced, an aporia
which Habermas believes Marx to have failed to overcome. [21]
Habermas's own response to this failure is to return to a form of
Hegelian phenomenology decapitated of its notion of the absolute,
wherein he can locate a form of critique which, on the one hand, avoids
reification of an (unhistoricized) subjective consciousness, and on the
other, overcomes the aporia of self-reflective enlightenment. Habermas
sees the reason for the aporia to lie in Marx's 'reduction of the self-
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generative act of the human species to labour', [22] a Kantian
standpoint where nature, unknowable in itself, appears for us only as
the result of mediation. Such a '"nature in itself"', argues Habermas,
'is therefore an abstraction...(since) we always encounter nature
within the horizon of the world-historical self-formative process of
mankind'. [23] Nature is presupposed beyond that which it appears to
be, and as such it is always thought of as an object encountered by the
subject to be transformed. The aporia of experience, solved by Kant in
the positing of pure reason as the transcendental identity of
experience a posteriori, is solved by Marx in positing historical and
dialectical materialism as beyond all historical and dialectical
mediation. But the reflective critique of historical materialism
undermines its own claims as synthesis, and is here, again, experienced
as the result of historical activity. It is an insight which Habermas
acknowledges in Marx as an advance over Hegel, but one which is
interpreted by Marx in the 'restricted conception of the species' self-
reflection through work alone'. [24]
Transformation understood solely in terms of labour cannot provide
self-comprehension because labour is used as a materialistic
explanation of reflection, and reflection is consequently comprehended
as object, and according to the technical knowledge-constitutive
interest, and not as self-reflective critique.
Habermas notes that Marx tries to accomplish two contradictory tasks in
the concept of materialist synthesis. On the one hand, 'what is Kantian
about Marx's conception of knowledge is the invariant relation of the
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species to its natural environment, [25] whilst on the other hand,
'Marx assumes empirically mediated rules of synthesis that are
objectified as productive forces and historically transform the
subjects relation to their natural environment'. [26] Thus man's
relationship to the object both does and does not change. Man's
labouring activity upon nature is purely instrumental action, and
synthesis in this sense is the application of procedures in the
interest of technical control over nature. But Marx also wants to claim
that this new technical knowledge becomes a new and re-formed
historical consciousness, such that 'both nature, which has been
reshaped and civilized in labour processes, and the labouring subjects
themselves alter in relation to the development of the productive
forces'. [27] Habermas points out here that there are more elements in
this concept of synthesis through labour than Marx admits to, for he
has fused into one activity both productive activity and critical-
revolutionary activity. The result is that the latter adopts the
historical form and shape of the former.
Marx has confused technical activity with social practice, and has
produced a scientistic understanding of human development and activity
which requires a self-critique similar to that which Marx has performed
on Hegel. Habermas notes the approval which Marx registered when
Capital was reviewed and evaluated as a methodology, and that he tended
to see his own work as akin to the natural sciences. This, says
Habermas, is
astonishing. For the natural sciences are subject
to the transcendental conditions of the system of
social labour, whose structural change is supposed
- 48 -
to be what the critique of political economy, as the
science of man, reflects on. Science in the rigorous
sense lacks precisely this element of reflection that
characterizes a critique investigating the natural-
historical process of the self-generation of the social
subject and also making the subject conscious of this
process. [28]
Habermas is therefore critical of a materialist idea of synthesis which
does not subject its own understanding of the object to critical
reflection. Because of its repetition of the production of object as
other, 'the philosophical foundation of this materialism proves itself
insufficient to establish an unconditional phenomenological self-
reflection of knowledge'. [29] Material synthesis is merely
instrumental action, it is not intersubjective practice, which is the
very dimension in which 'that phenomenological experience moves'. [30]
Habermas concludes that Marx has conflated labour and reflection into
labour only.
The Second Dimension - Reflection as Formation.
Marx, having identified that 'it is the development of the forces of
production that provides the impetus to abolishing and surpassing a
form of life that has been rigidified in positivity and become an
abstraction', [31] then obscured the possibility of such transformation
by reducing the moment of self-transparency to a process of labour. It
is Habermas's argument that the conditions for human formation and
enlightened progress, are satisfied not in a process of labour which
develops technological capacities, but in a process of reflection which
develops mutual awareness of the distortions inherent in that technical
process. By understanding itself 'in analogy to the natural sciences as
productive knowledge (I)t (historical materialism) thus conceals the
dimension of self-reflection in which it must move regardless'. [32] At
this stage Habermas is not concerned to reveal the mechanism by which
reflection overcomes mere technical labour, only the awareness that a
different type of activity results from the materialist insight into
social and historical dependency than mere productive activity.
This new activity, which is the substance of reflection and therefore
of transformation is, however, what becomes more familiar as
communicative action. [33] But such an understanding remains in Marx as
no more than an 'indecision' [34] where on the one hand, transformative
activity is instrumental production, and on the other where it is the
social practice of the 'real living men... who possess things and fight
battles' [35] which Marx spoke of in The Holy Family.
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Habermas concludes that 'unlike synthesis through social labour, the
dialectic of class antagonism is a movement of reflection'. [36]
Habermas sees the indecision in Marx, noted above, as resulting from
his working with an idea of a dialectic between forces and relations of
production which, although interdependent, 'do not converge'. [37]
Emancipation from nature and emancipation from social domination are
seen by Marx as one category of social practice. For Habermas it is
instrumental action which is directed at the first, but a different
sort of activity which aims at the second, an activity which in
reflecting on domination arrives at an ever clearer understanding both
of the distorting effects on reality of that domination, and therefore,
at the same time, of the nature of freedom and mutuality which it
prevents. This activity is 'a process of reflection writ large', [38]
and it is what Habermas calls 'communicative action'. [39] He writes
the course of the social self-formative process...is
marked...by stages of reflection through which the
dogmatic character of surpassed forms of domination and
ideologies are dispelled, the pressure of the institutional
framework is sublimated, and communicative action is
set free as communicative action. The goal of
this development is thereby anticipated: the organization
of a society linked to decision making processes on the
basis of discussion free from domination. [40]
Habermas here, has established reflective knowledge as a second
dimension of the 'self-constitution of the human species', [41] adding
to that of productive knowledge. He notes that whilst the two are
interdependent, still their interests do not converge.
Marx tried in vain to capture this in the dialectic
of forces of production and relations of production.
In vain - for the meaning of this 'dialectic' must
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remain unclarified as long as the materialist concept
of the synthesis of man and nature is restricted to
the categorical framework. [42]
This marks the beginning of Habermas's own social theory, and he now
combines Marx and Hegel to produce the self-formative activity of
reflective critique. It is materialist because, in the self-reflection
of class consciousness its manifestations are now 'seen as prompted by
developments of the system of social labour', [43] and it is
phenomenological because the critical subject knows itself 'to be
involved in the self-formative process that it recollects'. [44] By
exorcising the absolute from Hegelian phenomenological reflection
through an understanding of consciousness as historically contingent,
Habermas is now able to establish reflection as the dimension of
transformation, and to claim its self-identity as synthesis not through
technical labour, but as intersubjective communicative relations.
If the idea of the self-constitution of the human
species in natural history is to combine both self-
generation through productive activity and self-formation
through critical-revolutionary activity, then the concept
of synthesis must also incorporate a second dimension. [45]
This, for Habermas, is self-reflective activity, and is now manifest in
the emancipatory knowledge-constitutive interest as 'the critique of
ideology'. [46]
The Reconstruction of the Unconditioned.
The critique of ideology, understood as a transformative, reflective
activity, is an activity which does not sit within the materialist
model of production. [47] In Marx, the reduction of reflection upon
presupposition to a technical model of production does not allow the
insight thus gained to achieve an understanding of itself as the
interest in which the lack of mutual social relations is rationally
criticized, known, and overcome.
Reflexive social theory, where critique is transformative species
activity, is embodied in the third of the knowledge-constitutive
interests, the emancipatory interest, which has yet to be discussed. As
will become clear, it is the interest in which a unity of theory and
practice is claimed, and upon which the theory of communicative action
is based.
In understanding technical and practical knowledge-constitutive
interests, consciousness has achieved or realized a third interest. In
knowing, first, to criticize the abstract universality of subject and
substance in civil society, it follows, second, that consciousness
knows the distortion is of itself, that the appearance of the subject
is directly affected by its non-identity with the object. Third, in
pursuing this immediately practical interest, the reflexive subject has
become aware of itself as performing this critical activity, that is,
has become self-conscious of itself and its activity as interested. In
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this interest, by criticizing the idea which the subject had of itself
at the outset, that is, the subject in civil society, it now comes to
know itself differently, not as independent, but as dependent and
determined. This is no longer to have an independent identity, but
rather to realize dependence through self-interested work or
reflection.
Habermas discusses this process or development in terms of interest as
reason. Technical interest arises from the immediate desire for
control; practical interest is already a rational enquiry by a social
subject into the social conditions which pre-determine its existence.
It is reflective activity. The emancipatory knowledge-constitutive
interest is the dimension of social self-enlightenment, in which the
object of inquiry and the investigator learn that the one is also the
other. [48]
The separation of subject and object in critique is known by the
subject who realizes that critique is the unification of subject and
object because it is the self-expression of reason in its attempt to
produce itself as autonomous. [49] Its critique of the social is the
production of the social as the mutual interest in emancipation; it is
the unity of subject and object because reason, in seeking to produce
itself, also performs itself. Knowledge of the separation of activity
and result overcomes the separation because the (technical) interest
behind that separation is overcome in and by its self-expression as the
emancipatory interest. It is at one with itself when it is united
against the interest which denies it that unity. Thus, this third form
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of consciousness is social or mutual self-consciousness, an
intersubjectivity aware of itself as the self-identity of that which
seeks liberation from its abstract appearance. To know this is to have
seen through the technical interest, to have understood the individual
as social and historical production, and to have produced this
enlightenment through its own self-activity. To produce itself in this
way is to be the transformed result of reflexive self-activity, a unity
achieved in the (mutual) interest for emancipation. Habermas comments
the experience of reflection articulates itself
substantially in the concept of a self-formative
process. Methodically it leads to a standpoint from
which the identity of reason with the will to reason
freely arises. In self-reflection, knowledge for the
sake of knowledge comes to coincide with the interest
in autonomy and responsibility. For the pursuit of
reflection knows itself as a movement of emancipation.
Reason is at the same time subject to the interest in
reason. We can say that it obeys an emancipatory cognitive
interest, which aims at the pursuit of reflection. [50]
It is only when the emancipatory knowledge-constitutive interest is
understood by itself as its own result that the other two interests can
themselves be grasped as incomplete forms of reasoning. 'We can
methodologically ascertain the knowledge-constitutive interests of the
natural and cultural sciences only once we have entered the dimension
of self-reflection. It is in accomplishing self-reflection that reason
grasps itself as interested', [51] an interest which is its own self-
identity as work and result.
The import of reflection as critique now emerges. It is in the
awareness of an abstract relationship between subject and object, that
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a rational form of knowing develops which, in grasping this, its own
determination, achieves a self-expression in which what is known is at
one with the activity of its being known. In critique, as the activity
and result of self-reflection, 'knowledge and interest are one'; [52]
an activity which has, therefore, produced 'a new stage of self-
reflection in the self-formative process of the species'. [53]
Critique, then, is the activity which has the unity of reason and
interest as result, and is thus enlightenment as the overcoming of
their abstract separation. The result of reflection, because it is
rational self-result, can then be reconstructed into a theory of its
own becoming, and of the necessary preconditions for that becoming.
Thus Habermas distinguishes between reflection and reconstruction. On
the one hand 'self-reflection brings to consciousness those
determinants of a self-formative process of cultivation and spiritual
formation (Bildunq) which ideologically determine a contemporary praxis
of action and the conception of the world'. [54] On the other hand,
what is reasoned justification within the contexts
of acts of reflection on oneself bases itself on
theoretical knowledge which has been gained independently
of the reflection on oneself, namely, the rational
reconstruction of rule systems which we have to master
if we wish to process experience cognitively or participate
in systems of action or carry on discourse. [55]
The relationship between reflection and theory reconstruction explains
why Habermas is able to claim that 'critique understands that its
claims to validity can be verified only...in the practical discourse of
those concerned'; [56] a claim that is itself based on the idea that in
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the emancipatory interest, reason is unconditioned because it is a
self-result, and our self-enlightenment. It is only by comprehending
how the emancipatory interest is a result and a unity for Habermas,
that its transition into the theory of communicative action can be seen
as immanent rather than abstract reconstruction.
The result achieved in the emancipatory interest is the enlightenment
which enables Habermas to believe he has overcome the illusory
negativity of dialectics by becoming aware of its intersubjective
precondition. In an important section of Theory and Practice, Habermas
acknowledges that a social theory based on dialectical logic does not
suffice as a basis for a theory which aims at political praxis and
emancipation from the domination of bourgeois institutions. At best,
dialectic can refer to the process of bringing to the surface previous
distortions of communication, but it cannot understand its own
activity, and is unable thereby to effect self-transformation. The
dialectic, as Habermas has already pointed out with regard to Marx, can
explicate the mechanism of emancipation, but not become it in the sense
of species-activity. The dialectic cannot survive its own insight into
itself because it has no ground upon which it can be itself in self-
reflection, or is never comprehended as a self-result, or as
unconditioned. This, as will be seen, necessitates a 'paradigm shift'
from consciousness to language.
But the advance of self-understanding which the dialectic can produce,
leads to and develops a self-understanding of itself in reflection.
[57] In other words, it comes to understand that it is itself dependent
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upon, and only possible as, the consensus of linguistic rules which
must presuppose all learning activity. Thus, the appearance of the
dialectic as mere instrumental action is overcome in the awareness of
its underlying mutuality. The search for agreement in discourse is the
emancipatory activity of reason seeking its genuine self-expression.
Habermas notes that 'in every speech act the telos of reaching an
understanding is already inherent'. [58] Behind the activity of
reaching an understanding there lies the conditions of the possibility
of that activity; 'functioning language games, in which speech acts are
exchanged, are based on an underlying consensus', [59] and this
consensus is realized as the self-generated species activity when, in
reflection, dependency becomes real as and in the search for agreement.
Thus, communicative action presupposes (consensus on) the possibility
of discursive validation of truth claims. In a phrase which is pivotal
to understanding the whole of Habermasian social theory, he remarks
that 'discourse is the condition of the unconditioned', [60] and since
for Habermas the conditioned (or the dependent) is the true expression
of the species, then the activity in which the species produces itself
as dependent upon itself, is the activity wherein the grounds for truth
emerge. Truth can only appear as itself, as the unconditioned, in an
activity which produces its own dependence, or is its own interest;
this is precisely what occurs in self-reflective discourse which aims
at ideology-critique and emancipation from systematically distorted
communication.
The unity of reconstruction and reflection is dependent upon the
phenomenological achievement whereby consciousness becomes enlightened
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that its own misunderstandings are themselves dependent upon, and the
result of, distortions of the same communicative relations which
underpin the possibility of all discourse. Emancipation, in the
emancipatory knowledge-constitutive interest, is not freedom from
intersubjective communicative relations, rather it is emancipation from
the distortions of those relations which produce the illusion that
consciousness is independent of them altogether, including the illusion
that enlightenment is only dialectical and never result.
The insight which self-reflection produces in its education concerns
itself; it renders explicit the intersubjective preconditions of
subjectivity by employing the rules of discourse which are that
precondition. Self-consciousness thus does not presuppose them, rather
it comes to know them as the presupposition of subjectivity itself, and
moreover in this knowledge it overcomes its abstract independence from
them.
By moving transformative activity from production and nature to
reflection and social enlightenment, Habermas has found a notion of
overcoming which does not repeat the object as other, as in
materialism, but which in and by its own activity, sees through the
illusion of separation and abstraction. This enlightenment is the
result of rational self-inquiry, and can therefore be reconstructed
into a theory which is not abstract, but is a self-comprehension.
Thus it is in the emancipatory interest that the abstract subject
perfoms mutual communicative activity which, as an activity dependent
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upon pre-existing social rules of communication, is also the
realization in self-consciousness of its unconditioned necessity as
intersubjectivity. 'The act of self-reflection that "changes a life" is
a movement of emancipation' [61] based on the phenomenological notion
of self-consciousness or self-transparency as the overcoming of
abstract appearances. Just how self-critical this idea of overcoming
is, and how abstract the theoretical reconstruction of reflection is,
are questions which will force their own return in chapter III. It will
become clear there, that what Habermas is really reconstructing in his
Theory of Communicative Action is his own presupposition of the
identity of enlightenment as overcoming, and not the unconditioned as
self-result.
Overcoming as Therapy.
Before becoming the theory of communicative action, the idea of
overcoming is further expanded upon in Knowledge and Human Interests
and elsewhere, by a comparison with Freudian psychoanalysis. [62] Like
Marx, Freud incorporated into his work 'an interest in emancipation
going beyond the technical and practical interest of knowledge'. [63]
Through psychoanalytic therapy as self-critique and self-reflection 'in
the end insight can coincide with emancipation from unrecognized
dependencies' [64] in just the same ways as Habermas has argued that
ideology-critique is the work of the realization of, and therefore
emancipation from, previously unrecognized determinations. [65]
In psychoanalysis, overcoming is achieved in the therapeutic
'discourse' between analyst and patient, and in the process reveals all
the characteristics which have already been examined in relation to
emancipatory critique. First, just as the emancipatory knowledge-
constitutive interest is dependent upon distortions of communication in
order to produce itself, so the patient can only partake in the
'discourse' provided it is not on equal terms with the doctor; 'the
conditions for a participant in discourse are precisely what is not
fulfilled by the patient. [66] Second, participation in therapy is
implicit as self-reflection since what is under examination is the
deception of a subject about itself, just as in ideology-critique the
activity of self-reflection is species activity. The realization which
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for both constitutes 'overcoming' is to become an object to itself, and
comprehended therein as the author of its own (false) identity.
In developing 'scenic understanding', [67] the analyst makes the
patient aware of scenes (from childhood) that are the origin of a
conflict which itself has been transformed to other (more recent)
scenes, and has even become a blockage to genuine self-understanding
and responsible for the neurosis. The analyst induces self-reflection
in the patient, a process whereby what has split off from the identity
of the patient and produced a 'miscarried self-formative process', [68]
becomes clear to the patient as being his own work; and who now
overcomes these mental blocks and false objectifications by seeing
through their illusory identity, and understanding their contingency
upon his authorship. Thus, 'a clarification of the genesis of the
faulty meaning is achieved...with reference to the initial
circumstances which led to the systematic distortion itself'. [69]
Third, the authenticity of the self-reflective therapy does not lie
with the analyst, but with the patient. It is his self-produced
enlightenment alone which determines the validity of the therapy; 'only
the patient's recollection decides the accuracy of the construction. If
it applies, then it must also "restore" to the patient a portion of
lost life history'. [70] At the beginning of the therapy the analyst is
as ignorant about the causes of the neurosis as is the patient.
Comprehension grows for the former to the extent that it increases in
the latter. Although at the start of the treatment there is less than
equality between analyst and patient, the success of the treatment
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depends not on the interpretation of the former but of the latter. The
dependency of the patient, even in seeking treatment in the first
place, is the will to recovery, or to emancipation, and becomes the
grounds of the validity of the exercise when the interest in recovery,
the activity of self-reflection, meets itself as the knowledge which
provides for the recovery. The unequal relation is itself the result of
distortion, and the inequality itself disappears in the overcoming of
the distortions. The 'mastery' of the analyst is an illusion which is
overcome in successful therapy, and success
	 here requires
authenticity produced in and by the context of the patient who is
dependent. The analyst can institute the process of enlightenment only
because of the emancipatory interest of the patient, and is therefore
himself dependent upon the patient for that enlightenment. Knowledge of
distortion is valid only when it is enlightening for the patient, when
he has worked it through and it has become his in the sense of a new
self-understanding. This is overcoming as enlightenment, as self-
transformative activity, in which there are only participants, and
where the truth of both (analyst and patient) is a relation of mutual
dependency. It is the same idea of overcoming that manifested itself
earlier as the unity of theory and practice in the emancipatory
interest.
For Habermas, psychoanalysis and ideology-critique both produce a unity
of interest and knowledge when, because of the conditions which are
lacking as a result of systematically distorted communication, the
subject seeks to overcome this false existence, and finds that in doing
so, it is precisely this activity which does overcome these
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distortions. What was previously hidden to consciousness becomes known
as origin, and its power is overcome because the knowledge of origin
corresponds with the interest or activity which gave rise to it.
However, for Habermas, this insight into dependency upon the object is
not an absolute grounding for critique, even though the precondition of
its validity is the appearance of the unconditioned. It is again based
on the separation of reflection and reconstruction noted earlier. In
terms of psychoanalysis the analyst is guided and justified in offering
analysis in the first place because he has a theoretical preconception
'of the structure of non-distorted ordinary communication', [71] or
communicative competence.
Theorizing Communicative Competence.
Habermas distinguishes between the necessary conditions of experience
(a priori universals) and the particular invariant features of
experience common to all cultures (a posteriori universals). The latter
process is shaped by the particular society under examination, but the
former are those conditions which make that process possible in the
first place. It is not a particular language which is important in the
theory of communicative action, but the possibility of any linguistic
activity at all.
In other words, a situation in which speech, i.e. the
application of linguistic competence, becomes in
principle possible, depends on a structure of
intersubjectivity which is in turn linguistic.. .In
order to participate in normal discourse the speaker
must have at his disposal, in addition to his linguistic
competence, basic qualifications of speech and symbolic
interaction (role behaviour) which we may call
communicative competence. [72]
Habermas refers to such competence as 'dialogue-constitutive
universals', or as that which establishes in the first place the
intersubjective relation of competent speakers. This competence has to
be assumed as the unconditioned necessity of all linguistic
communication, that is, as the ideal speech situation, and is therefore
the true nature of genuinely undistorted social relations.
Inasmuch as communicative agents reciprocally raise
validity claims with their speech acts, they are
relying on the potential of assailable grounds. Hence,
a moment of unconditionality is built into factual
processes of mutual understanding
	 Once participants
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enter into argumentation, they cannot avoid supposing, in
a reciprocal way, that the conditions for an ideal
speech-situation have been sufficiently met. [73]
The theory of communicative action is a social theory regarding the
(condition of) free and undistorted intersubjective mutual relations
which lies behind the activity of reflection and critique. Only in the
emancipatory interest is this underlying consensus of competence
realized, and the theory of communicative action possible, because only
here is the critique of distortion unified with the knowledge that
critique is itself dependent upon the potential for mutuality. The
theory of communicative action is possible as the self-understanding of
that possibility, but it is not absolute or truth in itself because it
is known only through activity, and activity is the reflection which
realizes the unconditioned, but only as its own necessity, not as its
own abstract identity. Thus,
a speech situation determined by pure intersubjectivity
is an idealization. The mastery of dialogue-constitutive
universals does not itself amount to a capacity actually
to establish the ideal speech situation. But communicative
competence does mean the mastery of the means of construction
necessary for the establishment of an ideal speech situation.
No matter how the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding
may be deformed, the design of an ideal speech
situation is necessarily implied in the structure of
potential speech, since all speech, even of intentional
deception, is oriented towards the idea of truth. [74]
The theory of communicative action is therefore only that, a theory.
But its truth is the truth of Habermasian social theory, for it is a
theory of the presupposition of the unconditioned, that is, of mutual
relations necessarily underpinning all claims to truth, all activities
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which aim at genuine understanding over and against the distortions of
knowledge as mere technical interests. Critique is already, in theory,
the overcoming of such distortions, and is valid as self-reflection
when it realizes itself as the unity which is communicative action. The
ideal speech situation is not realized in modern society, but in
critique its truth is already anticipated, because 'with the very first
sentence the intention of a common and uncompelled consensus is
unequivocally stated'. [75]
This claim, based around the presupposition of enlightenment as result,
is the cornerstone of the political implications of Habermasian theory.
Overcoming has been seen to be achieved when a subject, in criticizing
his illusory identity of independence and autonomy, becomes aware of
his own dependence upon the unconditioned in his critical reflective
activity. This dependence is known as the unconditioned necessity of
communicative competence for all discourse, and is expressed in a
theory of communicative action which knows itself to be conditional
upon discourse; that is, it is enlightened with regard to the
unconditioned.
The theory of communicative action is thus a theory of enlightenment,
which is itself the result of enlightenment, or of having overcome the
separation of reason and interest. As such, Habermas believes, claims
of foundationalism are dissolved because in critique, the unconditioned
is an immanent result and not a presupposition. Critique is still of
the conditioned, but its own abstract appearance as mere subjective
activity has itself been overcome, and is the theory of communicative
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action, or the foundation which makes critique possible. 'Participants
in discourse do not have to come first to an agreement about this
foundation. Indeed, a decision for the rationality inherent in
linguistic understanding is not even possible'. [76]
The theory of communicative action is a theory which expresses the
truth of overcoming, that is, as a theory of enlightenment which is
itself the result of just such an enlightenment. It is now in a
position to offer a theory of the foundations of emancipatory activity,
knowing that such a theory is itself the result of just such activity.
It is the fact that Habermas tries to produce a social theory where
dependence emerges as a positive result rather than as a negative
result, as enlightenment rather than nihilism, that is responsible for
his widespread appeal in social theory. In offering the theory of
communicative action as transformative political activity he is
offering a positive resolution to the 'crises of the critique of
knowledge' [77] which characterizes modernity.
The Theory of Communicative Action.
The two volume work carrying this title is not so much an explanation
of the roots from which the theory has developed, nor a defence of the
theory. It is rather a work which assumes as already in existence the
critique or reflections which have produced the possibility of the (re)
construction of the theory. In this sense it is the immediate result of
the developments described above, culminating in a theory of
communicative competence. The Theory of Communicative Action itself is
a work which examines its own implications for social theory as a
whole, particularly with regard to the philosophies which remain tied
to the paradigm of consciousness and subjectivity, and to systems
analysis which adopt a functionalist outlook. [78]
However, Habermas makes clear that the theory of communicative action
is not itself a theory of communicative competence, or a prescription
for the ideal speech situation. As was seen above, these are the
rational implications and necessary presuppositions for a critical
discussion regarding the lack of human freedom to take place at all. He
notes that the ideal speech situation is needed 'in order to
reconstruct the normative foundations of critical theory', [79] and
that 'one should not imagine the ideal speech situation as a utopian
model for an emancipated society'. [80] Rather, the ideal speech
situation is 'a description of the conditions under which claims to
truth and rightness can be discursively redeemed'. [81] Thus the theory
of communicative action is the insight into why and how an ideal speech
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situation of communicative competence became known as the foundation
(at present distorted but implicit nevertheless) of that which makes
agreement upon truth claims in communication possible, even with regard
to the fact that this foundation is distorted. It 'provides only an
explication of meaning, it does not provide a criterion'. [82]
What Habermas has arrived at in the theory of communicative action is a
self-expression of the understanding of the necessity of presupposition
in communication, without presupposing its 'true' form or content, but
which knows that it is already the result of this necessary consensus
underlying itself. It is therefore its own result, produced through its
own activity and dependent upon only itself. A theory of communicative
action is therefore a self-enclosed action which, by itself, produces
itself and in so doing also produces or realizes the conditions which
are its normative foundation. The understanding of presupposition is
treated as a self-education into the intersubjective ground upon which
action is dependent for its own being, and the theory of communicative
action is a theory of what this self-education looks like to itself.
The two volume work is not about the process of this self-education up
to a theory of communicative action, for that has already been worked
out. It is an expression of an already educated communicant, one who
now works not from a subjective egoistical perspective, or an objective
systems perspective, but as the self-understanding of mutuality or
intersubjectivity, at the level of what Habermas refers to as the
'lifeworld'. It is, therefore, an educated work, one which already has
the unconditioned as result, rather than one which is (still) self-
educating. It is sufficiently enlightened regarding the intersubjective
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nature of the lifeworld to know it as 'the condition under which all
participants in the action may pursue their own claims'. [83] The
theory of communicative action is the theory of self-activity, the
self-becoming of the lifeworld, a theory which necessarily has already
taken its own education regarding itself as completed. It is the
knowing of itself as (its own) result which becomes the enlightened
standpoint which is The Theory of Communicative Action. This section
examines intersubjectivity as it appears within the two volume work.
The enlightened stance of The Theory of Communicative Action is a
discourse theory of truth, one which has reflexively comprehended the
dialectical relation between its activity and the rational
presuppositions of that activity. In one of the interviews in Autonomy
and Solidarity, Habermas argues that the core of the discourse theory
of truth is characterized by three basic concepts. First, the
conditions of validity, which are 'fulfilled when an utterance holds
good'; [84] second, that these conditions are brought about by the
raising, in discourse, of validity-claims; third, the redemption of a
validity-claim, which occurs
in the framework of a discourse which is sufficiently close
to the conditions of the ideal speech situation for the
consensus aimed at by the participants to be brought about
solely through the force of the better argument, and in this
sense to be 'rationally motivated'. [85]
He concludes, 'the discourse theory of truth, then, explains what it
means to redeem a validity-claim by an analysis of the general
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pragmatic presupposition of the attainment of a rationally-motivated
consensus'. [86]
Habermas is confident that he can show that 'a species that depends for
its survival on the structures of linguistic communication and
cooperative purposive-rational action, must of necessity rely on
reason', [87] even though under present conditions that rationality is
mostly concealed. This truth, or claims to truth, are a communicative
activity which contains and produces the criterion upon which these
claims gain an affirmative or negative response.
The concept of communicative rationality carries
with it connotations based ultimately on the unconstrained,
unifying, consensus-bringing force of argumentative speech,
in which different participants overcome their merely
subjective view and, owing to the mutuality of rationally
motivated conviction, assure themselves of both the unity
of the objective world and the intersubjectivity of their
lifeworld. [88]
Rationality is thus mutuality, produced and grounded in the discourse
of participants aiming at the substantiating of truth claims. The
theory of communicative action is the self-expression of this
mutuality, not presupposed but understood as the (distorted) basis of
all rational agreement. Thus, says Habermas, 'the concept of grounding
is interwoven with that of learning', [89] and learning here refers to
the reflexive awareness of the dependence of subjectivity upon
intersubjectity as the ground of its own truth. It is this insight
which heralds the theory of communicative action as a shift from the
paradigm of consciousness to language and intersubjectivity, and to the
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idea of the lifeworld, which in the theory replaces consciousness as
the territory upon which truth claims are both grounded and criticized.
Habermas remarks that just as communication theory was inaccessible to
those brought up in the tradition of the philosophy of consciousness,
so a theory of societal rationalization is impossible for those who
deal with the lifeworld only as a system defined by instrumental
reason, for there remains no ground on which critique is possible. For
Habermas, however, 'the point of reference becomes instead the
potential for rationality found in the validity basis of speech', [90]
and it is the implications of communicative action for consciousness
and lifeworld which structure and form the two volume work as a whole.
The first of these informs most of Volume 1 and takes three main forms.
The critique of consciousness is presented as a failure in self-
comprehension, viz, that arguments surrounding relativism, negation and
reification are all misunderstandings of communicative rationality.
This rationality has already been formulated in Habermas's previous
work as the necessity of communicative reason which underlies all
activity. Habermas in Volume 1 of The Theory of Communicative Action is
not attempting to uncover a theory of rationality, only to reveal it as
the presupposition of what he is, now, already engaged in. Argument,
discussion, or any activity which aims at the truth cannot avoid the
implication that a concept of communicative rationality underpins it.
'Whatever language system we choose, we always start intuitively from
the presupposition that truth is a universal validity-claim', [91] and
therefore 'every action oriented to reaching understanding can be
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conceived of as part of a cooperative process of interpretation aiming
at situation definitions that are intersubjectively recognized'. [921
This insight is turned against those, for example Winch, who see the
necessity of presupposition as a barrier to reaching understanding, and
who advance a theory of (cultural) relativism. [93] The greater a
culture's understanding of these presuppositions as determinant of
action, the more this signifies the new levels of learning to which a
culture is rising. Indeed, as will be seen in the discussion of the
uncoupling of lifeworld and system, the rationalization of social life
is itself dependent upon 'the de facto recognition of validity claims
that can be attacked internally, that is, shaken by critique, new
insights, learning processes and the like'. (943 The greater the
reflexivity of a culture, the more open it is to self-criticism, and
the less it is reliant on an egoistic understanding of the world.
This understanding of falsifiability and self-critique puts an end to
the idea of a universal claim to truth, but it is itself a development
or a learning about the rational grounds upon which such claims are
fought out, and is equally therefore the production of those grounds.
Put another way, discourse is activity which both produces
communicative rationality and realizes that its activity is that (self)
production of mutual intersubjective relations. This universality is
not a methodology for Habermas, for it is reflective and therefore 'the
same structures that make it possible to reach an understanding also
provide for the possibility of a reflective self-control of this
process'. [95]
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To know the unconditioned as communicative rationality is therefore to
understand rationality as intersubjectivity, which is an enlightenment
regarding the identity of mutual social relations. What was taken by
Winch as the incommensurablity of comparative cultural truths is turned
by Habermas into an educational lesson regarding the universality that
makes even a theory of incommensurability possible. 'The very situation
that gives rise to the problem of understanding meaning can also be
regarded as the key to its solution'. [96] The impossibility of a
theory of rationality is itself therefore an enlightenment, and the
insight upon which the theory of communicative action is based.
The universalist position does not have to deny
the pluralism and the incompatability of historical
versions of 'civilized humanity'; but it regards this
multiplicity of forms of life as limited to
cultural contents, and it asserts that
every culture must share certain formal properties
of the modern understanding of the world, if it is at
all to attain a certain degree of 'consensus awareness'
or 'sublimation'. Thus the universalist assumption refers
to a few necessary, structural properties of modern forms
of life as such. [97]
In his critique of Lukcs, Habermas argues that having employed the
concept of 'reification' to explain the process of rationalization,
then, in order to overcome the aporias of instrumental reason which
lead to the incommensurability of truth claims and the impossibility of
rational critique of bourgeois society, Luk gcs establishes class
consciousness as the ground of authentic insight. According to
Habermas's interpretation, Lukgcs maintains the idea, found in Hegel,
of objectivity in the relation of human beings to one another and to
nature, but argues, according to the model of the commodity relation,
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that this reason in capitalist society establishes a 'form of
objectivity' within which individuals interpret both their own
identities and that of society. This distortion of social processes
into a merely external objective identity is what Lukacs refers to as
'reification', such that 'category mistakes are built into our
understanding of interpersonal relationships and subjective
experiences: we apprehend them under the form of things, as entities
that belong to the objective world...'. [98] The activity which is
human creation has, under the influence of the commodity relation,
transformed both the producer and the produced into a relation between
things. Whereas for Weber, capitalist commodity exchange was only one
expression of a general process of rationalization, Luk gcs is able to
view reification and rationalization together, and takes the
'encompassing character of the societal rationalization diagnosed by
Weber as a confirmation of his assumption that the commodity form is
establishing itself as the dominant form of objectivity in capitalist
society'. [99]
By remaining only within the sphere of instrumental action, a
rationality which to him appears complete, he has, says Habermas, 'to
run up against internal limits'. [100] In order to offer the critique
of rationalization, which Lukacs himself has performed, he has somehow
to show how he (or some form of consciousness) is not so completely
reified as to make this critique impossible. This, argues Habermas,
forces Luk	 into a philosophical theory of knowledge, similar to that
which Hegel mounted against Kant, and by which 'Luk gcs is presupposing
the unity of theoretical and practical reason at the conceptual level
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of absolute spirit'. [101] However, Habermas points out that even this
has a 'Young-Hegelian twist', [102] in that Lukacs criticizes Hegel for
remaining merely contemplative and missing the practical import of this
reconciliation. It is at this point, a point made inevitable by the
reliance of Lukacs solely on the paradigm of a philosophy of subjective
consciousness, of instrumental action, that he has to resort to an
idealist solution to the aporia of a critique of a process of
rationalization which, it is claimed, is complete. It is here that
Lukacs, says Habermas, is forced into 'a decisive error'. [103] By
claiming that Hegel's spiritual unity is infact the revolutionary
actuality of philosophy,
he has to credit theory with more power than even
metaphysics has claimed for itself. Now philosophy
has to be capable of thinking not only the totality
that is hypostatized as the world order, but the
world-historical process as well - the historical
development of this totality through the self-conscious
practice of those who are enlightened by philosophy
about their active role in the self-realization of
reason. [104]
As a result, Luka/cs is forced to supplement his theory of reification
with a theory of class consciousness, a theory which 'amounts to an
enthronement of proletarian class consciousness as the subject-object
of history as a whole'. [105]
Just as Winch could not see that relativism resulted from the reliance
in his work on the paradigm of consciousness, rather than on the form
of reason which presupposes subjective action, so Luk gCs attempts to
escape from the aporias of the critique of rationalized consciousness
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by raising one form of consciousness above and beyond reification.
Enlightenment here is presumed, it is not, as in the theory of
communicative action, enlightenment regarding the totality of
presupposition. For Habermas, the aporias of instrumental reason 'burst
the bounds of the philosophy of consciousness' [106] and cannot be
self-explanatory or self-realizing.
Horkheimer and Adorno no longer trusted Hegelian logic in the way
Lukacs did. But their view in the Dialectic of Enlightenment that
reason and enlightenment were only possible indirectly through
continual self-negation, is still dependent upon the paradigm of the
philosophy of consciousness. It is Habermas's point that they fail to
acknowledge the rational lesson which is implicit in their work and of
which that work is itself a result. In a lecture in 1982, Habermas
stated that the Dialectic of Enlightenment 'must make use of the same
critique which it has declared false'. [107] He follows the thread of
their argument through the idea of the 'decentering' of the world view,
noting that the external world of things and norms becomes separated
from the experiencing subject, and that this is precisely the process
of critical enlightenment. He agrees 'with Horkheimer and Adorno that it
is at this point that enlightenment becomes reflexive because it
reftects upon its own genealogy, as the result not of truth but of
power. 'The critique of ideology furthers the process of Enlightenment
by unearthing a category mistake which stems from the fusion of
declared validity claims with hidden power claims', [108] but then
undermines itself by revealing its own genealogy also to lie in power.
Thus, 'critique becomes total', says Habermas, 'and opposes not only
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the ideological function of the bourgeois ideals, but rationality as
such...'. [109] But by working only within the paradigm of the
philosophy of consciousness, their presentation 'is incomplete and one-
sided', [110] and fails to do justice to 'the internal theoretical
dynamic which constantly propels the sciences... .beyond the creation of
merely technologically exploitable knowledge'. [111] By remaining fixed
within the paradigm of individual subjective consciousness they are
forced to posit the rationalization of the lifeworld as merely the
totalitarian domination of instrumental reason, which reproduces
culture as reification. Their 'myopic perspective', says Habermas,
makes them 'insensitive to the traces and the existing forms of
communicative rationality'. [112] Because truth is seen to lie at the
level of consciousness, and because consciousness is dependent upon an
object which has become completely dominated by instrumental self-
interest, then criticism of that process by consciousness becomes an
impossibility. If Horkheimer and Adorno 'do not want to give up the
goal of an ultimate unmasking and want to carry on their critique, then
they must preserve at least one standard for their explanation of the
corruption of all reasonable standards'. [113] Labour and thought are
both reduced to the role of function of the system, and rather than
reify a particular 'moment' as over and above this process, as Lukacs
had done in his 'enthronement of proletarian class consciousness',
[114] they remain resigned to the loss of critical reason. Habermas is
complimentary, however, that at least 'in the twenty five years since
the completion of the Dialectic of Enlightenment Adorno has remained
faithful to his philosophical impulse and has not evaded the
paradoxical structure of thinking engaged in totalized critique'. [115]
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The theory of communicative action, based as it is upon the
understanding of itself as dependent upon (distorted) communicative
rationality, therefore requires only to make the straightforward
criticism of the Dialectic of Enlightenment that it is forced into the
paradoxical situation of a theory which renders itself impossible.
[116] To do so is also to be communicatively active in registering the
truth claim of the impossibility of truth claims per se. Thus, the
comments aimed at Winch apply equally here, that the situation which
gives rise to the problem is, in its being communicated, already
dependent upon structures (of consensus) which are the key to its
overcoming. What is therefore required to overcome the aporias of the
negative dialectic is a shift from the paradigm of the philosophy of
consciousness, which finally exhausted itself in the Dialectic of
Enlightenment, to the theory of communicative action, a change in
direction from instrumental (solitary) action to communicative (mutual
inter) action. This is to give up
a subject that represents objects and toils with them
- in favour of the paradigm of linguistic philosophy
- namely that of intersubjective understanding or
communication - and put the cognitive-instrumental
aspect of reason in its proper place as part of a more
encompassing communicative rationality. [117]
What Horkheimer and Adorno miss is the lesson of their own dependence
upon a form of reason which is prior to their knowledge of dependence
upon the social object. What is paradigmatic for the theory of
communicative action
is not the relation of a solitary subject to something
in the objective world that can be represented and
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manipulated, but the intersubjective relation that
speaking and acting subjects take up when they come to
an understanding with one another about something. [118]
Such a shift in paradigm from consciousness to language enables
Habermas to reconstruct a theory of the rationalization of modern
society which, he believes, does not repeat the aporias noted above of
relativism, reification and negativity. Behind the knowledge of
rationalization there always lies that which makes possible that
(critical) knowledge. This necessary presupposition of discourse is the
communicative rationality upon which discussions surrounding
rationalization are all dependent. It is this insight into the
necessity of mutual consensus for the possibility of any subjective
action which prevents the need to remain within the paradigm of
consciousness, and its consequent aporias. This insight into the
background rationality of all discussions on (a dominant form of)
rationality was seen in earlier work as the unity of the emancipatory
interest, as the possibility of theory formation, as implicitly the
possibility of an ideal speech situation, and as explicitly the
necessary presupposition of communicative competence, In The Theory of
Communicative Action, Habermas now unites all of these ideas into the
one idea which he calls the 'lifeworld', and which is used in Volume 1
to oppose the ideas of a completely rationalized social totality which
denies consciousness the possibility of critique, and in Volume 2 is
itself examined so as to develop a theory of modernity and
rationalization which does not repeat the aporias of the philosophy of
the subject.
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The idea of the lifeworld embodies the insight which Habermas has
gained elsewhere that 'a telos of mutual understanding is built into
linguistic communication'; [119] that is, that intersubjective
consensus is the necessary background of all attempts to produce
agreement on validity claims. To agree, or even to try and reach
agreement, is already to be part of an intersubjective relation and not
simply a subjective action. The lifeworld, says Habermas, 'stands
behind the back of each participant in communication...in the
distinctive, pre-reflexive form of background assumptions, background
receptivities, or background relations'. [120] In any communicative
action, 'each actor draws from a common stock of knowledge which is
provided by a cultural tradition shared with others. It is this
4
background-knowledge which represents the context / the lifeworld'. [121]
Thus the idea of an ideal speech situation now becomes the condition
that a lifeworld must satisfy if a 'rational conduct of life is to be
possible for those who share such a world view', [122] and anticipates,
therefore, social relations determined through common will formation.
But the lifeworld itself is not something that can be known in the same
way as other experiences of self and the world, just as communicative
competence itself presupposes a theory of communicative competence but
cannot be known except as result. That which can be experienced are the
objective world, the social world and the subjective world, but behind
all three lies that which exists as the possibility of each of these as
facts, that is, the unproblematic background conditions which
constitute the lifeworld. Communicative action reproduces the
lifeworld, and in that sense (of mutual intersubjective consensus
forming activity) is primarily 'a principle of sociation'. [123]
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Discussions with regard to world concepts, or processes of
rationalization of the social world and individual consciousness form
the 'categorial scaffolding that serves to order problematic
situations... (but) in a lifeworld that is already substantively
interpreted'. [124]
The phenomenological aspects of Habermas's work would dissolve if the
theory of the lifeworld became an object which could be transformed in
order to produce mutual relations, for that would imply communicative
rationality was not intersubjective at all, and the grounding of
critique, but merely another object known by a consciousness which did
not recognize its own necessary (communicative) preconditions. Subjects
cannot refer to 'something in the lifeworld' in the
same way as they can to facts, norms or experiences.
The structures of the lifeworld lay down the forms of
the intersubjectivity of possible understanding... (it
is) the transcendental site where speaker and hearer
meet, where they can reciprocally raise claims that their
utterances fit the world (objective, social or subjective)
and where they can criticize and confirm those validity
claims, settle their disagreements, and arrive at
agreements. In a sentence: participants cannot assume
in actu the same distance in relation to
language and culture as in relation to the totality
of facts, norms and experiences concerning which mutual
understanding is possible. [125]
It is precisely this distance, which enables The Theory of
Communicative Action to raise the theory of modern societal
rationalization outside of the strictly limited bounds of the paradigm
of instrumental reason. Whereas Lukacs, Horkheimer and Adorno are
forced to assume that it is the lifeworld itself which is reified,
Habermas can now explain that in the critique of rationalization
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another form of rationality appears, one upon which critique itself
depends but in which, equally, is realized. This self-education is
therefore of the mutual and communicative rationality which underpins
the critique of another form of rationality, that is, instrumental
technical reason. The aporias produced in a concept of reification thus
do not appear, for it is not the communicative rationality that is
reified, rather it is the world as experienced. This is not to say that
the structures of the lifeworld are not themselves distorted, it is
rather to say that in critique this distortion is realized and overcome
in the critical communicative activity. Nor, then, is this a
presupposition of what mutual relations should look like, or which
historical agents they appear to. It is merely to acknowledge that the
distorions of mutual relations are known in the necessary
presupposition of the mutuality which is critique.
The theory of communicative action operates on an intersubjective
level, but to present his revised theory of rationalization and
modernity on such a level requires Habermas to offer first, a critique
of the aspect of sociology which is normally associated with such
thought, namely functionalism. In Volume 2 of The Theory of
Communicative Action, he tries to show how this shift from instrumental
action to communicative action, or from subject and object to
intersubjective thought was prepared for by G.H. Mead and Emile
Durkheim, but is in their work an incomplete project due to the one-
sidedness of their 'functionalism'. Habermas argues that in a theory of
communicative action it is necessary to understand that the lifeworld
is not the same as the social system. This does not have to be assumed,
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it is already known and presupposed as the critique in Volume 1 and as
the theoretical foundation of the theory of communicative action
itself. As early as 1971 in Theory and Practice, Habermas has noted
that the emancipatory interest 'can only develop to the degree to which
repressive force, in the form of the normative exercise of power,
presents itself permanently in the structures of distorted
communication - that is, to the extent that domination is
institutionalized'. [126] Just as the young Marx was faced with the
actual economic fact of the alienation of worker and product, [127] so
the theory of communicative action begins with the 'fact' of reflection
upon the social world. Mead and Durkheim exemplify for Habermas the
growth of this reflection.
Reflection is itself dependent upon what appears to be the separation
of subject and object - this is the appearance for those who work
within the paradigm of consciousness. But for the theory of
communicative action, which already understands that critical
reflection as discourse is based on intersubjective rationality or the
lifeworld, this separation is the uncoupling of that lifeworld from the
social system, or the uncoupling of communicative rationality and the
structures which (now do not) embody it. [128] For Habermas, 'the
uncoupling of system and lifeworld is experienced in modern society as
a particular kind of objectification: the social system definatively
bursts out of the horizon of the lifeworld (and) escapes from the
intuitive knowledge of everyday communicative practice'. [129] Thus a
theory of rationalization emerges which is based on the intersubjective
acknowledgement that its own existence is now distorted, and separated
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from the world which could reflect its own authentic expression of
communicative rationality. Even though the system is uncoupled from
the lifeworld, nevertheless Habermas sees the critique of this
separation, through communicative action, as the self-activity of the
lifeworld, or as the implicit activity of (absolute) ethical life.
Habermas is making a phenomenological point about the 'always already'
character of the critique of the uncoupling of system and lifeworld.
The colonization of the lifeworld is the increasing distortion of
intersubjectivity by the technical, organizational and instrumental
rational interests of power and money. These latter operate as the
agents of the interest in control, even of control over those whose
agents they are. Habermas seeks to claim that, by performing critique
in terms of colonization rather than reification, and comprehending
critique as 'always already' the activity of the lifeworld (that is, as
communicative action), he can escape the contradictions of the
dialectic of enlightenment in Marx, Weber, Lukacs and Horkheimer and
Adorno. Because it is no longer operating on the level of
consciousness, Habermas is able to replace ideology and reification
with 'steering media' (based on Parsons theory of media), which operate
at the level of the separated system, and colonize the lifeworld, but
do not abolish it or dominate it to the extent that critique becomes
completely impossible. Habermas states, 'I sharply distinguish between
the more or less differentiated or "rationalized" lifeworlds that are
reproduced by way of communicative action and, on the other hand,
formally organized systems of action based on steering media'. [130]
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The very existence of critical reflection is evidence of a rationality
which understands its distortions, and is already therefore the
education of consciousness beyond technical and instrumental ideas of
subjective action. 'The analysis of the lifeworld is a self-referential
enterprise'; [131] it is always already a self-referential enterprise.
It is the self-reflexive interest in emancipation which characterizes
modernity and enlightenment, but is possible only as the self-critique,
in communicative action, of the lifeworld. With regard to these
steering media, Habermas notes that 'money and power - more concretely,
markets and administrations - take over the integrative functions which
were formerly fulfilled by consensual values and norms, or even by
processes of reaching understanding'. [132] These steering media
replace communicative action as the immediate principle of sociation,
and reflect not intersubjectivity, but the objective nature of a social
world detached from the (control of) rational will. They give rise to
new institutions which transfer the sovereignty of the lifeworld to
instrumental action, to efficiency, and to technical control. Habermas
is optimistic, however, that there are increasing signs of a
legitimation crises where these steering media are trying to usurp
areas 'which are demonstrably unable to perform their tasks if they are
removed from communicatively structured domains of action', [133] and
he cites as evidence the growth of new protest movements. 'I would not
speak of "communicative rationalization" if...a piece of "existing
reason".. .were not...recognizable...today in feminism, in cultural
revolts, in ecological and pacifist forms of resistance, and so forth'.
[134]
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The aim behind the theory of communicative action as a whole is to
explicate a concept of reason which 'stands against Adorno's
negativism' [135] and 'frees historical materialism from its
philosophical ballast'. [136] Habermas attempts to preserve the element
of critique in Hegel's phenomenological method whilst relieving it of
the pretentious burden of the absolute. This he does by understanding
the result of such critique to be the necessary precondition for
communicative action of the lifeworld. As such, for Habermas, the
absolute cannot be known in a way which is beyond the possibility of
its own falsifiability, but the conditions in which validity claims are
grounded is increasingly understood. It is the knowledge of the
necessity of presupposition which, in critical reflection, is also the
realization of the intersubjective relations which constitute that
presupposition, at least to the extent that it can become the basis of
a theory. Reason is not therefore abandoned to the form of instrumental
rationality which dominates under certain historical conditions, rather
it is the critical awareness of that domination which is in itself
taken as proof that reason, and hence the enlightenment project, is
still active. 'Horkheimer and Adorno', concludes Habermas,
failed to recognize the communicative rationality
of the lifeworld that had to develop out of the
rationalization of worldviews before there could be
any development of formally organized domains of
action at all. It is only this communicative
rationality, reflected in the self-understanding of
modernity, that gives an inner logic - and not merely
the impotent rage of nature in revolt - to resistance
against the colonization of the lifeworld by the inner
dynamics of autonomous systems. [137]
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It is investigations at this level, rather than in the philosophies of
consciousness, which now represent for Habermas the tasks which lie
ahead for critical theory.
CHAPTER III - DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT.
A - ENLIGHTENMENT
The Need For Self-Reassurance
For Habermas, the dialectic of enlightenment represents the cris/s
which is 'modernity'. The Enlightenment brought forward a subject
who no longer required the past, in the form of traditions, or
dogmatic truths based on faith, in order to provide normative
orientations in and for the world. But this development of the
reasoning powers of an autonomous subject was double-edged. It does
possess, notes Habermas,
an unexampled power to bring about the formation
of subjective freedom and reflection and to undermine
religion, which heretofore has appeared as an
absolutely unifying force. But the principle of
subjectivity is not powerful enough to regenerate the
unifying power of religion in the medium of reason...
The demotion of religion leads to a split between faith
and knowledge which the Enlightenment cannot overcome
by its own powers. [1]
This modern self-imposed separation of subjectivity and knowledge,
or of activity and result, is itself the result of enlightenment,
for the rational subject now has itself as object. The task of
repairing the separation is carried out by that which has already
led to the separation. This is the aporia of the dialectic of
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enlightenment, where unification is logically contradictory to the
method of unification. Habermas notes that this 'marks the entrance
into a modernity that sees itself condemned to draw on itself for
its consciousness of self and its norm'. [2] For those who remain
tied to this dialectic of enlightenment solely through the paradigm
of consciousness, then, says Habermas,
modernity's form of knowledge is characterized by
the aporia that the cognitive subject, having become
self-referential, rises from the ruins of metaphysics
to pledge itself, in full awareness of its finite powers,
to a project that would demand infinite power. [3]
The negativity which inheres in this view of the dialectic of
enlightenment has given rise to a form of thought whose only
'achievement' is to acknowledge the impossibility of an
enlightenment beyond its negativity. Such a negative viewpoint, for
Habermas, does not take account of the conditions which are
necessary for its own articulation, and he is dismissive of it
beyond the insight that truth and knowledge are fallible. This, he
remarks, was pointed out by Hegel nearly two hundred years ago, and
'nothing has changed since then'. [4] The philosophical discourse of
modernity has rather 'made a drama out of something which should be
trivial by now'. [5]
Habermas praises Adorno in particular as being the only philosopher
'to develop remorselessly and spell out the paradoxes of.. .the
dialectic of enlightenment that unfolds the whole as the untrue'.
[6] But even this work, which greatly influenced the young Habermas,
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[7] only revealed that 'one must go back to a stage before the
dialectic of enlightenment because, as a scientist, one cannot live
with the paradoxes of a self-negating philosophy'. [S]
Habermas's own reception of, and reaction to, the dialectic of
enlightenment informs his interpretations of others reactions to it.
As one who 'cannot live with the paradoxes of a self-negating
philosophy' his unavowed aim throughout his work has been 'to
explicate a concept of communicative reason that can stand against
Adorno's negativism', [9] in order to arrive at 'forms of living
together in which autonomy and dependency can truly enter into a
non-antagonistic relation, that one can walk tall in a collectivity
that does not have the dubious quality of backward-looking
substantial forms of community'. [10] This desire, or Sollen, which
underpins his philosophical enterprise is then transferred onto
Hegel, in an attempt to account for, what for Habermas, is the
fundamental flaw in the former's philosophy, the positing of the
absolute.
Habermas's own desire to overcome the implications of the dialectic
of enlightenment through, in his case, a communicative unification
of reason and subject, becomes the desire by which to explain all
other attempts at unification, attempts which are less successful
than his. Thus, he is able to explain Hegel's philosophical system
in terms of the 'crises of experience' [11] which it is claimed
Hegel was living through at the turn of the nfmteenth, century, and
which (in keeping with Habermas's own aims) were at the root of 'the
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conviction that reason must be brought forward as the reconciling
power against the positive elements of an age torn asunder'. [12]
Habermas concludes, 'what encourage[d] Hegel to presuppose an
absolute power of unification, therefore, are not so much arguments
as biographical experiences'. [13] The crises of modernity becomes,
here, a crises of Hegel's own self-reassurance. This misreading of
Hegel's system as Sollen, which lies at the heart of the aporias of
Habermas's reading of Hegel, is a reading formed in and by an
understanding of the educational import of phenomenology and
absolute knowing as abstract methodologies. As Rose has pointed out,
there is a Sollen in Hegel's philosophy, but it is one which lies
within philosophy itself. [14]
Enlightenment as the Overcoming of Dialectic.
There are two aspects of particular importance in examining Habermas's
reworking of Hegelian phenomenology as the basis of his social
theorizing as a whole. First is his critique of Hegel's presupposition
of the absolute as lying within the philosophy of subjective
consciousness. Second is the misunderstanding that Habermas himself has
of phenomenology, which leads him to reproduce it as a methodology with
a beginning and end, rather than as self-movement.
Habermas's view of the absolute in Hegel remains constant from
Knowledge and Human Interests, first published in 1968, to The
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, published in 1985, and is the
theoretical foundation to the development of, and the exposition of,
the theory of communicative action. As was seen above, Habermas's
presupposition of enlightenment as overcoming is the central idea
behind the theory, for it is with this notion that the subject both
realizes his dependency, and therein becomes aware of the necessity of
intersubjective communicative consensus. This thesis argues, however,
that the idea which Habermas has of overcoming is the result of his
misreading of Hegelian phenomenology, and misrecognition of determinate
negation and dependency.
Knowledge and Human Interests begins with praise for Hegel who, says
Habermas, 'replaced the enterprise of epistemology with the
phenomenological self-reflection of mind'. [15] The problem for a
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critical philosophy is that, in trying to understand the a priori
conditions for the possibility of self-validating reason and reliable
knowledge, it has at its disposal for this task only that which is the
subject of the investigation, namely, the faculty of (rational)
knowledge. 'Every consistent epistemology', says Habermas, 'is caught
in this circle from the beginning'. [16] Indeed, Habermas goes as far
as to state that 'Hegel's argument is conclusive...rnor the circle in
which epistemology inevitably ensnares itself is a reminder that the
critique of knowledge does not possess the spontaneity of an origin'.
[17] It is this insight which, when turned on the theory of
communicative action, reveals the latter to have presumed precisely
just such a beginning.
With these comments in mind, there appears to be little disagreement
between Hegel and Habermas on the phenomenological necessities of
philosophical enquiry. When thought examines itself, it appears 'after
the fact' as Habermas puts it, [18] but equally is aware that the work
on which it is dependent for this appearance is its own. In
Communication and the Evolution of Society, Habermas enthusiastically
refers to K.O. Apel's use of the phrase 'always already' (immer schon)
to describe the necessity of this dependence. He notes that Apel draws
attention away from the outlook of an observer, to the more immanently
reflective content of 'what we must necessarily always already
presuppose in regard to ourselves and others as normative conditions of
the possibility of understanding'. [19] This movement, therefore, is
the experience of reflection, and can be known only as self-reflection.
Hegel states in the introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit that
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'this dialectical movement which consciousness exercises on itself and
which affects both its knowledge and its object, is precisely what is
called experience'. [20] However, Habermas's interpretation of
phenomenological experience as a result of and for consciousness
differs from that of Hegel5 ; and it is from here that the fundamental
misreading of Hegel by Habermas stems.
Habermas argues that the result of this experience of reflection by
consciousness teaches that (self) knowledge exists only in a dependent
relation and cannot therefore justify a priori claims to a knowledge of
conditions which exist pre-reflection. He then takes this to be a
Positive result for us, one which can be known, and can be confidently
known, precisely because it is its own result. The critique of
epistemology has, in this experience of the dialectic of enlightenment,
'cast off its false consciousness by being turned against itself in
metacritique'. [21] The authenticity of the result lies in the fact
that it has received no external input, presupposed nothing, but has
merely resulted from itself, from the work which is its own self-
inquiry. There is no reason to doubt this result, for such doubt would
require to be brought to the situation from outside, since doubt does
not inhere in the result that is achieved. This authenticity, then, is
taken by Habermas unconditionally to be the self-identity of critique,
arrived at through its own phenomenological (self) movement and known
by those whose (self) interest it is. From this self-production emerges
an understanding that this self-identity is a new 'level of learning',
[22] higher than knowledge that is unreflective and not self-conscious
of its origins. What is therefore to be retained from Hegel's
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phenomenological critique of epistemology is that it 'brings to light a
series of implicit presuppositions of a critique of knowledge that
claims to be free of presupposition'. [23] What is disagreed on between
the two is precisely the place of this insight within the dialectic (of
enlightenment) which has produced it.
For Habermas, by becoming aware of dependency (through self-reflection)
consciousness has achieved an understanding of itself which has
overcome its previous condition of unenlightenment regarding its
, origins and independence. It now understands itself in a way which
previously it did not. In overcoming that shape of consciousness it has
learnt about itself, and this education has, moreover, been achieved by
itself. Indeed, as was seen in the previous chapter, what has ir/fact
been overcome, for Habermas, is subjectivity itself. A knowledge of the
pre-conditions which make subjective reflection possible enable the
reconstruction in theory of those preconditions. They are the
intersubjective communicative consensus upon which subjectivity is
dependent. Thus it is from the idea of reflection as overcoming, found
in but misunderstood by Hegel, which is the dynamic behind a paradigm
shift from the philosophy of consciousness to the philosophy of
communication.
What Habermas is critical of in Hegel's interpretation of phenomenology
is that rather than remain with this positive result, that is, the
education of consciousness regarding its own communicative
presuppositions, Hegel takes this to be a negative result.
Consciousness, instead of gaining self-transparency, assumes that what
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it has learnt regarding itself makes a result an impossibility. The
inability of consciousness to exist without presupposition leads to
Hegel 'abandoning the critique of knowledge itself', [24] because,
rather than accept what reflection teaches, he presupposes that this
too must be doubted in the same way that unreflected consciousness was.
Hegel therefore imports to the knowledge arrived at in self-reflection
a method of unconditional doubt which, for Habermas, is not justified
by the result which has been attained. Why should the reflective
critique itself be reflected upon as if it were not already the result
of such reflection?
The positive result of the dialectic of enlightenment for Habermas, the
knowledge of dependency as the self-identity of critique, Hegel would
see 'as a sign of the untruth of the critical philosophy as such'. [25]
Hegel must, therefore, have known the appearance of truth before
phenomenological inquiry if he is now so sure that what has been
arrived at is not truth. Habermas states,
he (Hegel) sees through the absolutism of an
epistemology based on unreflected presuppositions,
demonstrates the mediation of reflection by what
precedes it, and thus destroys the renewal of First
Philosophy on the basis of transcendentalism. Yet in
doing so he imagines himself to be overcoming the
critique of knowledge as such. This opinion insinuates
itself because from the very beginning Hegel presumes as
given a knowledge of the absolute... [28]
Thus what should have been an immanent inquiry, the Phenomenology of
Spirit, is flawed because the result was already presupposed before the
enquiry even began. Absolute knowledge which, says Habermas, 'in
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accordance with the approach of phenomenological investigation' [27]
ought to result from the enquiry, can now be viewed in the
Phenomenology of Spirit as a result which is itself dependent upon its
being presupposed at the start. Thus, 'the apparent dilemma (Aporie) of
knowing before knowledge...now returns in Hegels thought as an actual
dilemma: namely, that phenomenology must ilkact be valid prior to every
possible mode of scientific knowledge'. [28]
This misunderstanding has not changed throughout Habermas's writings.
His recent Philosophical Discourse of Modernity reveals the same debt
to Hegel that is apparent in Knowledge and Human Interests, and the
same criticisms of him. As a modernist Hegel was inspired, argues
Habermas, to overcome the separation of knowledge and truth, subject
and object produced in the dialectic of enlightenment, but only by the
use of reason's own self-understanding. In order to ensure the
stability of the recently shattered identity of the modern, Hegel's
critique could
make use of no instrument other that that of
reflection which it encounters as the purest expression
of the principle of modern times. If modernity is to
ground itself, Hegel has to develop the critical concept
of modernity through a dialectic residing in the principle
of the Enlightenment itself. [29]
It is therefore Hegel's own modern credentials which undermine his
immanent critique, for even before he has seriously begun to examine
the modern dilemma, he has decided upon a notion of the absolute which
serves as 'the power of unification'. [3O]
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He treats the concept of the absolute...as a further
presupposition under which alone philosophy can resume
its business. With it, philosophy can make sure of its
goal from the outset - the goal of exhibiting reason as
the power of unification. [31]
The target of Habermas's criticism this time is not the method of
unconditioned doubt by which the (presupposed) absolute directs the
Phenomenology of Spirit. It is now Hegel's early writings, and their
presupposition of an ethical totality from which the modern separation
of individual and social can be explained. [32] Again the discussion is
in terms of Hegel's 'motives'. [33] He has, according to Habermas, to
project reason as 'a force that not only differentiates and breaks
apart the system of life-conditions, but also reunites them'. [34] This
is achieved in the Spirit of Christianity and its Fate, where a
presupposed ethical totality is posited as the life which is known as
lost by 'the experience of the negativity of divided life'. [35]
Habermas sees in this early work the possibility of a theory of
communicative action, for the ethical totality represents the
intersubjective preconditions which are necessary for subjectivity and
reflection. But by not pursuing any further 'the traces of
communicative reason that are clearly to be found in his early
writings', [36] Hegel places himself in an aporia which he is unable to
resolve. By remaining within the philosophy of the subject, 'he fails
to achieve the goal essential to the self-grounding of modernity:
thinking the positive element in such a way that it can be overcome by
the same principle from which it proceeds - precisely by subjectivity'.
[37] It is only his presupposition of a concept of the absolute which
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enables him to believe that such a reconciliation is possible within
reflection.
For Habermas, the result is a failure by Hegel to unify subject and
object, and a failure to overcome the identity crises of modernity. A
concept of the absolute which resides in the (absolute) power of
subjectivity has only reproduced the dialectic of enlightenment, it has
not learnt from it. He has carried the dialectic to the point of
exhaustion, to a position which, having presupposed unconditional
doubt, requires an all-knowing subject in whom reconciliation is
achieved. The impulse which originally set critique in motion, having
attained its goal, is therefore finished. The insight into fallibility
is spent, and merely reproduces itself. What is missed is the education
which is implicit in the dialectic of enlightenment but never
recognized by philosophies which remain tied to subjectivity, and never
become enlightened regarding the intersubjective conditions upon which
they themselves are dependent.
The lesson of modernity for Habermas is that the crises in modernity,
the separation of subject and object, and the impulse for unification,
are themselves dependent upon, and reliant upon, a communicative
consensus. Thus, in Habermasian critique the identity of mutual
dependence is arrived at through reflection, and can be reconstructed
in theory, and employed in practice. In this move, the subject has
deduced the a priori necessary and universal conditions for
intersubjectivity and absolute ethical life. These conditions are
reconstructed in the theory of communicative action which now,
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therefore, provides for the future possibility of authentic and
absolute ethical life.
Having seen how Habermas overcomes Hegel's presupposition of the
absolute, and turns the negative implications of a dialectic of
enlightenment into a positive educational result, it is now possible to
understand the central importance which this idea of overcoming has for
the whole of Habermasian social theory; indeed, it is only the idea of
phenomenological experience as overcoming which enables Habermas's
work, from the critique of positivism to the theory of communicative
action, to be understood as an internally coherent project. Overcoming,
presupposed as the identity of self-enlightenment and emancipation, is
the substantial ground upon which Habermas proceeds to construct
ideology-critique, psychoanalytic models, a theory of communicative
competence, and finally, as the self-expression of consciousness which
has overcome subjectivity, a theory of communicative action and
lifeworld.
In his later work there is much less emphasis on the ideas of critique,
of emancipation, of overcoming, because he is more concerned to work at
the level of the result itself, of the lifeworld, than the process by
which it has been arrived at. [38] This is often referred to as the
linguistic turn in his work, but what is overlooked in such
interpretations is that the move to language is itself the result of,
and requires, the notions of critique and overcoming which make the
appearance of the intersubjective possible in the first place. [39]
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A theory of phenomenology as overcoming, as a process of learning and
enlightenment, is therefore the key to understanding the totality of
Habermas's work. It can be summarized as consisting of the idea that
instrumental distortions of genuine communicative rationality are
overcome in the critical activity of a subject seeking to comprehend
the separation of activity from identity. The overcoming is achieved
because the will to emancipation is at one and the same time the unity
of activity and result, or intersubjectivity, in communicative action.
The result of this overcoming is therefore the possibility of
reconstructing a theory of intersubjectivity, which is a theory of the
truth of intersubjectivity produced by those whose truth it is.
The final point which remains to be made here is that Habermas's notion
of phenomenology as overcoming infact fulfills the Sollen or desire
which, as was seen above, lay behind his work. A theory of
communicative action which establishes that 'the goal of coming to an
understanding is the process of bringing about an agreement that
terminates in the intersubjective mutuality of reciprocal
understandings, shared knowledge, mutual trust, and accord with one
another', [40] is also a social theory of non-domination. By overcoming
the 'I' or the individual in society, the theory of communicative
action is able to claim itself as a theory of intersubjectivity, of
autonomy and solidarity, and of genuinely free relations between
communicative partners. In this sense, then, it is a theory of absolute
ethical life, of the possibility of mutual recognition and mutual
social relations in which the abstractions of civil society are seen
through and overcome. It is a theory, finally, which achieves the
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restoration of a rational society as a positive possibility against the
melancholy science of reason as negation.
The idea of communicative competence is a theory of absolute ethical
life. Because each has linguistic competence and shares a set of
symbols which are mutually understood, then what appears as an
exclusivity of one individual against another in dialogue is ilyiact the
reproduction of that which they have in common. From the discourse of
the two individuals, a 'we' is produced which is their understanding of
their common situation. Habermas makes this point in the following way;
the relation between I (ego), you (alter-ego), and we
(ego and alter-ego) is established only by an
analytically paradoxical achievement: the speaking
persons identify themselves at the same time with two
incompatible dialogue roles and thereby ensure the
identity of the I (ego) as well as of the group. The
one being (ego) asserts his absolute non-identity in
relation to the other being (alter-ego); at the same
time however, both recognize their identity in as much
as each acknowledges the other as being an ego, that is,
a non-replaceable individual who can refer to himself as
'I'. Moreover, that which links them both is a mutual
factor (we), a collectivity, which in turn asserts its
individuality in relation to other groups. [41]
Thus, the theory of communicative action is self-knowledge of (the
possibility of) this 'we', and is, therefore, a theory of free and
undistorted ethical life. Abstraction is overcome when its effects
become an object of critical reflection. For that which is now the
reflecting subject is no longer abstract, but aware in its own activity
of itself as part of a 'we', an ethical totality, whose genuine
expression can be reconstructed in theory. The enlightenment produced
in critique regarding dependency is also the production, through
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critical discourse, of dependency, which is in turn, for Habermas, the
identity of mutual, intersubjective social relations.
Overall, Habermas has missed the educational import of phenomenology
and replaced it with an idea of education that is as instrumental as
the forms of reason which it was used to overcome. It is by
presupposing this critique of dialectic to be the identity of
enlightenment as overcoming, that Habermas repeats the aporia which is
not dialectic as enlightenment, but the dialectic of enlightenment. The
remainder of this chapter subjects this educational presupposition to
the very critique which it claims as its own self-identity, and
realizes the immanent negation which has as result only the dialectic
of enlightenment.
Beginnings and Ends.
A theory of modernity which, like the theory of communicative action,
has the notion of 'result' as central to the identity of enlightenment,
implicitly also relies on a notion of 'beginning'. If overcoming is
achieved as the result of critique, then critique as method can be
begun, with a view to this eventual success. The fact that critique can
be begun underlies Habermas's theory reconstruction, both in therapy
and the organization of enlightenment. The understanding of that
beginning, that is, of its nature and structure, is the theory of
communicative action and, which is the same, is Habermas's idea of
mutually interdependent social relations. The phenomenology therefore,
of Habermasian social theory is that through critique one arrives at a
(social) self which has overcome its appearance in civil society, and
from which one can comprehend ones true nature in the theoretical
reconstruction of the communicative mutuality which is the beginning,
the possibility of, all that has occurred. Thus, the understanding of
the intersubjective beginning can only be arrived at as the result of
critique, and not presupposed beforehand.
In this analysis there is no disagreement between Habermas and Hegel;
indeed, Habermas has employed (one half of) the phenomenological
movement of the Phenomenology of Spirit in a strictly Hegelian way.
Where their disagreement arises, and where Habermas's phenomenology
becomes logically unsustainable, is in their understanding of what the
result of phenomenology is. Habermas, having criticized the identity of
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objects as they appear in civil society and in the technical interest,
then presupposes the identity of the result of phenomenology as
providing a view of subject and object which expresses its genuine and
authentic social relationship. Why is this identity not subject to the
same critique as the previous identity? To do so, as was seen above,
Habermas would argue, involves a method of unconditional doubt which is
not immanent in critique, for it is to ignore the result which has been
produced. Therefore the difference between Habermasian critique and
Hegelian phenomenology is that for the former, critical reflection can
be trusted to educate itself correctly, providing no need to distrust
its results, whereas for Hegel, seemingly, phenomenological reflection
does not even trust itself and doubts everything. In reading Hegel
according to 'motives', Habermas sees that the nihilism which would be
the logic of such a phenomenology is only avoided by the presupposition
of the absolute. This is, in Habermas's view, to act in a very
unphenomenological way, slipping in as explanation precisely what is to
be explained. 'He (Hegel) ought first to demonstrate, and not simply to
presuppose, that a kind of reason which is more than absolutized
understanding can convincingly reunify the antithesis that reason has
to unfold discursively'. [42]
However, to see Hegelian phenomenology as a method of unconditional
doubt is to misread it in the most fundamental fashion. Habermas, in
seeking a unity of theory and practice in the self-activity of critique
can only claim the knowledge of this achievement by resting on a
position which is not that of critique. The negative results of
philosophical doubt produce insufficient substance for a theorist whose
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aim in critique is precisely to overcome the world as it is for the
possibility of another, better one. In order therefore to improve, for
example, on Adorno, Habermas requires more than critique. He needs a
form of critique which is successful in overcoming this world, and from
which the possibility of another clearly emerges as rational and self-
produced. It is this need which is responsible for him viewing critique
in a way which is more than can be claimed for it, and it is in so
doing that he reduces the phenomenological insight which appeared in
the emancipatory interest as result, to a methodological presupposition
that the nature of result can be positively grasped and employed. It is
the presupposition that the activity of doubt (or of philosophical
consciousness) has resulted in something other than philosophical
consciousness. Doubt becomes (reconstructed as) the certainty and truth
of enlightenment as result in the theory of communicative action. It is
Hegel's phenomenology alone here which investigates doubt, or critical
reflection, according to itself, or strictly as self-identity, and not
according to the desire which it can fulfill by performing a particular
emancipatory task. Several points can be made here, which draw out the
misunderstandings of Hegel in Habermas's work, and which mark the
reappearance in the latter of the aporias which it was designed to
overcome.
Hegel does not need to adopt reflection as a method, nor to impute to
it qualities regarding its dependence or unconditionedness. Doubt in
Hegel is not a methodology for it does not produce the manner of result
which allows it to become anything other than what it already is. What
happens in a phenomenology 'is not what is ordinarily understood when
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the word "doubt" is used', says Hegel, [43] referring to those for whom
doubt is a critical and analytical tool by which to examine the world
in such a way that nothing really is at stake and nothing really
changes. To employ doubt in such a way is to render it impotent of all
critical import. The doubt which characterizes phenomenology is 'the
way of despair', [44] a way which is immanently committed as the
movement of doubt, and which changes the doubter along the way with
each new insight. It is not a method for it can only be known after its
movement, since what it comes to know is the result of reflection.
There is no point on the way of despair at which consciousness can
resist this movement of reflection in order to ensure that any
knowledge secured is not itself immediately also the result of further
doubt and reflection. It is precisely this destruction of the
possibility of a result which can resist its own phenomenological
movement, which characterizes it as a way of despair. It is not, as
Gillian Rose points out, 'a path of self-enlightening doubt' [45] which
can be methodologically set out upon.
'The series of configurations which consciousness goes through along
this road is, in reality, the detailed history of the education of
consciousness'. [46] The result of this phenomenology is the absolute
insight that there can only ever be achieved another result. It is an
insight therefore whose negativity undermines itself precisely at the
same time as it proves its substance. The truth of phenomenology is
negative, and therefore is only true in the negation also, of its own
truth. But Habermas has taken the insight into dependency as a result
which is not self-negating, and can resist its own truth with regard to
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itself. Habermas has taken this result, the knowledge of self-
education, to be the positive result of critique, and in doing so lifts
himself off the pathway of despair to a position from which that
pathway can be known, and is therefore not despair. It is not enough to
claim from this position that what is known is that all knowledge, even
this knowledge, is fallible. The understanding that knowledge could be
fallible is not a phenomenological result, for it is no longer the
self-movement of doubt, or the self-identity of critique, it is the
movement of doubt as method. Habermas, who criticizes Hegel for
imposing unconditional doubt as a method, 	 act imposes a
methodological doubt which is conditional only upon his own
presupposition of what critique is.
In Habermas, then, such reflection becomes the instrument by which
abstraction can be understood and criticized, but the identity of the
instrument has to be presupposed beforehand. If doubt is a self-
activity, as Habermas claims in the emancipatory interest, how is it
possible that it can produce anything other than itself? The fear that
doubt will only produce itself precisely underlies modernity's need for
self-reassurance noted above, for in this fear is already contained the
view, the prejudgement, that the instrument alone is incapable of
producing a positive result. [47] Habermas's view of overcoming has its
origins in this prejudgement, and his response to it is to force onto
reflection a result which is other than itself. In so doing he has
repeated the aporia of modernity's separation of subject and object
which, precisely, was that which it was intended to overcome.
Unconvinced and unsatisfied by the negative education which is the
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pathway of despair, Habermas replaces it with his own idea of critical
education, one which whilst claimed as the self-identity of
enlightenment, infact is other than that critical movement itself.
Hegel views any attempt to know more than the instrument employed in
philosophy can actually produce, as another lesson in the education of
consciousness on the way of despair, asking 'should we not be concerned
as to whether this fear of error is not just the error itself? [48] It
is mere subjective caprice to suppose that the negativity of
phenomenology is not sufficient to grasp the nature of truth, and it is
a presupposition which lies outside of phenomenology itself. This is
Habermas's view of the dialectic of enlightenment and accounts for the
Sollen which underpins his work.
Hegel comments that in general such presuppositions take for granted
certain ideas about cognition as an instrument and
as a medium and assumes that there is a difference
between ourselves and this cognition. Above all, it
presupposes that the absolute stands on one side and cognition
on the other.., in other words, it presupposes that cognition
which, since it is excluded from the absolute, is surely
outside of truth as well, is nevertheless true, an
assumption whereby what calls itself fear of error reveals
itself rather as fear of the truth. [49]
Habermas's critique of instrumental reason is phenomenological in the
sense that it is immanent, but his theory of communicative action is
less than phenomenological for it removes the movement of critique from
the path of despair and onto a ground which, beyond doubt, knows its
true origins or beginnings. The claim embodied in the theory, that
critique knows its true self in mutual communicative relations, is
forced into the aporia that it is both still critical reflection, and
yet not, at the same time. Habermas's assertion that this is still a
relation of dependence, and not a theory constructed in abstraction,
can only repeat the aporia that the claim itself is not critique, and
thus undermines the very criterion of authenticity upon which it rests.
The dialectic of enlightenment is the dialectic of immediacy and
mediation, and the problem it poses is that the instrument used in
philosophical enquiry is also the ob'ect of that enquiry. The fear of
error which arises here, regarding the capacity of consciousness as an
instrument with which to grasp the true, is itself the immediate
outlook of natural consciousness, which has objects for it, but does
not have itself for object. Reason as it immediately appears on the
scene takes itself to be the universal category by which the truth of
all objects can be known. The object lies before it as something which
enjoys an objective existence, unhindered by transcendental or
metaphysical interference, or by subjective whims and fancies. However
this idealistic satisfaction of natural consciousness is disrupted by
its own activity. Natural consciousness cannot therefore remain a pure
identity, for it becomes as much an object in the world as those
objects which it took as proof of its own being. When reason becomes an
object for itself, it cannot escape the fact that consciousness now has
a previous shape of consciousness known to it. In Hegelian terms,
natural consciousness has become an object for philosophical
consciousness. The result is that the truth of natural consciousness
has been lost because it is no longer an immediate certainty, but
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rather is mediated by the consciousness for which it is an object, and
which acts as the instrument through which it is known. The fear of
error is therefore the fear of natural consciousness's own death; since
it takes itself to be real knowledge, then this mediation has 'a
negative significance for it... (and) counts for it rather as the loss
of its own self'. [50] In reflection, thought 'entangles itself in
contradictions, i.e. loses itself in the hard-and-fast non-identity of
its thoughts, and so, instead of reaching itself, is caught and held in
its counterpart'. [51]
Natural consciousness, the outlook of empirical and technical reason in
Habermas, is therefore lost to philosophical consciousness on each and
every occasion that it proclaims its certainty of identity. There can
be no reason without mediation, and there can be no natural
consciousness which is not also for philosophical consciousness. Since
natural consciousness and philosophical consciousness are two aspects
of the same consciousness, then it can be seen that
consciousness suffers violence at its own hands: it
spoils its own limited satisfaction. When consciousness
feels this violence, its anxiety may well make it
retreat from the truth, and strive to hold onto what
it is in danger of losing. But it can find no peace...
thought troubles its thoughtlessness, and its own
unrest disturbs its inertia. [52]
This describes both the dialectic of enlightenment and Habermas's
response to it. It is his hope that the negativity which is implicit in
philosophical consciousness can be overcome and that a form of
(communicative) reason be found which is both self-mediated and yet
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more than the consciousness of a (particular) reflecting subject. He is
well aware that in the negative 'reason remains a restless searching
and in its very searching declares that the satisfaction of finding is
a sheer impossibility', [53] but is not content with this. Against the
seeming inevitability of the endless mediation of objects, including
consciousness, by (self) consciousness, Habermas posits a still point
of immediacy [54] as that which understands how mediation or reflection
is made possible in the first place. Rather than 'looking the negative
in the face' [55] he has avoided its gaze in order to gain an
undistorted snapshot. To this very problem Hegel comments, 'to see that
thought in its very nature is dialectical, and that, as understanding,
it must fall into contradiction - the negative of itself - will form
one of the main lessons of logic'. [56]
What Habermas has not comprehended here is that the division between
consciousness and object is not optional, even in describing its being
non-optional. 'There is nothing,' notes Hegel,
nothing in heaven or in nature or in mind or
anywhere else which does not equally contain both
immediacy and mediation, so that these two
determinations reveal themselves to be unseparated
and inseparable and the opposition between them
to be a nullity. [57]
Therefore a theory which attempts to get behind mediation to look for
the origins of its possibility, in the very act of producing itself, is
also, already, an object for that which knows it. The universality of
mediation cannot be explained (away) in any terms other than the
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movement which it is, and which presupposes all such attempts at
explanation.
This leads to the second point regarding the differences between the
phenomenologies of Hegel and Habermas, namely that Habermas, in
claiming the self-identity of critique as phenomenological result, is
also claiming a self-understanding of origins and beginnings. Since
movement itself is avoided in such a claim, then from the position of
rest it is possible to view the whole process of becoming from
beginning to end. Such a model of enlightenment, however, which denies
movement to itself, never becomes, and thus denies itself the result
from which its beginnings can therein be reconstructed. The path of
despair which Habermas wishes to invoke as radical critique is its own
truth only when it is known as itself. If its result is itself, viz.
doubt, how is it ever to arrive at a result which can produce the
overcoming, the explanation of itself, that Habermas assumes in the
emancipatory interest? Put another way, if the result of doubt is not
presupposed as a method of enlightenment, then its result is always
itself. The question then is, what manner of result is doubt, and can
it ever provide a self-explanation of an unconditioned beginning?
Whereas Habermas's answer, in order to provide for modernity's self-
reassurance, is a positive Yes, Hegel's philosophical system attempts
to comprehend the aporia of an unmediated beginning according to its
contradictory nature, and not by importing external Sollens as guides
to what the solution should be.
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Habermas, having criticized the absolutism inherent in attempts to
produce a first philosophy, himself mistakes the nature of mediation,
and its movement as phenomenology. By seeking to reveal the rational
origins of mediation, of a reflecting consciousness, he is also
arriving at a first point upon which that consciousness is itself
dependent, and is therefore a first point which marks the possibilty of
the beginning of a theory of communicative action. Because, he argues,
it is arrived at as result, it is not a presupposition. Yet what he has
presupposed is precisely that this is a result produced according to
itself, and representing the self-identity of critical reflection.
Habermasian critique presupposes the identity of mediation itself, and
therefore claims enlightenment regarding the mediation of subjectivity
in civil society. To know this result as the identity of critique as
enlightenment and overcoming, is to presuppose as method that which is
claimed as result. The knowledge which has been gained relies in
advance on knowing what the method for gaining valid knowledge, or
enlightenment, is. It must presuppose what a result, or enlightenment
is. This involves Habermas having the result before it has appeared as
result, and it cannot therefore be the unpresupposed identity of result
which he claims it to be.
Habermas's problem lies in the nature of mediation, for it does not
'allow' a beginning or an end. Since it is movement, everything that is
known is already mediated and negated. Thus to claim that the result of
critique is the self-identity of movement, a movement which moves all
content on again, must exempt itself from another movement acted upon
its own identity. Habermas's result of mediation is assumed as post-
- 116 -
mediation, as an overcoming of the separation of subject and object,
whereas precisely by becoming an object for consciousness this claim is
itself overcome, ceasing to be a result and becoming again another
activity.
This problem of the seeming impossibility therefore of a beginning or
an end for critical reflection, and therefore of the impossibility of
result at all, is the aporia of the dialectic of enlightenment which
Habermas is seeking to overcome. What is immediate is (already) known
as object and therefore mediated, and the knowledge of this mediation
is again already another (immediate) object. Given the nature of this
dialectical circle 'it seems as if it were impossible to make a start
at all'. [58] Neither immediacy nor mediation exist without the other,
and cannot therefore serve as a 'moment' with which to begin. And yet
by acknowledging the problem of a beginning, a beginning has already
been made. In this insight alone, the dialectic of enlightenment
provides the awareness that this activity regarding the problem of
beginning is already a beginning. 'Through this progress, then, the
beginning loses the one-sidedness which attaches to it as something
simply immediate and abstract; it becomes something mediated, and hence
the line of the scientific advance becomes a circle'. [59]
This circle is the comprehension that the dialectic of enlightenment,
in order to produce the negative as result, has already begun.
Logically, therefore, even according to Habermas's own recognition of
the circular nature of all 'consistent epistemology', [60] a
phenomenology characterized by movement, and which is self-identity as
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movement, denies itself the possibility of beginnings and ends. The
theory of communicative action therefore denies its own becoming by
positing the lifeworld as the a priori condition of the separation of
subjectivity and knowledge, a separation which is its own becoming.
Without the movement of becoming it cannot achieve the self-knowing
which is claimed for it. It is an aporia noted by Habermas himself -
'the lifeworld is that remarkable thing which dissolves and disappears
before our eyes as soon as...it becomes explicit knowledge' [61] - but
it is an aporia which he can claim to have overcome because he has
presupposed beforehand the (unmediated) identity of overcoming as the
identity of enlightenment.
Repeating the Law and Logic of Identity.
Habermas's contribution to critical theory has been to draw attention
to the dominance which technical reason has established in modern
society, even to the extent of replacing communal discourse on
political and social matters with an instrumental interest based on
control and manipulation. In Legitimation Crises, Habermas argues that
bourgeois ideologies can assume a universalistic
structure and appeal to generalizable interests
because the property order has shed its political
form and been converted into a relation of production
that, it seems, can legitimate itself.. .This does
not diminish the socially integrative significance
of this new type of ideology in a society that no
longer recognizes political domination in personal
form. [62]
If one adds to this his comment that positivism 'assumes the
prohibitive function of protecting scientific enquiry from
epistemological self-reflection', [63] then one has in view the two
major targets of Habermas's work.
Positivism and commodity production, for Habermas, distort rational
activity. Both mask the processes of human mediation and manufacture,
and both view their respective objects as independent of process. This
form of reasoning is what Habermas unites under the term instrumental
technical interest, an interest characterized by a will to dominance
which is facilitated by maintaining the object as separate. Positivism
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and commodity exchange both 'own' their respective objects through this
domination - positivism explains and manipulates the natural and social
world, commodity exchange controls and manipulates the distribution of
goods and services. Both manifest the domination which is the
universality of the logic of non-contradiction, and the abstract
universality of civil society. Positivist techniques offer the
bourgeois state feedback knowledge which increases its control over and
separation from subjectivity. Habermas's concern throughout his work
has been to replace the non-reflective dimension of positivism and
commodity fetishism with a reflective form of communicative
rationality, grounded in the idea of critique as enlightenment and
overcoming. Positivism and commodity production restrict the Learning
capacity of mankind as a whole, and therefore 'not learning, but not-
learning is the phenomenon that calls for explanation'. [64]
How to learn about not-learning was the problem, then, that Habermas
set himself. The task is already contradictory, for it requires as
method that which is not yet known, that is, the object in question. It
is the same aporia which is modernity's dialectic of enlightenment,
and a task which already contravenes the law and logic of identity and
non-contradiction. What was required was a critique of not-learning (of
identity thinking) which was not itself also not-learning (also
identity thinking). It required an understanding of, and an
enlightenment regarding abstraction which was not itself also abstract,
that is, an activity which was itself the overcoming of abstraction.
But the task is already a contradiction which can only repeat identity
thinking. To seek to overcome abstraction is already to repeat the
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movement of separation. Overcoming, seen as the result of enlightenment
critique, is already the presupposition of the identity of
enlightenment as self-activity or method and thus already requires and
repeats the separation of activity and object in the presupposition of
the identity of enlightenment.
Habermas contradicts his own stated criterion of critique as
presuppositionless enquiry by presupposing its independent identity to
lie outside of process and activity, in the a priori intersubjectivity
of the lifeworld. As a critical theorist of all forms of bourgeois
domination, he has exposed the one-sidedness of the technical interest
in which man's autonomy and independence is embodied by his ever
increasing control over the natural and social worlds. He has not,
however, subjected the idea of what constitutes the identity of
enlightenment to that same critique, with the result that he works with
a notion of education which is as determined by the
technical/instrumental interest as those positivist visions of social
evolution and enlightenment which he has opposed throughout. Habermas's
enlightenment about the dialectic of enlightenment returns to the
dialectic itself, and reveals the positivism and instrumentalism which
is inherent in his work.
In political terms, Habermas has been unsuccessful in his attempt to
overcome the separation of subjective activity and political object
because his own idea of overcoming repeats that division as the
separation of subject and substance. In attempting to explain the
universality of abstraction in civil society he has excluded his idea
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of critique from that universality, and has therein already repeated
the separation of activity and result according to the law and logic of
non-contradiction and identity. His work is therefore in the dialectic
of enlightenment precisely in the presupposition that his work
overcomes it. Enlightenment posited as overcoming is a repetition of
the domination of an object by an enlightened subject, and always
therefore a repetition of the separation of activity and object.
Habermas has not solved the problem of knowledge and enlightenment as
domination, and has not removed himself from a technical instrumental
view of education as a tool of domination. For him, overcoming
communicative distortion means a theory of communicative autonomy, an
autonomy that can only exist, or be known, as an overcoming of, and
therefore a domination of, dependence and mediation. The knowledge of
the universality of mediation and dependence is separated from the
movement which has produced its truth. Enlightenment therefore ceases
to be reflective, immanent and phenomenological, and becomes a method
which is then used to produce itself. But method is not self-movement,
and is therefore no longer educational according to its own stated
criterion of immanent self-activity. Rather, it is objectified as
method and known in a way which replaces movement and activity with
stasis. Habermas's notion of education is therefore less than the
critical activity of which it is claimed to be the self-generated
result. He employs an abstract notion of education to overcome the non-
learning in civil society, and thus can only repeat this education As
another domination of identity over activity.
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Habermas, having criticized Hegel as a 'master thinker' [651 who
assumed for himself the highest philosophical vantage point, now
appears himself as the thinker who presents himself as master over that
which is his becoming. Habermas has to presuppose the universality of
abstraction for everything except his notion of overcoming and yet that
notion too, is itself determined within the law and logic of non-
contradiction (or non-learning). An explanation of domination in civil
society is no less a form of domination; to claim otherwise is
precisely to fetishize its identity and separate it from its being
known. A theory of intersubjectivity and ethical life which claims its
identity to be its overcoming of abstraction as a self-activity, is
always already the negation of that knowledge due to its own separation
from the movement which produced the activity.
The aporia which overcoming was intended to overcome remains. To claim
as phenomenological result the self-identity of critique and therein
intersubjective mutual relations or absolute ethical life, is to be
absolute ethical life. If Habermas, and the theory of communicative
action is any less than absolute ethical life, then it is less than
autonomous self-identity, and merely particular. The very act of
claiming critique as overcoming is not an overcoming. Indeed, the
movement which is held to be the identity of critique reasserts itself
by undermining the claim. Critique repeats its own law of non-
contradiction even to undermine itself.
In epistemological terms, Habermas has interpreted phenomenology in a
positivist way because he has employed it as an instrument to
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understand and explain his own assumption that the path of despair,
which is phenomenology, has been overcome. He takes and uses precisely
that which is not overcome, activity, as the method and identity of
overcoming. The educational import of phenomenology for Habermas lies
in its instrumental value of being able to overcome the non-learning in
civil society regarding man's mutual and intersubjective communicative
relations. It is the instrument by which intersubjectivity realizes
itself, but its use as an instrument is not immanent phenomenological
activity. It is, rather, the goal directed activity of a consciousness
which seeks to achieve knowledge about an object. Habermas claims that
the theory of communicative action is the result of its own activity -
critique - and yet it is critique which he uses as the instrument to
produce this result. By a sleight of hand, Habermas has turned
education as self-activity (phenomenology) into self-reflective
communicative action as self-activity. What is crucial here, is that a
theory of communicative action replaces the path of despair because the
former is the certainty of itself as the result of, and therefore the
identity of, the latter. Certainty is that which is lost, not found, on
the path of despair. Habermas's aporia lies in his having presupposed
the presuppositionless character of phenomenological inquiry, a move
which renders it self-contradictory.
In so doing, Habermas has turned Hegel's phenomenology on its head. A
self-generated movement of uncertainty and mediation on the path of
despair has become, in the theory of communicative action, the
certainty of that movement. The movement has become the knowledge of
the movement, or precisely non-movement. The immanent
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presuppositionless character of this movement has become presupposed as
a methodology and an instrument. The self-generated dependency and
uncertainty of phenomenology has become an independent self-knowing
certainty of that dependence. In all of these formulations the
dialectic of enlightenment returns, such that the truth of the former
is sacrificed in the formulations of its truth in the latter.
To invoke phenomenology as a tool for emancipation is to remove that
which is educational from phenomenology, or to remove the movement
which is education from itself. Habermas removes the result of
phenomenology from the realm of result, from the dialectic of
enlightenment, by claimimg the result as the identity of self-
knowledge. Yet for phenomenological result to be itself it must be
comprehended as it is, and as it is known by itself. This Habermas does
not do, but it is what Horkheimer and Adorno attempted to do in their
Dialectic of Enlightenment, a book which preceded Habermas, but to
which his work inevitably returns. Rather than base his work on an
illegitimate presupposition, Habermas has presupposed the absence of
all presupposition - which is to presuppose in the beginning that which
is intended to be arrived at and proved as result. All beginnings are
abstract and thus determinate. Having understood that in critique there
are only participants, Habermas employs this result for his own
purposes, rather than remain tied to the implication of the result,
that he can only continue to participate in the movement of the
dialectic of enlightenment, and not abstract this participation as a
method for the organization of enlightenment.
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Habermas against himself, in order to enable the dialectic of
enlightenment its own immanent return in his work.
In his support of dialectical theories over scientistic positivistic
research methods, he notes that the former 'incorporate reflexively the
fact that they themselves remain a moment of the objective context
which, in their turn, they subject to analysis'. [71] The result of
this, he says, is that they establish themselves as a concept which is
'appropriate to the object itself', [72] by recognizing that their
inquiries are themselves dependent upon the insight that 'there is no
such thing as immediate knowledge. The search for the primary
experience of a manifest immediacy is in vain'. [73]
He employs dialectics against Popper's brand of positivism, arguing
that Popper, in his critique of all primary knowledge, fails to realize
that such a critique is itself a socially produced activity and can
itself 'only be grounded by recourse to at least one of the sources of
knowledge' [74] which he has previously ruled out as presuppositions.
This form of doubt is itself based on a tradition of hypothesis testing
and experimentation for its validity. It is already a presupposition.
And yet this is not an insight which Habermas employs against his own
idea of enlightenment as overcoming. Just as Popper has assumed facts
and objects and then tested them against theories, so Habermas has
presumed that he knows what an education consists of, and has then
tested the idea against that presupposition.
Habermas's criticism of Popper is that his work
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presupposes that 'facts' exist in themselves, without
taking into account that the meaning of the empirical
validity of factual statements...is determined in
advance by the definition of the testing conditions...
One would thus recognize the concept of 'facts' in
positivism as a fetish which merely grants to the
mediated the illusion of immediacy. [75]
An immanent dialectical critique of the theory of communicative action,
based on this same logic, would therefore read as follows; the theory
presupposes that critique exists in-itself, without taking into account
that the meaning of the communicative validity of critical-reflective
insights is determined in advance by the definition of the instrument
as an enlightenment in-itself. One would thus recognize the concept of
critique as overcoming as a fetish which merely grants to the mediated
the illusion of immediacy.
Habermas's attempt to produce enlightenment as result from the
dialectic of enlightenment has only returned enlightenment to its self-
destructive, contradictory, dialectical movement. Knowledge of
mediation is not an overcoming of mediation such that the necessary and
universal conditions of determination and dependency, and of absolute
ethical life, can be understood and reconstructed in the lifeworld.
That which Habermas takes to be the self-produced identity of
enlightenment - activity as overcoming - is active also against that
presupposition of identity, and negates it. The failure to produce such
a result is dealt with by Horkheimer and Adorno in Dialectic of
Enlightenment, and it is in that work that the aporia of Habermas's
attempt to claim critique as enlightenment and enlightenment as
critique, finds expression.
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CHAPTER III - DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT.
B - DIALECTIC.
From Enlightenment.
There is, then, in Habermas, a notion of enlightenment separated from
the dialectical movement which is its becoming, and from which it
results. By working through Habermas's social theory it becomes clear
that the task of replacing modern negative consciousness with a
positive modern discourse has only in fact reproduced the former. A
theory which claimed all knowledge as movement, or as determinate, and
then claimed a status for that knowledge beyond its own stated self-
truth, is proved correct only when it is itself negated by the truth of
its own declared insight. The dialectic of enlightenment proves its own
truth by refusing that truth. An enlightenment regarding dialectic
ceases to be dialectical, and immediately therefore is subject to the
dialectic, and is experienced as loss. The appearance of this new
object, arising behind the back of Habermas's theory of communicative
action, is therefore experienced as the loss of this theory, and for
the identity of critique is 'the loss of its own self'. [1]
It is in this failure of Habermas that the intention behind his work is
continually realized, that is, to present all knowledge as movement.
His own theory of communicative action is unable to realize this
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movement as its own truth, for the result referred to here is negative.
His attempt to reveal the true nature of the dialectic of enlightenment
as result infact has as result only the totality of repetition
described by Horkheimer and Adorno some 34 years before the theory of
communicative action. [2] In this work, the dialectic of enlightenment
is presented as movement; enlightenment becomes not a position or an
identity but a totalitarian self-completing circle, a logic of non-
contradiction which Habermas in attempting to overcome only repeats.
It would be easy to posit Habermas's view of the dialectic of
enlightenment as antithetical to that of Horkheimer and Adorno, and
certainly the former's stance against their road to 'nowhere' [3] lends
weight to such a view. However, this interpretation misses the import
of Horkheimer and Adorno's description of the dialectic, and
misunderstands the nature of Habermas's failure. It is the truth of
Habermas's phenomenology which produces its untruth, a movement
understood by Horkheimer and Adorno, but it is a truth which none of
them even taken together recognize as actual. The 'positions' of
Habermas and Horkheimer and Adorno when taken together represent the
actuality of the dialectic of enlightenment, a totality referred to
later in this chapter as 'the broken middle', and recognized in
Hegelian philosophy as misrecognition. It is the argument of this
thesis that Habermas represents enlightenment without dialectic, and
Horkheimer and Adorno dialectic without enlightenment, and that Hegel's
system is the comprehension and self-identity of precisely the aporetic
nature of the dialectic of enlightenment which they re-present in their
opposition.
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Will to Enlightenment.
Dialectic of Enlightenment presents a reading of modern consciousness
centred around the authors interpretation of Nietzsche's idea of will
to power. There is, for them, no form of thought available to modernity
which can be used as critique of modernity which is not already
determined by the principle of equivalence and non-contradiction, and
is not already mediated within the universality of bourgeois property
law, commodity production and identity thinking. The aporetic nature of
enlightenment as dialectic, seen above as the repetition of the
negative in Habermas, is here dei :ribed by Horkheimer and Adorno in its
totality as return; as a circle in which modern consciousness is
enmeshed to the extent that any and all attempts to 'overcome' it can
only repeat the will to enlightenment which is the very form of
thinking in which domination is maintained through the separation of
subject and object.
'Enlightenment is totalitarian'. [4] Its own rationale is to extinguish
all forms of thought, all powers of reasoning, all explanations which
are not its own. Anything which is not the result of 'formal logic',
'calculability' and 'equivalence' [5] is myth, and can be discarded as
the irrational musings of unenlightened subjectivity. 'To the
enlightenment, that which does not reduce to numbers, and ultimately to
the one, becomes illusion; modern positivism writes it off as
literature'. [6] Thus the will to enlightenment is the will to control
and master nature by explaining it 'without any illusion of ruling or
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inherent powers, of hidden qualities'. [7] The more opposition it
encounters, the stronger it becomes; the greater the number of mythical
interpretations it can reveal to be illusory and irrational, the more
dominating as a form of power it becomes. Indeed, and here lies its
totalitarian nature, the more it is opposed by forms of thought which
are subjective, the more substance is available for it to overcome and
thus grow progressively stronger. This is precisely the insight which
Habermas notes as the implicit negativity of Horkheimer and Adorno's
dialectic of enlightenment, that to portray technical, objectivistic
and commodified thought as total left no possibility at all of critique
as positive enlightenment. Yet what was seen to result for Habermas is
no less than that which is here described by Horkheimer and Adorno.
Every spiritual resistance it (enlightenment) encounters
serves merely to increase its strength...whatever myths
the resistance may appeal to, by virtue of the very
fact that they become arguments in the process of
opposition, they acknowledge the principle of
dissolvent rationality for which they reproach the
enlightenment. Enlightenment is totalitarian. [8]
Horkheimer and Adorno reconstruct the genealogy of civilization as the
movement of the self-preservation, and by implication extension, of
enlightenment over myth, up to the modern condition where reason
replaces god as the totality of explanation. This is the victory for
enlightenment which ensures its totalitarianism, and in which it
achieves its own dialectical circularity through the domination of its
own logic of non-contradiction. Horkheimer and Adorno state this
victory succinctly as the self-movement in which 'myth is already
enlightenment: and enlightenment reverts to myth'. [9]
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The first half of this formulation is a Nietzschean form of
genealogical uncovering of the origins of knowledge as lying in power
and domination. For the primitive, terror of the unknown was terror of
that which could not be dominated, and becomes that which is outside of
human control, viz, the sacred and the supernatural. The inability to
explain is the origin of human fear, 'the echo of the real supremacy of
nature in the weak souls of primitive men'. [10] This fear, or lack of
power, is the first separation of subject and object, that is, when a
symbol becomes a representative of that which is other than the
subject; thus, that which is not subject is now other. Equally, the
element of contradiction has entered language, for the symbol when
spoken of is that which is known as not-known. This contradiction is
'the cry of terror' [11] reproducing itself; that which would overcome
the fear only repeats it in its being (not) known when spoken. However,
even in this terror, man is already learning about his ability to
control and dominate that fear. Language is the medium through which
terror controls itself. The unknown is known by being named, and the
user or controller of this medium is the person who begins to become
aware of this power.
When Horkheimer and Adorno state that 'language is required to resign
itself to calculation in order to know nature', [12] they are not
inferring that the result for language is negative. The rituals and
rites which developed because of the terror of that which could not be
explained served as an explanation and the names which were given to
the unknowable became the (known) identities of the unknown. 'When
language enters history its masters are priests and sorcerers.. .Soon
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the magicians peopled every spot with emanations and made a
multiplicity of sacred rites concordant with the variety of sacred
places. They expanded their professional knowledge and their
influence'. [13] Thus did the many become subject to the domination of
the power over the unknown which lay in the 'professional' hands of the
few.
Neither the resignation of the shaman to language, nor the sacrifices
or gifts offered in fear of the unknown during rituals are what they
appear. The resignation of the shaman is in fact only to his domination
over the (fear of) the collective; and it has its basis in the very
transaction which is his ritualistic activity, that is, the offerings
made to the other. The overcoming of myth by enlig+nment is present
here even in its most primitive outpost, because the offering is no
more than a rational calculation of the amount of gift of which this
'other' is worthy, or which represents its worth. Enlightenment is at
work here because the offering represents the knowledge of the other,
and is the use of that knowledge as control. The gift, formed by the
terror of the unknown, is already equivalent to, and thus a knowing of,
the unknown.
If barter is the secular form of sacrifice, the
latter already appears as the magical pattern of
rational exchange, a device of men by which the gods
may be mastered: the gods are overthrown by the very
system by which they are honoured. [14]
By virtue of the totality of the dialectic of enlightenment, sacrifice
becomes control, non-identity becomes identity, and myth becomes
enlightenment.
From the genealogy of knowledge as power, based on equivalence and
calculability, Horkheimer and Adorno can now state that the principle
of enlightenment, of its self-preserving, calculating rationality, is
that 'man imagines himself free from fear when there is no longer
anything unknown', [15] and thus it is this genealogy which is now
understood to determine the course of demythologization. 'The awakening
of the self is paid for by the acknowledgement of power as the
principle of all relations'. [16] Enlightenment at every opportunity
overcomes myth because 'nothing at all may remain outside, because the
mere idea of outsideness is the very source of fear'. [17] Horkheimer
and Adorno conclude that,
myth turns into enlightenment, and nature into
mere objectivity. Men pay for the increase of their
power with alienation from that over which they
exercise their power. Enlightenment behaves towards
things as a dictator toward men. He knows them
insofar as he can manipulate them. [18]
However, when enlightenment becomes the basis of control not only of
the natural world but also as the sole legitimate form of reasoning
over the government of the social world, then man becomes an object to
himself, an object which requires controlling. This process of
demythologization reaches its zenith in bourgeois society which is
'ruled by equivalence'; [19] the death of god announced by Nietzsche's
Zarathustra, not known or understood by those in the market place, in
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fact produces the market place itself as the embodiment of
enlightenment. The identity of the object, whether bourgeois individual
or commodity, is guaranteed in the fact that everything is the
equivalent, or can be calculated as such, of everything else.
Men were given their individuality as unique
in each case, different to all others, so that
it might all the more surely be made the same
as any other...The unity of the manipulated
collective consists in the negation of each
individual. [20]
This sameness refers to the equivalence of persons in bourgeois private
property law. Equivalence (and consequently identity) embodies the
dominance of the logic of non-contradiction which guarantees identity
by holding apart the separation of object and activity. Its domination,
however, is masked by the mediation of subjectivity in bourgeois
property law because the independence and identity of subjectivity is
what appears to be guaranteed by the state in civil society. Bourgeois
individuality, as the equivalence of persons, masks its domination of
the relation which is the state by guaranteeing that identity in
(abstract) universal legal relations.
The second half of the formulation of the dialectic of enlightenment
states that enlightenment reverts to mythology. It is in this movement
that the negative implications of the enlightenment project are
realized. 'Just as the myths already realize enlightenment, so
enlightenment with every step becomes more deeply engulfed in
mythology'. [21] The will to enlightenment is the will to explanation;
to providing a world view in which all else is contained, categorized
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and therefore controlled as knowledge. But the will to enlightenment is
repetitious, to the extent that the increasing demythologization of the
world serves only to replace one myth of total explanation by another.
The enlightenment 'receives all its matter from the myths, in order to
destroy them', remark Horkheimer and Adorno, but 'even as judge it
comes under the mythic curse'. [22]
The principle of repetition which enlightenment employs as its rational
will is the instrumental viewing of mythical knowledge as having its
origins in man, and not in the objects which are created to explain
man. As with Habermas, man's increasing rationality is also man's
increasing dependence upon his own activities for explaining the
natural and social world. Enlightenment wins out over faith because
enlightenment is repetition, and this repetition is contained precisely
in the contradiction which arises whenever knowledge claims an other to
itself which is not known. The repetition therefore is of itself, by
itself. It is its own thinking activity. Enlightenment must always
return to itself, and in doing so each time it destroys the myth which
previously was held as other to thought. But whereas for Habermas this
knowledge of return ultimately marks enlightenment in itself, for
Horkheimer and Adorno even this overcoming, or enlightenment in itself,
is only another repetition. It cannot avoid the implication that even
its own thought must inevitably become an object for it, separated from
it, and thus mythical. It is the 'relentless' [23] advance of
enlightenment, its never ceasing will to explanation, which not only
destroys all other myths, but recreates itself as myth and is forced to
destroy itself.
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'The principle of immanence, the explanation of every event as
repetition, that the Enlightenment upholds against mythic imagination,
is the principle of myth itself'. [24] It cannot hold out against the
all-encompassing logic of non-contradiction which is its own instrument
and rationality. What became a rational advance over forms of mythical
thought which did not acknowledge their origins in human activity,
becomes a rational impasse when that activity seeks to assert itself as
more than myth. The totality of myth which enlightenment undermines
becomes the myth of the totality of enlightenment.
That arid wisdom that holds that there is nothing
new under the sun, because all the pieces in the
meaningless game have been played, and all the
great thoughts have already been thought, and
because all possible discoveries can be
construed in advance and all men are decided on
adaptation as the means to self-preservation -
that dry sagacity merely reproduces the fantastic
wisdom that it supposedly rejects: the sanction of
fate that in retribution relentlessly remakes what
has already been. [25]
This is the path of despair which Habermas ultimately refused to
follow. It is the path where thought returns to trouble any positions
of rest or complacency in identity and it is a negative path because
the very principle of the path itself - that thought is already the
origin of the object - makes that origin impossible to grasp since it
is 'always already' a moment lost. [26] The pathway of despair is self-
expression when it cannot even know itself except as lost. The identity
thinking of enlightenment, that human reason is independent, is at the
same time, and against itself, the realization that this source remains
always other than the activity which knows it. Thus in the dialectic of
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enlightenment as outlined by Horkheimer and Adorno there is only
movement, there is only the repetition of the logic of non-
contradiction against itself as enlightenment. 'The identity of
everything with everything else is paid for in that nothing may at the
same time be identical with itself'. [27]
There is no overcoming in this dialectic, because there is only the
repetition of overcoming, and thus no rest from which a judgement can
be made regarding a completed enlightenment or rational critique.
Enlightenment as will to explanation through the self-power of
contradiction has dissolved 'the injustice of the old inequality -
unmediated lordship and mastery - but at the same time perpetuates it
in universal mediation...'. [28] It is this universal mediation which
describes the repetition of the dialectic of enlightenment, a mediation
which returned even in Habermas's attempt to proclaim it according to
itself. As was seen, a successful attempt to give mediation self-
expression as anything other than another negation must fail - and
precisely the failure is that self-expression. The negativity of the
dialectic of enlightenment which reduces modernity to its crises of a
lack of self-reassurance is understood as negative by Horkheimer and
Adorno, and their book is not, therefore, an attempt to overcome that
negativity. Unlike the theory of communicative action it is, rather, an
attempt to mount an internal negative critique of enlightenment by
exposing both the necessity of negativity, and the implications for
freedom of a society wherein that necessity, as a critique of
enlightenment, is unsustainable and only serves to strengthen that
which is the object of the critique.
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The Impossible Critique of Bourgeois Society.
It is in the sense of repetition, then, that enlightenment is
totalitarian. It dominates everything, including itself, to the extent
that it is a totality of thought. Its dialectic is that 'myth is
already enlightenment; and enlightenment reverts to mythology'. [29] It
is therefore mediation without repose. Each explanay(tion of (the
contradiction of) myth re-establishes the domination of enlightenment,
including the thought of its own self-contradiction. It is in the
ability of enlightenment to negate its own negation that it continually
scores absolute victory over all forms of critique. If bourgeois
society was the most complete form of enlightenment domination over
myth, its power of rational domination is increased in the repetition
of enlightenment which, in reverting to myth as subjective critique, is
already again the domination of the rational over the irrational. This
understanding of the dialectic of enlightenment accounts for the
pessimistic reception of the book, for in describing the domination of
enlightenment as total, they are implicitly arguing that there cannot
be an overcoming, or successful critique, of bourgeois society. They
raise the spectre that a critical theory of society is no longer
possible. 'It is characteristic of the sickness that even the best-
intentioned reformer who uses an impoverished or debased language to
recommend renewal, by his adoption of the insidious mode of
categorization of the bad philosophy it conceals, strengthens the very
power of the established order he is trying to break'. [30]
- 140 -
In offering their own critique of bourgeois domination they do not
offer emancipation from dominabn, as Habermas does, but only a release
from 'blind domination'. [31] Unlike Habermas, it is not their argument
that to know domination is to produce a unity of knowledge and interest
in freedom, but only again to know the loss of that unity in another
domination or rather as the repetition of the same one. In the
description of the domination of bourgeois society in Dialectic of
Enlightenment, the contradiction that the critique is itself negated
and results in a strengthening of that very domination is already
acknowledged. Nevertheless, in offering the critique in the full
realization of its self-destruction, Horkheimer and Adorno do hold out
the hope that the truth of enlightenment as dialectical and negative
will enable its more overtly totalitarian positive expressions to be
subjected to criticism and lose the power held in and by a lack of
self-reflection. The dilemma is summed up in the following way: 'there
is no longer any available form of linguistic expression which has not
tended toward accomodation to dominant currents of thought'. [32]
Nevertheless, 'we are wholly convinced...that social freedom is
inseparable from enlightened thought'. [33] Critique is necessary
because 'if enlightenment does not accomodate reflection of (its)
recidivist element...if consideration of the destructive aspect of
progress is left to its enemies, (then) blindly pragmatized thought
loses its transcending quality and its relation to truth'. [34]
Therefore, the aims of Habermas and Horkheimer and Adorno are not so
different here. Both wish to undermine the positivist conceptions of
modern enlightenment thought, one by overcoming repetition, the others
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precisely by not overcoming repetition. Where Habermas found a will to
emancipation, Horkheimer and Adorno express the totality of
enlightenment which is already an acknowledgement of enlightenment as
myth. In the consciousness of 'actual life', [35]
the dutiful child of modern civilization is
possessed by a fear of departing from the facts...;
his anxiety is none other than the fear of social
deviation....Since that notion (of enlightenment)
declares any negative treatment of the facts or of
the dominant forms of thought to be...alien, and
therefore taboo, it condemns the spirit to
increasing darkness. [38]
It is precisely to lift this darkness, to prevent fear of subjectivity
becoming petrified as unmediated or unreflective enlightenment, that
Horkheimer and Adorno offer their analysis. It is intended 'to prepare
the way for a positive notion of enlightenment which will release it
from entanglement in blind domination'. [37] Such an aim should not be
read as anything other than to ensure the universal mediation of the
dialectic of enlightenment against its reverting to stasis, objectivity
and unreflectiveness. The point is that 'the Enlightenment must examine
itself'. [38]
The particular features of bourgeois society which Horkheimer and
Adorno offer up for reflection range from the culture industry to
fascism, and from the increasing pliability of the masses to the
genocide of the unassimilated other. All have their roots in the
positivist enlightenment concerning the calculability of all things,
and the equivalence of all things under one objective measure. As was
seen above, bourgeois private property law embodies the objective
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measure of the equivalence which is all legal persons. The bourgeois
social whole establishes itself as an abstract collectivity, one whose
'unity' is based on the repression of the ethical relation which is the
recognition of that unity as misrecognition, and which is grounded in
the legal identity of the person in civil society. 'It is this unity of
the collectivity and domination, and not direct social universality,
solidarity, which is expressed in thought forms'. [39]
The production of objects as commodities reproduces this domination.
The social relation is masked by the illusion of the independence of
objects from the activity which is their becoming. The value of Marx's
theory of commodification for Horkheimer and Adorno is that it
comprehends not only that men appear related to each other as to
things, separated from and alienated from mutual activity as ethical
relation, but more importantly that 'a relation between men appears in
the form of a property of a thing'. [40] Activity or work appears as a
property of the thing which is the result of activity or work, and not
as the self-activity of the producer. Social labour is identified as
the exchange-value of the object, and similarly a theory of reification
has its identity in the exchange of values in the political market
place, not as a unity of theory and practice. 'In capitalist society,
reified concepts are the only form in which non-reified properties can
appear'. [41] Thus reification and exchange-values are already social
activities. Reification, like commodity production, 'is a social
category. It refers to the way in which consciousness is determined'.
[42] The domination, therefore, of bourgeois society is the repetition
of its own abstract universality as the identity and knowledge of
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subjectivity and human activity and this abstraction of the universal
from activity is the fetishism of objects, including the state in civil
society. Fetishism is mediation as identity, where activity becomes
repetition and conformity. Fetishism therefore
has extended its arthritic influence over all
aspects of social life. Through the countless
agencies of mass production and its culture, the
conventionalized modes of behaviour are impressed
on the individual as the only natural, respectable,
and rational ones. He defines himself only as a
thing...(and) his yardstick is self-preservation,
successful or unsuccessful approximation to the
objectivity of his function... [43]
Positivism represents the fetishism of enlightenment as method or non-
activity, where 'reason itself has become the mere instrument of the
all-inclusive economic apparatus'. [44] Its principle of non-
contradiction is the immanent movement of its own self-preservation,
and there is therefore no longer a form of thought available with which
to rebel against repetition. To challenge it is already to employ the
very logic which is the instrument of domination, and positivism
ensures that this instrument 'ratifies in the lecture room the
reification of man in the factory and the office'. [45]
The dialectic of enlightenment is therefore not only the repetition of
enlightenment as rational thought, but it is equally a sociological
explanation of power and domination tied to a specific production
process. [46] The static identities resulting from processes of
objectification which mask the movement behind their appearance, a
movement which is their becoming and to which their identities
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inevitably return, dominate both subject and object, ensuring their
eternal separation, precisely through the work carried out by the
unknowing creators or movers who produce these identities. [47]
It is with this in mind that Horkheimer and Adorno describe culture as
an industry whose product is illusory and deceives, by the very fact
that it has been produced, those who are its movement and becoming. The
cultural product, like the commodity, is already the equivalence of all
subjectivity, 'not merely because of the standardization of the means
of production', [48] but also because the individuality 'on show' [49]
transforms the particular into generality.
It is also with this sociology of domination in mind that Horkheimer
and Adorno present enlightenment as a 'half-education' which
'hypostatizes limited knowledge as the truth'. [50] It is precisely the
concealment of domination in production which, they argue, is the
economic reason behind bourgeois anti-semitism. [51] Jews are made the
scapegoats for the economic injustice faced by a whole class, by
personifying that which is concealed in the production process in the
person of the Jew. The fact that the Jews 'could not be absorbed into
the European nations' [52] ensured that the rulers could maintain the
Jews so that they could be placed as intermediaries between the
oppressor and the oppressed.
The productive work of the capitalist, whether he
justifies his profit by means of gross returns as
under liberalism, or by his director's salary as
today, is an ideology cloaking the real nature of
the labour contract and the grasping character of
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the economic system. And so people shout: Stop
thief! - but point at the Jews. [53]
This role of mediator turns the clinical objectivity of the production
process into an exploitative relation based on the will of those whose
greed can now be seen. Nationalist anti-semitism is more a
manifestation of the desire for revenge by the dispossesed masses,
generated and encouraged in an atmosphere where rule is not a matter of
equality, and where the visibility of the Jew as non-legitimate ruler
makes him a target for that revenge. In an atmosphere of objectivity,
conformity, and non-questioning, subjectivity becomes taboo as that
which is alien. In this half-education, race as identity becomes
defined according to the 'self-assertion of the bourgeois individual
within a barbaric collective'. [54] Just as enlightenment overcomes
fear of the non-identical by destroying it, so does nationalist anti-
semitism. 'Anti-semitic behaviour is generated in situations where
blinded men robbed of their subjectivity are let loose as subjects',
[55] but as subjects whose personalities represent the law of the
barbaric culture whose universality they are. At the time of their
exile, Horkheimer and Adorno could conclude that 'finally under the
conditions of modern capitalism, half-education has become objective
spirit'. [56]
Negative Dialectics
Men are robbed of their subjectivity in and by the totalitarianism of
enlightenment. It keeps subject and substance strictly separated by
excluding from reason the 'middle' which is the reflective movement in
which that separation is itself generated. The 'middle', as movement,
cannot be known without again already being enlightenment, as was seen
with the theory of communicative action, which attempted to reconstruct
the middle before or prior to separation. The domination of the logic
of non-contradiction denies the middle a non-identity, and therefore
keeps it permanently inactive. 'That an individual consciousness is one
applies only on the logical premise of an excluded middle - that it
shall not be able to be something else'. [57] Reflection, and activity
which is other than identity thinking, is negated by the domination of
a self-completing form of thought whose power lies in the return
implicit in contradiction. Not only is thought suspect which 'does not
conform to the rule of computation and utility, [58] but criticisms of
the logic of non-contradiction are forced, in the very activity of
critique, to repeat that logic, and thus domination is total.
However, faced with the seemingly secure victory of enlightenment,
Horkheimer and Adorno do offer the Dialectic of Enlightenment as
critique. It is their aim to make explicit what enlightenment prefers
to remain hidden, namely, that behind identity thinking, behind the
independence of facts, and behind the principles of equivalence and
calculation, there is a dialectical movement; and a movement which at
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one and the same time both grounds the identity of objects and
undermines that identity. Against the logic of disintegration, by
exposing the dialectic of enlightenment, they are trying to keep open
the possibility of subjectivity, of non-identity. Even though mediation
returns to enlightenment, nevertheless it may be possible, by
concentrating on mediation and movement rather than on result, to
undermine all identity, including that of critique. It is no longer a
question of taking sides for or against rational claims, but of
undermining all such claims by exposing the movement from which
identity both originates and returns. By concentrating enlightenment on
its dialectic rather than on its knowledge, on the movement of return
rather than that return as result, then the mythical is at least
present as reflection, and domination as total can enjoy no rest. Even
though this domination 'allows of no truth against which it could be
measured, the truth appears negatively in the very context of the
contradiction'. [59] Thus, by concentrating on the negativity of the
dialectic of enlightenment, the critical potential of reflection is
kept alive. 'Enlightenment which is in possession of itself and coming
to power can break the bounds of enlightenment', [60] but only
negatively, and this, as Rose points out, requires 'a changed concept
of dialectic', [61] one which makes possible the impossibility of the
(non) identity of self-destructive mediation and return.
Adorno's work after Dialectic of Enlightenment is largely concerned
with this problem of developing an idea of dialectic which has the
negative as (non) result. Since critique lies in the movement of
contradiction, and not on one side of a proposition or the other, he
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attempts to develop a style which can reveal the contradiction of
identity, and at the same time reveal the hidden mechanisms of
bourgeois domination. He arrives at an 'immanent method', a way of
allowing the contradiction of identity to speak for itself without
being resolved. Its immanence lies in the fact that it enables the
genuine self-expression of negativity, and of the social mediation of
individual objects and identities. Rose states,
Adorno's philosophical ambition was to redefine
the subject and the object, and their relationship,
without presupposing their identity, and to show
that this can only be accomplished if the subject
and object are understood as social processes, and
not as the presuppositions of pure epistemology. [62]
This immanent method is therefore the activity which, carried out
within and as the dialectic of enlightenment, can 'break the bounds' of
enlightenment from within. By inducing thought to contradiction, Adorno
is using enlightenment against itself to reveal its own mythological
character. The only result of such critique is no result, but a lack of
result is the critique of identity thinking. The very conditions of
repetition which contain the totality of enlightenment are also the
conditions which imply 'at the same time the objective possibility of
overcoming it'. [63] Whereas Habermas has assumed the theory of
communicative action as the identity of critique, Adorno is concerned
to preserve the critical movement of critique by precisely not
presupposing its identity. 'Thinking, which teaches itself that part of
its own meaning is what, in turn, is not a thought, explodes the logic
of non-contradiction'. [64]
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This immanent method expressed itself as Adorno's style. Rose notes,
'it is impossible to understand Adorno's ideas without understanding
the ways in which he presents them, that is, his, style', [65] and
further that 'criticism and composition in Adorno's work are
inseparable'. [66] His idea is to write in such a way as to create the
movement of contradiction, the dialectic of enlightenment, in the
reader, and thereby refuse static identities to concepts. Non-identity
is induced by the use of chiasmus where statements are made in an
antithetical, logically contradictory fashion such that the identity of
A is also claimed to be the identity of B. [67] Since the dialectic of
enlightenment lies in the immanent return of contradiction on itself,
this movement can be generated by bringing to view the lack of identity
implicit in enlightenment thinking. Where the aporias of contradiction
are resolved, there is bourgeois domination; when the aporias are
unresolved then, in that reflection, bourgeois domination is known but
is not identity as result. Thus 'Adorno presents whatever philosophy he
is discussing so as to expose its basic antinomies. [68]
Rose comments that Adorno's works are 'exemplars of negative
dialectic', [69] written and presented in such a way as to reveal the
previously hidden window of truth; and yet she also comments that his
decision to write the book Negative Dialectics, could be considered 'an
admission of failure'. [70] His problem is that the logic of self-
destruction may well have overcome the negativity which is now the
title of the book and available in the market place. Adorno himself
acknowledges that 'no theory today escapes the market place. Each one
is offered up as a possibility among competing opinions; all are put up
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for choice', [71] so it could also be claimed that such a book is
another methodological attempt to induce the non-identity of his own
work.
In Negative Dialectics, the dialectic of enlightenment is given a more
objective treatment as the logic of non-contradiction, and of identity
and non-identity, and the liberating or educational potential of the
negative as (non) enlightenment. Equally, however, the totality of
mediation as negative dialectic is offered against Hegel. Just as
Habermas criticized Hegel for presupposing the non-identity of
phenomenological critique, so Adorno criticizes him for presupposing
its identity.
The dialectic of enlightenment is what is referred to in Negative
Dialectics as simply dialectics, and enlightenment alone as identity
thinking. Just as the theory of communicative action presupposes the
self-identity of critique, so Negative Dialectics can be read as an
explication of the changed concept of dialectic. Nevertheless, it is
Adorno's aim to maintain the immanent method in the work, and therefore
it demands to be read according to that changed concept, that is, to be
understood negatively. 'The idea of a changed philosophy would be to
become aware of likeness by defining it as that which is unlike
itself'. [72] The contradiction involved in such a reading is the
immanent method.
Adorno explains that 'I have no way but to break immanently, in its own
measure, through the appearance of total identity', [73] and this can
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only result in the contradiction of non-identity. 'Totality is to be
opposed by convicting it of non-identity with itself', [74] not by a
method which presupposes another result, or is another will to
enlightenment, but immanently by exposing the self-contradiction which
is already involved in a claim to total identity. 'Dialectics is the
consistent sense of non-identity. It does not begin by taking a
standpoint. My thought is driven to it by its own inevitable
insufficiency...'. [75] Thus, Adorno concludes, 'dialectics is the
ontology of the wrong state of things'. [76]
Equally, the totalitarianism of identity thinking, which is reproduced
even in critique, can perhaps be held up to view as an education for
others regarding the excluded middle of activity and mediation. At the
very end of the work Adorno comments that 'it lies in the definition of
negative dialectics that it will not come to rest in itself, as if it
were total. This is its form of hope'. [77] This hope, the prison
window, is kept alive and reproduced in the idea of negative dialectics
by its continual inducement to contradiction. The movement which is
contradiction is also the movement which is critique, a negation which
will not even allow its own identity, as, for example, a theory of
reification. 'We can no more reduce dialectics to reification than we
can reduce it to any other isolated category'. [78]
The truth of negative dialectics lies therefore in its educative
character. Negation undermines the independence of objects, and a
negative dialectics undermines all independence per se. Thus the
subject, previously disinfected of subjectivity, reclaims self-truth as
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non-identity, an identity which exists as loss, and is never regained.
But the nothingness of this result is, for Adorno, at least a method of
destroying the self-destructive logic of enlightenment, by retaining
for us that process of self-destruction. Precisely because 'objects do
not go into their concepts without leaving a remainder', [79] there is
always a lack of identity, and therefore always the window of hope in
the prison wall. The excluded middle is always returned to, but only
known as fragmented, as not the middle. It is by inducing the return,
however, that the possibility of its (re) unification is kept alive.
This is the educational import of negative dialectics. 'The power of
the status quo puts up facades into which our consciousness crashes. It
must seek to crash through them.. .Where the thought transcends the
bonds it tied in resistance - there is freedom'. [80] Dialectics
exceeds the logic of identity at the same time as reproducing it
because it knows that it is reproducing it. Even though this is not a
victory over enlightenment, nevertheless in forms of non-identity
thinking 'it is possible to think against our thought, and if it were
possible to define dialectics, this would be a definition worth
suggesting'. [81]
The negative as a method of return is not a programme, for a programme
and a method cannot be immanent. Thus even if negative dialectics is
read as such, its untruth will exceed the reading. The truth of
Adorno's work is precisely the criticism which Habermas levels at it,
that nothing positive can result, including itself, which is not a
distortion and therefore also untrue. 'In dialectics', remarkes Adorno,
'it is not total identification which has the last word, because
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dialectics lets us recognize the difference that has been spirited
away. Dialectics can break the spell of identification without
dogmatically, from without, contrasting it with an allegedly realistic
thesis'. [82] And he might have added against Habermas that concerns
regarding the aporetic nature of non-identity are precisely based on
the form of identity thinking which is to be overcome.
Yet to have the negative as result, is in truth to have no result; but
it is to hope that the movement which is critique will not rest and
thereby cease to be critical. 'The individual is both more and less
than his general definition...he will experience this "more" as his own
negativity'. [83] That is, as where the more is less and the less is
more. To expose identity thinking as domination, as an exclusion of the
middle, is all that is possible for Adorno in civil society.
Negativity, as the true (non) identity of enlightenment is therefore a
political education about the illusions of the political, but one which
steadfastly refuses to succumb to an identity as that will to
enlightenment.
This refusal is not passive or resigned, it is strong and active in
destroying the logic of disintegration which robs man of his
subjectivity and of the possibility of realizing his ethical relation.
'While praxis ultimately is to affect the life of each and every
individual it must be recognized that life itself is mediated by
aspects of the social totality which determines it. The forms of
mediation have to be understood before praxis is really possible'. [84]
The experience of hope as negativity proves too much for those who,
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faced by the truth of contradiction, cling 'to the idea of something
beyond contradiction'. [85] The disintegration, through negative
dialectics, of the logic of disintegration, means 'philosophy must do
without the consolation that truth cannot be lost'. [86] It is not in
negativity that resignation is to be found, but rather in all non-
negative forms of thought and production; 'the individual life is made
easier through capitulation to the collective which he identifies. He
is spared the cognition of his impotence....it is this act, not
unconfused thinking, which is resignation'. [87]
A Changed Concept of The Negative.
Negative Dialectics has Hegel as adversary. Whilst Habermas claimed
that Hegel had not learnt from phenomenology that the will to
emancipation is the activity of self-critique, Adorno argues that Hegel
has not learnt from phenomenology that the will to enlightenment is not
absolute identity.
Despite being the first to envisage the modern contradiction between
experience and object, [88] Hegel fails to do justice to this insight
into the dialectic of enlightenment. 'Hegel does not carry out the
dialectics of non-identity to the end'. [89] He does not 'put his trust
in dialectics, does not look upon it as the force to cure itself'. [90]
His version of non-identity, of the movement which is mediation, is
turned into a principle of identity. 'There is truly no identity
without something non-identical', an insight Adorno concedes to Hegel,
but 'in his writings identity, as totality, takes ontological
precedence'. [91]
Adorno is critical not of Hegel's understanding of the negative, but of
his commitment to it. Having acknowledged that mediation moves
everything, including the idea which it gains of itself, Hegel still
produces from this a system wherein absolute identity is claimed. For
Adorno this is to fail to see that the truth of what is claimed as
absolute applies equally to itself, and it is Adorno therefore, not
Hegel, who unhesitatingly follows the path of despair, and it is Adorno
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who remains with the force of thinking which shatters all identity
thought, including its own. Non-identity, the repetition which is the
dialectic of enlightenment, cannot enclose itself within a system, for
its own truth is anithetical to closure. Therefore Hegel's system
negates itself, for,
no matter how dynamically a system may be
conceived, if it is i9kact to be a closed system,
to tolerate nothing outside its domain, it will
become a positive infinity - in other words,
finite and static. The fact that it can sustain
itself in this manner, for which Hegel praised
his own system, brings it to a standstill. Bluntly
put, closed systems are bound to be finished. [92]
Once again the idea arises that Hegel has presupposed the absolute.
[93] For Habermas the presupposition concerned the identity of the
positive, unconditioned absolute identity, for Adorno it concerns the
identity of the negative or of non-identity. The result is seen as the
same by both, that is, an untenable position according to the process
of phenomenology upon which Hegel's claims are based. Heglian logic
escapes the abyss of non-identity because it has 'advance assurance of
what it offers to prove'. [94] This is then achieved in the system by
an idea of synthesis as the instrument of dialectics. This synthesis is
used to preserve that which is lost in mediation to produce an all-
knowing identity, of both immediacy and mediation, both substance and
subject. It is a claim to have grasped the identity of that which
denies and destroys identity - 'the non-identical is not to be obtained
directly, as something positive on its part, nor is it obtainable by a
negation of negation...To equate the negation of negation with
positivity is the quintessence of identification'. [95]
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The problem that such an interpretation raises for Adorno is that it
appears now as if it is he, rather than Hegel, who seeks to protect the
negative from his own idea (presupposition) of its true appearance. If
Hegel's system, based around the identity of the non-identical,
contradicts the very idea of such a notion, then in that contradictory
movement it is more at one with the negative than Adorno's
protectionism. 'To negate a negation', says Adorno, 'does not bring
about its reversal; it proves, rather, that the negation was not
negative enough'. [96] But to know that a negation is not a negation is
a judgement that can only be based on an already to hand notion of what
the genuine self-identity of the negative is. Whereas Adorno claims
that Hegel makes a fetish out of the positive, it is perhaps more clear
that Adorno has made a fetish out of the non-identity of the negative.
By insisting on the impossibility of the absolute as the identity of
non-identity, by insisting on repetition without determination, Adorno
has removed negative dialectics from the dialectic of enlightenment and
identified it as absolutely the not-absolute. By the end of Negative
Dialectics, Adorno has claimed that 'it lies in the very definition of
negative dialectics that it will not come to rest in itself, as if it
were total'. [97] Indeed, this is precisely where the window of hope is
to be discovered. And yet it is 'the very definition of negative
dialectics' which is the problem here.
Adorno, having argued for a changed notion of dialectics, works with a
traditional (enlightenment) notion of negation. This version of the
negative is exclusive to and from the positive. It thus has its
identity when it is non-identity. As Horkheimer and Adorno noted back
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in 1947, the will to enlightenment ensures 'the distance between
subject and object' [98] such that the identity of the latter is gained
at the expense of the former. Adorno has repeated the dialectic of
domination in the very attempt to hold onto the negative, for he has to
assume an identity for negation where its distance and exclusivity from
the positive is guaranteed. Where Habermas presupposes the identity of
enlightenment and critique as overcoming, Adorno presupposes the
identity of the negative as not-overcoming, or as non-enlightenment.
Both repeat the separation of activity from object - Habermas by
presupposing the identity of the positive in critique to be non-
activity, and Adorno by presupposing the identity of the negative in
critique to be non-objective. Both versions of the dialectic of
enlightenment, of its identity as overcoming and non-overcoming,
presume an already accomplished enlightenment regarding the identity of
critique as self-activity, and presuppose the identity and non-identity
of the unconditioned.
Just as the theory of communicative action is based on a misreading of
the (absolutely) positive in Hegel, so negative dialectics is based on
a misreading of the (absolutely) negative in Hegel. It is precisely by
insisting on an identity for negation which is not absolute, that a
self-identity for the negative becomes impossible. 'To proceed
dialectically means to think in contradictions (and to be) suspicious
of all identity' remarks Adorno. [99] Yet a changed concept of
dialectics without a changed concept of negation is no change at all.
Dialectics remains external to the logic of destruction when its
identity is presupposed as not its own, and negative dialectics remains
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immanent critique of all identities except its own, which it
presupposes and thus establishes. Adorno rejects the absolute identity
of negation because it contradicts the idea of what the negative is.
For Adorno, negation which is absolute is not 'itself', whereas for
Hegel, determinate negation which is absolute is 'not-itself'; only the
latter, with a changed concept of negation, is immanent, not
presupposed, and true according to its law and logic of non-
contradiction. Having accused Hegel of making his dialectics a
principle of identity, [100] Adorno now emerges as having made the
negative his own principle of identity. He has a negative dialectic but
not a dialectic of absolute negativity.
In denying the notion of positive negation, Adorno also denies the
notion of determinate negation. It was his aim, having exposed the
dialectic of enlightenment as a totalitarian circle which destroyed
both non-enlightenment myth and enlightenment self-critique, to keep
the circle in motion, in order that the movement behind domination
could at least be kept in view. But in so doing, Adorno lost sight of
the subject he was intending to protect from the logic of
disintegration. Unless the subject is destroyed there is no movement.
That the subject requires to be mediated, and therefore to become
object, is a prerequisite for the appearance of non-contradiction as
movement. Indeed, they are one and the same. Thus the protection of
subjectivity from objectification, by inducing the repetition of non-
contradiction, is to concentrate on only one side of the totality of
the dialectic of enlightenment. With Adorno it is all dialectic and no
enlightenment. The subject never actually realizes himself beyond his
- 160 -
repetition as non-identity, and therefore is continually required to
forget that which is lost in each contradiction. It is the destruction
of subjectivity which determines non-identity by the very fact that it
is destroyed. By presupposing the dialectic of enlightenment to be not
enlightening, return is protected from itself.
Adorno charges Hegel with attributing dialectics 'to the subject
alone', [101] and thus ultimately removing the subject from
contradiction. This is a misreading of Hegel which, if it were the
case, would deny the subject any form of self-knowledge. This is
precisely, however, what Adorno has done, because in negative
dialectics there is only one negative movement after another, and no
subject which can recognize itself in any of them, that is, no subject
with any substance. For Hegel, the dialectic does not only move, it is
also known as movement; for Adorno this knowing is not self-knowing,
and thus subjectivity becomes an abyss, without meaning, without
substance and only always more nothingness. When the principle of
mediation 'is employed by the understanding separately and
independently...(then) dialectic becomes scepticism; in which the
result that ensues from its action is presented as mere negation'.
[102] By denying non-identity a self-truth, Adorno reduces the
dialectic of enlightenment to this empty result, a denial which has to
be forced onto the negative in a relationship of dominance over it.
Non-identity is itself. If it were not then it would have no use for
Adorno as critique of identity thinking. It is identity thinking which
demands that non-identity be nothing, a non-result. It is speculative
thinking which recognizes that non-identity, as itself, is result and
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moreover an immanently determinate one, defined by itself. Non-identity
cannot be nothing, for that would be an identity independent from the
movement which is its own becoming.
To be itself it cannot be itself. That is genuine dialectical thought
and a negative dialectic allowed immanent development. The
contradiction of the logic of non-contradiction is the third stage of
the Hegelian system.
In contradistinction to mere scepticism, however,
philosophy does not remain content with the purely
negative result of dialectic. The sceptic mistakes
the true value of his result, when he supposes it
to be no more than a negation pure and simple. For
the negative which emerges as the result of dialectic
is, because a result, at the same time positive: it
contains what it results from, absorbed into itself,
and made part of its own nature. 103]
Thus the result which Adorno denies on behalf of the negative is in
fact the self-result of the negative, and in Hegel's system is the
third moment of phenomenology, the speculative moment of reason as
self-produced. [104]
This, for Hegel, is the concept. The principle of the concept is the
same as that which, for Adorno, was the principle of dialectical non-
identity thinking. But for Hegel the concept is the identity of the
non-identical as non-identical, a self which Adorno presupposes to be
impossible because he presupposes already that the negative has no
identity. The concept is the only possible logical result of the
dialectic of enlightenment, even according to Adorno's own logic of
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disintegration and contradiction. A contradiction is a negation of
something. When the negation is of contradiction itself, then it is
also a negation of something, and at the same time, because it is a
self-contradiction, it is its own result. This is the identity of
contradiction and non-contradiction, the concept, without which
Adorno's negative dialectic cannot be known as negative, because of its
assumed identity of non-identity. The contradiction of this assumption
is the concept, because 'the result essentially contains that from
which it results: which strictly speaking is a tautology', [105] and is
known as the negation of the negation, that is, as self-activity.
Adorno's criticisms of Hegel with regard to his lacking faith in the
dialectic and opting out of its movement in fear of its negative
implications can now be turned back on Adorno. The fear of the negative
is really Adorno's. It is he who cannot bear the idea of the negative
as the true and therefore turns away from the absolute nature of
negative dialectics. He is left without a concept of negation which is
critical with regard to itself, manifested precisely in his claims that
it is not protected from itself and therefore is also a non-identity.
The refusal of identity for negative dialectics is the presupposition
of the identity of the negative. When negative dialectics turns on that
thought, then the contradiction produces in thought, the negation of
(thought as) negation. For the speculative to emerge as the result of
this negation of such ideas, 'the only thing needed is that they be
thought'. [106]
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This activity is determinate negation. It is the negative which has its
own movement not only as an object for it, but equally as that which
has given rise to itself. 'What is thus separated and non-actual is an
essential moment' of the concept, [107] or of self-movement. The logic
of non-contradiction when turned on itself (in/as philosophy)
determines itself as philosophical consciousness, and philosophical
consciousness, or the concept, is the identity of that non-identity.
Adorno would not allow the subjectivity of negation a substance on the
assumption that the negative had to remain uncontradicted by itself,
and thus immune from its own logic. Thus critique became impossible.
The concept is the recognition that the logic of non-contradiction is
Precisely the substance of the subject which it has produced through
its own activity and thus is its own self. All presuppositions of
mediation either as true or not true are only one side or the other of
the logic of non-contradiction, and both inevitably remove the absolute
from its immanent self-activity.
Consciousness is, on the one hand, consciousness of
the object, and on the other, consciousness of itself;
consciousness of what for it is the true, and consciousness
of its knowledge of the truth. Since both are for the
same consciousness, this consciousness is itself their
comparison; it is for this same consciousness to know whether
its knowledge of the object corresponds to the object or
not. [108]
As the concept, what it discovers is that only philosophical
consciousness corresponds to the immanent self-production which is (the
logic of) non-contradiction.
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Thus philosophical consciousness is absolute knowing. When Hegel says
that 'the true is the whole' [109] it is a speculative statement, which
is therefore not only the result of itself, but is also and at the same
time the production of that result as its own truth. In the concept,
movement and result are a unity, [110]
the whole is nothing other than the essence consummating
itself through its development. Of the absolute it must
be said that it is essentially a result, that
only in the end is it what it truly is; and that
precisely in this consists its nature, viz, to be actual,
subject, the spontaneous becoming of itself. [111]
Where Habermas presupposed an end and a beginning of mediation, and
Adorno presupposed their impossibility, for Hegel it is the absence of
beginning and end which is the result which Habermas was forced to
posit in advance, and which Adorno was forced to refuse. Philosophical
consciousness, when it fully comprehends its subjectivity and its
substance as the movement of self-contradiction, comprehends itself as
'the circle that presupposes its end as its goal having its end also as
its beginning'. [112] This circle consists of the fact that the concept
is actual only as self-result and self-activity, or that philosophical
consciousness is actual as the movement which is the result of and the
determinant of its own being-in-and-for-itself.
The Phenomenology of Spirit describes the education of consciousness to
this comprehension of itself as self-result. It is the journey of
consciousness along the path of despair 'from the first immediate
opposition of itself and the object to absolute knowing. The path of
this movement goes through every form of the relation of consciousness
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to the object and has the notion of science for its result'. [113] It
is therefore a process of self-enlightenment which Hegel describes as
'the detailed history of the education of consciousness itself to the
standpoint of science'. [114] The Science of Logic is the attempt by
philosophical consciousness, or the concept, at self-expression, that
is, to describe itself according to the circle which is its becoming.
Pure science presupposes liberation from the
opposition of consciousness.. .As science, truth
is pure self-consciousness in its self-development
and has the shape of the self, so that the absolute
truth of being is the known notion and the notion as
such is the absolute truth of being. [115]
By denying the absolute an actuality, Adorno suffers his own dialectic
of enlightenment, for he denies actuality altogether. [116] Without the
concept, Adorno has no way of comprehending what is actual and yet
actuality is the unrecognized result of negative dialectics. By
misreading the nature of the concept in Hegel, and not recognizing it
as the substance of his own claims for the impossibility of negative
self-identity, Adorno makes criticisms of Hegel which, for Hegel, are
actual statements regarding the concept. Adorno writes, 'the power of
the self-realizing universal is not, as Hegel thought, identical with
the nature of individuals in themselves, it is always contrary to that
nature'. [117] This is an accurate
	 description of the concept as the
identity of contradiction, and therefore of the movement between
identity and non-identity. What Adorno reads into the concept as
identical is underpinned by his own lack of a dialectic of negation,
and his presupposition of the identity of non-identity. Further, he
states that 'the principle of absolute identity is self-contradictory'.
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[118] Intended as a criticism of Hegel, it is in fact an actual
formulation of the concept.
When Hegel says that 'what is rational is actual and what is actual is
rational', it is a speculative statement regarding the movement which
is the dialectic of enlightenment. 'When thought grows hopeless', says
Hegel, 'of ever achieving, by its own means, the solution of the
contradiction which it has by its own action brought upon itself, it
turns back to these solutions of the question with which the mind had
learned to pacify itself...'. [119] For Habermas what is rational is
not what is actual, but rather is the prior existence of the lifeworld;
and for Adorno what is actual is not rational because it is self-
contradictory and is the moving repetition of enlightenment and myth.
But according to the concept, both of these views have their truth only
in a unification.
Actuality is the non-identity of the subject and object (the individual
and the external world), but it is the result of the mediation of
consciousness knowing the truth of the world to be (self)
contradictory. Thus what is rational is actual because the logic of
non-contradiction results in having itself for object - that is its
actuality - and what is actual is rational because the result is self-
valid - that is its (self-produced) rationality. Without the concept,
actuality cannot be comprehended according to itself as the movement of
philosophical consciousness, that is, of the self-consciousness of its
becoming as both loss and gain, which are for it one and the same. To
comprehend the world as it appears in actuality is neither to
-167-
abstractly defend it nor abstractly reject it, but to recognize our own
position in the world as the self-work of that which Adorno has called
the 'excluded middle'. Actuality is the determinate negation of
enlightenment, and contains all the contradictions of identity and non-
identity which Adorno sees Hegel as overcoming. Actuality is thus the
educational idea which Habermas and Adorno have refused, in their
different ways, as the self-identity of critique. To comprehend
actuality, or what is, is not only the task of philosophy, it is the
actuality of self-education, or the identity of self-critique which
both Habermas and Adorno in claiming to possess or not to possess have
once again re-moved from the middle. Actuality in Hegel is not an
alternative to the dialectic of enlightenment, it is the re-cognition
of this re-moving, through a changed (educating) concept of negation.
The standpoint which refuses the actual as absolute recognition of
self-movement is therefore one which repeats the identity thinking of
the middle as excluded. Adorno's refusal of the absolute is based on a
calculation of the identity of the negative. It is the abstract
thinking of natural consciousness, the very form of identity thinking
which he attacks as one-sided, uneducated, positive and bourgeois. Just
as Habermas presupposed the identity of critique to be grounded in the
movement of consciousness, and therefore as other than, outside of,
mediation itself, so Adorno also presupposes that the movement of
consciousness cannot be the criterion of the absolute, and that the
dialectic of enlightenment is other than truth. Habermas replaces the
non-identity of mediation with the identity of critique as
communicative action. Adorno retains and repeats mediation as the non-
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identity of critique. Both separate cognition and truth on the
presupposition that one is not the other. But this is merely a
repetition of bourgeois identity thinking, that is, of the
determination of objects as independent from the movement which lies
behind their appearance.
To assume that truth is movement in itself (Habermas) and is not
movement in itself (Adorno) is in both cases to see consciousness only
as a medium through which truth (as other than consciousness) can be
known. To have mediation as any form of result is to presuppose a
method which is not itself also movement. The fear of error noted in
regard to Habermas is equally relevant here to Adorno, as an assumption
in natural consciousness of the absolute as an identity independent
from its being known. Adorno's case is the more oblique because his
assumption is a negative one, unlike Habermas. Nevertheless, to assume
that the negative is not the self-truth of consciousness is already
somehow to know the totality of consciousness in a less than negative
fashion.
The non-actuality of negative dialectics thus undermines Adorno's
attempts to release enlightenment 'from entanglement in blind
domination' [120] by not recognizing this activity as actual. Only a
negative dialectics which recognizes its own non-identity as its own
truth can become more than blind domination, and transgress the logic
of non-contradiction which holds enlightenment within the limits of its
own impasse. Without the concept, and a changed notion of the negative,
Adorno can only maintain and impose those limits.
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Two Halves of a Broken Middle. 
Habermas and Adorno represent the two sides of what the latter
presupposed as an excluded middle, and the actuality of which Gillian
Rose has termed 'the broken middle'. [121] In both expressions, the
middle which is absent is absolute ethical life. The experience of this
absence is the dialectic of enlightenment, and its two halves are not
merely the separation of activity and object, subject and substance,
but rather the positive possibility and negative impossibility of their
reconciliation as absolute ethical life. The broken middle, or
actuality, however, is the recognition of the dialectic of
enlightenment as itself a misrecognition of determinate negation. The
dialectic of enlightenment is already itself the possibility and
impossibility of education as self activity. It determines its own
interpretation according to the logic of non-contradiction, by always
presenting itself to itself after its activity, and thus as separation.
It is as this misrecognition that the presuppositions of the identities
of enlightenment and dialectic in Habermas and Adorno are grounded.
For Habermas, to know the middle as broken is the unity of interest and
knowledge where the separation (of activity and object) is overcome,
and where, once it is known as overcome, the absence can be
reconstructed in a theory of communicative action. For Adorno, the
broken middle is not overcome, but again, what is excluded is what is
presupposed by Adorno, this time as the certainty that it CInot repaired.
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Education as either overcoming or not-overcoming is already the
misrecognition of the actuality which is the broken middle.
The separation of activity and object is, as was seen above, the crisis
of modernity which for Habermas is the basis of its need for a self-
reassurance. The dialectic of enlightenment, however, threatens all
attempts at such reassurance because once the middle is broken and
becomes its own object (in critique or as philosophical consciousness),
then a paradox is produced which suggests that reunification is
logically impossible. The broken middle, self-consciously realized in
critical thought and through the critical sociological and
philosophical traditions, reveals the logic of separation to be the
logic of non-contradiction and repetition. For Habermas and Adorno, the
crisis is the same one. A consciousness which has truth as its object
is already aware of the absence of the middle, or the middle as broken.
The middle is actual as the problem of its own absence. Reflection is
always the absence of the middle, and consciousness is left with only
the contradiction that subjectivity is 'always already' not ethical
substance. Activity and object are always already separated, and
thinking is never, therefore, the work which repairs the broken middle.
Attempts to do so only repeat the separation, an aporia which is
experienced as the dialectic of enlightenment.
Thus the dialectic of enlightenment becomes a problem of mediation and
dependency. Human activity is always already faced by the middle as
broken, and is therefore already a repetition of relative ethical life,
or civil society. The middle thus appears in social and political
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thought as something to be repaired by overcoming the separation. What
Habermas and Adorno share up to a point is the view that such an
overcoming can only be achieved as reflection, or as critique, for only
in reflection can the subject work upon an object which is not wholly
other than itself. In critical theory, reflection is self-reflection,
and critique is self-critique. Both therefore see the overcoming of the
dialectic of enlightenment as an educational issue. Equally, both agree
in principle on the totality of mediation. Habermas aligns himself with
phenomenology because of its victory over all forms of first
philosophy, and, for Adorno, the dialectic of enlightenment is that
totality.
For critical theory, and critical theory of education, it is in the
idea of critique as educational activity and result that the two halves
of the broken middle, subject and substance, are to be unified. What is
to be overcome is the form of uneducated and unenlightened thought
which presupposes the identities of objects by remaining unaware of the
fact that objects are for-us and therefore already mediated.
Presuppositions of identity repeat the abstract universality of civil
society by ignoring the mediation which has already produced identity
as result. In identity thinking, substance is always separated from the
subject which is its activity. In their own ways, Habermas and Adorno
share the view of critique as non-identity thinking. The instrumental
interest, by treating objects as independent, repeats the abstract
universality of identity; and of course for Adorno, all enlightenment
does this. For both, critique is the weapon which undermines
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instrumental and identity thinking by revealing the necessity of
(social) activity behind such identities.
Where they differ, and yet where they ultimately remain the same, is in
their view of the possibilities of self-education which critique can
perform. For Habermas, the insight into the universality of activity is
itself an enlightenment regarding unconditional reason. It is the
result of critique and therefore an overcoming of the separation of
activity from result. For Adorno, the insight into the universality of
activity is also an insight into the totalitarianism of enlightenment,
or identity thinking and the impossibility of a result for critique
which is anything other than a repetition of abstract knowledge.
In Habermas, then, the result of critique as an overcoming of abstract
thinking through the comprehension of its communicative and
intersubjective origin, is the claim to the self-identity of critique.
But this claim involves the idea that enlightenment as overcoming is
itself outside of the dialectic of enlightenment, an explanation of the
broken middle, and therefore another fracture, rather than a
comprehension of its actuality, or the work which is subjective
substance. It is a presupposition which is returned to the dialectic of
enlightenment and thus the idea of overcoming becomes something to be
overcome. In Adorno, the impossibility of a result of critique which is
other than further repetition (further identity thinking), when
employed as a critique of the absolute in Hegel, is taken as the self-
identity of non-identity thinking, or the impossibility of overcoming.
This, again, is a presupposition of the identity of that which in the
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broken middle is precisely claimed to be excluded, a unity of activity
and result which is not also abstract. Where they differ, then, is that
Habermas presupposes the identity of enlightenment as overcoming, and
Adorno presupposes the identity of dialectic as not-overcoming.
Habermas 'overcomes' movement or return, Adorno does not. Where they
remain the same is in their misrecognition of the actuality of
separation as activity and result. This misrecognition determines the
separation of educational activity from result which is embodied in
their respective presuppositions of education as method.
Thus, with regard to the educational import of the dialectic of
enlightenment, Habermas and Adorno are two halves of the broken middle
or subjective substance. Habermas's theory of communicative action is a
theory of ethical substance which lacks the movement or subjectivity of
self-identity. Adorno's theory of negative dialectics is a theory of
the return of subjectivity and the consequent impossibility of a
unification with ethical substance. In Habermas there is substance
without subject; in Adorno there is subject without substance. In
neither is the broken middle comprehended as work and result. The
dialectic of enlightenment encloses both within itself - Habermas is
undermined by the universality of mediation, Adorno is undermined by
the universality of non-result. Or, again, Habermas's substantial and
determinate result of negation is undermined by the universality of
mediation, and Adorno's universality of mediation is undermined by the
determinate and substantial result of negation. The dialectic of
enlightenment is both of their 'moments' or identities, the positive
and the negative. But this absolute recognition is found in neither,
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and both, by giving priority to one of the halves of the broken middle
over the other, repeat its fragmentation but do not comprehend the
actuality which is that repetition.
To overcome and not to overcome the dialectic of enlightenment,
Habermas and Adorno respectively have presupposed the identity of the
dialectic of enlightenment as the identity of critique as
enlightenment, and as the non-identity of critique as enlightenment.
Both are one sided, both exclude the other, neither comprehend the
dialectic of enlightenment according to itself. The presupposition of
education as method is the invention of a third aspect to the
dialectic, one which solves the problem of the dialectic of
enlightenment either positively (Habermas) or negatively (Adorno). But
this third is what is actual: it is what is, or the broken middle. The
experience of contradiction which both produce is the whole which is
the broken middle. It is both our object and our experience. Their
contradiction is our actual education regarding the relative ethical
life of civil society.
The concept is this identity and non-identity of the dialectic of
enlightenment. But neither Habermas nor Adorno realize this education
regarding the actual because they do not comprehend the concept, the
broken middle, according to itself as the movement which is
fragmentation and unification. Enlightenment in Habermas has no
actuality because it is not also immanently known as destroyed or lost.
Dialectic in Adorno has no actuality because it is not also known as a
self-produced activity and determinate result. Result in Habermas lacks
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return, return in Adorno lacks result. Both interpret the movement
which is the broken middle according to presuppositions regarding the
identity of educational self-activity, presuppositions which always
separate activity from result, and remove education from the path of
despair. The idea of education in civil society as overcoming or non-
overcoming is already abstract. The experience of this is itself
understood only by employing the same idea of education of which it is
a critique. Thus the dialectic of enlightenment is understood according
to the abstract idea of education which it undermines. In critique, and
in critical theory of education, what is criticized about education,
the separation of activity from result, is precisely what is presumed
as already overcome, and thus repeated, as critique.
This movement has to be recognized as loss and gain, as negation and
determination, if it is to avoid presupposing enlightenment as result,
and denying us the educational import of our own misrecognition. It is
the idea of recognition of misrecognition which is this education for
us in Hegel, and which is the concept's own self-production. It is to
an examination of the implications of recognition of misrecognition as
the self-identity of education which the final chapter now turns to. It
reads the idea of education in Hegel against, or as the recognition of
the misrecognition of education in Habermas's and Adorno's work on the
dialectic of enlightenment and in critical theory of education.
CHAPTER IV - HEGEL AND EDUCATION.
A - RECOGNITION.
It is the work of the last three chapters, in comprehending the
dialectic of enlightenment as the absolute knowing of enlightenment as
dialectic and dialectic as enlightenment, that enables this chapter to
present the recognition of misrecognition in Hegel as the self-work of
that educational experience, or its educational import  or 	 ‘01%%0W2.
experience it is. What follows, then, first examines recognition in the
Phenomenology of Spirit with regard to the dialectical relationship of
-independence and dependence in the master/slave relationship, and in
subjective substance. Recognition of misrecognition, comprehended as
the movement and result which is education, or the concept, is then
presented as the actuality of two educational relationships in civil
society, that of the teacher and the student, and of critique and the
state.
Mutual Recognition.
In Hegel Contra Sociology, Gillian Rose notes that in Hegel's early
work it was not the idea of recognition which was used to try and
describe knowing which, as she puts it, 'does not dominate or suppress
but recognizes the difference and sameness of the other'. [1] Rather it
was the idea of 'seeing into'. However, such a 'reflective' idea
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repeated the dialectical movement of subject and object, but did not
adequately express the third moment of 'seeing into', that is, the
determinate result where both comprehend their mutuality in and as the
movement of the dialectic. 'Seeing into', 'has the semantic
disadvantage of sounding too immediate, too pre-critical, too
successful', notes Rose . [2] Its implicit finality was precisely not
the nature of the result; whereas '"re-cognizing" emphasizes the lack
of identity or difference', [3] a lack which is known and therefore is
result.
The insertion of the hyphen into the english term recognition, to
become re-cognition communicates successfully the mediation or movement
which is another, or re-knowing, and the fact that it is known, re-
cognized. The two parts of the term produce a unity of movement and
knowing, or determinate negation, which is the third movement, or the
actuality of enlightenment. Rose summarizes this as follows.
'Recognition' refers to the lack of identity or
relation which the initial dichotomy between
concept and intuition, or consciousness and its
objects, represents. But it also implies a unity
which includes the relation or lack of identity.
This unity mediates between the poles of the
opposition and is hence triune. 'Recognition',
'concept' and 'spirit' all have this triune
structure. [4]
In the Phenomenology of Spirit, recognition replaces 'seeing into' as
the educational self-movement and self-production which is spirit. The
movement of recognition, whilst the result of the Phenomenology of
Spirit as a whole, is dealt with in three different ways by Hegel. The
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first is an explicit and abstract exposition of mutual recognition,
another is the dialectic of domination and dependence as it is
manifested in self-consciousness, and another is the actuality of
recognition as misrecognition in moral self-consciousness, and as
absolute knowing.
Mutual recognition is absolute ethical life. It is the self-expression
of mutual social relations and intersubjectivity which Habermas
presupposed in the idea of communicative competence and later as the
lifeworld and which Adorno presupposed as unknowable by denying the
absolute an actuality, or the negative a self-negation.
Hegel's discussion of mutual recognition is placed before the
exposition of self-consciousness. However, in keeping with the remarks
made regarding beginnings and ends in chapter III above, this is not a
presupposition on Hegel's part of what is to follow, and what will
result. It is itself a result of that which follows. Moreover, the idea
of mutual recognition described here is not the actuality of
recognition at all, it is the abstract statement of the identity which,
as actual, must be realized and therefore also lost. The pure process
of mutual recognition precisely outlines that which is not achieved in
actuality, and which, therefore, is the actuality of recognition.
Recognition is social. When the object or other of immediate desire
(immediate need or self-gratification) is life itself, or the
preservation of life, then the only certainty which can be gained is
also immediate. There is no self-differentiation for natural man (to
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use Rousseau's term) because there is only the self-certainty of that
whose needs are temporarily satisfied. The object of its desire has no
independence of its own, it is simply a means to the end of
satisfaction for desire, and thus the relation of desire to the object
is a never-ending one. The independence of desire is the total
destruction of the other, and therefore there is no relation with it
which would negate its complete independence. 'The simple I', as Hegel
calls it, [5] is undifferentiated.
However, desire is not in such a state of nature. When its object is
another like itself, then by the very fact that it has an object of
desire, the independence of that object from it (from desire) becomes
apparent, as does its own independence from the object. Desire is the
origin of the social, and yet, as desire, it is already social. It is
immediately the loss of desire (i.e. of itself) as absolute
independence, because it is now of another like itself. Consciousness
of the other is therefore at the same time self-consciousness. This
relation of one to the other is the repetition of desire, for it
reproduces both desire and the other as independent. 'Thus, self-
consciousness, by its negative relation to the object, is unable to
supercede it; it is really because of that relation that it produces
the object again, and the desire as well'. [6] This dialectic has been
seen before in this work as the inescapable logic of the idea of
enlightenment as overcoming which, by presupposing its own identity
within the law of non-contradiction, is already separated from the
object, and thus ensures its own failure. Desire, which would destroy
the other for its own self-satisfaction and certainty, ensuring its own
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domination and independence, finds that in the very act of desire, in
the very act of seeking to overcome, the separation between itself and
the other is reproduced. What is destroyed in the desire for
independence is the possibility of independence, for desire becomes
dependent upon, and the repetition of, the (independent) other. Just as
in the dialectic of enlightenment, that which would overcome its object
ensures its own failure in and by the necessity, inherent in the
activity, of its already being separated from the object.
But this failure is a lesson for us, or for desire, because the loss of
its certainty, and repeated loss, is the truth of desire itself.
According to the logic of identity and non-contradiction, a satisfied
desire is not desire. But comprehended as result, a satisfied desire is
not-desire. Unsatisfied desire is the truth of desire, its self-
identity as the contradiction of its immediate appearance. It is in the
contradiction of desire - where its satisfaction is its unsatisfaction
- which is its truth. Hegel states, 'it is	 act something other than
self-consciousness that is the essence of desire', [7] something which
it must experience as itself in the loss of itself. Since desire is
'always already' negative, then in the recognition of this as its own
(non) indentity, it achieves satisfaction, but in and as the
contradiction, or the movement which is the loss.
The question remains as to what this 'other' is, which is the essence
of desire, for if recognition is only subjective, then no 'other' than
self-consciousness has in/fact resulted. Recognition must be brought
about by both subject and object who are respectively also object and
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subject for the other. The independence of one is generated by its
being object for another, and the dependence of each is already brought
about in the desire for self. Each is both subject and object, and each
is independent and negative, or the self-identity of dependence. 'A
self-consciousness exists for a self-consciousness' [8] but neither is
in-itself without the other. Their recognition is a relation, and their
negativity is the result of self-activity on both parts.
This action of the one has itself the double
significance of being both its own action and the
action of the other as well...Thus the movement
is simply the double movement of the two self-
consciousnesses. Each sees the other do the
same as it does.. .it is indivisibly the action of
one as well as of the other. [9]
This relation, then, is the result of mutual activity, and mutual
(self) negation. It is the relation in which 'a self-consciousness, in
being an object, is just as much "I" as "object". With this', says
Hegel,
we already have before us the notion of spirit...
this absolute substance which is the unity of the
different independent self-consciousnesses which,
in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and
independence. [10]
Recognition, therefore, abstractly comprehended according to itself by
itself, is the concept of spirit. It is also what Hegel calls mutual
recognition, or the middle which lies between, and is the unity of, the
separated individual self-consciousnesses.
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Each is for the other the middle term, through
which each mediates itself with itself and unites
with itself; and each is for itself and for the
other an immediate being on its own account, which
at the same time is such only through this mediation.
They recognize themselves as mutually recognizing
one another. [11]
This middle, then, is the identity of pure dependence or of the
negative which is the true essence of self-consciousness or desire. It
is the identity of the contradiction of the negativity of desire, and
when recognized by both is the intersubjective relation of mutual
freedom, or the independence of dependence. Thus, in mutual
recognition, is contained the idea of absolute ethical life, or of the
middle which is no longer broken. Put another way, ethical life is now
comprehended as the relationship of mutual recognition, a relationship
which is the education and enlightenment of both subject and object.
Both Habermas and Adorno share the idea that absolute ethical life, as
envisaged in mutual recognition, is the purpose or gaol of critique,
but both, in their own terms, would argue that it does not exist, and
has not yet existed in history. Hegel shares this view, but the
abstract interpretation of the absolute in his work by commentators
removes it from its actuality, and sees it as complete in the sense of
finished, and therefore of history as already having culminated in the
idea of freedom on earth as the state. Such interpretations take no
account of the necessity of movement and contradiction which prevents
completion in the sense of finished, and yet is the truth of self-
consciousness in terms of self-realization. Indeed, as Rose points out,
there are occassions when Hegel does not hide his despair at the
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seeming impossibility of an ethical unity, or of mutual recognition.
[12]
What such interpretations again misread is Hegel's meaning of
actuality. Just as desire is already separated from its object, so
self-consciousness is already separated from its other. Their unity
cannot be presupposed outside of the mediation which is this
experience, and thus unity is 'always already' separation in being
known. To assume that somehow mutual recognition is anything other than
actual, is to presuppose absolute knowing or the pure concept in logic
as other than its own result, or, put another way, to dominate the
absolute. The absolute, in Hegel, contains the lack of absolute ethical
life as its result. The comprehension of mutual recognition is
precisely not mutual recognition. The contradiction, or negativity, is
its truth, and philosophical consciousness, or the concept, is re-
cognition of its own self in the negativity which is not mutual
recognition, and is its actual realization. To say that the
comprehension of actuality is not mutual recognition is to express the
experience which is the truth of mutual recognition.
Hegel's description of mutual recognition in the Phenomenology of
Spirit is the acknowledged Sollen in his work. It is a statement of
unity abstracted from its own work and is not, therefore, an exposition
of the actuality of recognition as education. The remainder of the
Phenomenology concerns mutual recognition as it is actually realized by
the subject, or by self-consciousness. What in mutual recognition is
abstractly presented as 'the double movement of the two self-
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consciousnesses', [13] becomes, as misrecognition, 'the inequality of
the two, or the splitting-up of the middle term into the extremes
which, as extremes, are opposed to one another, one being only
recognized, the other only recognizing'. [14] The loss of the middle,
or self-consciousness, is therefore already educational work, and it is
this self-work which is comprehended in the master/slave dialectic as
the misrecognition of the slave, and the determinate result which is
the slave as work and result.
The Master/Slave Dialectic.
Written in the 'pure' terms of domination and dependence, the
master/slave dialectic recognizes the educational movement wherein
the relation which is dependence realizes itself according to
itself. In line with its own nature as dependent, its self-identity
cannot enjoy the power of domination. A self-identity of dependence
requires a complete lack of domination as its own autonomy. That is
again the contradiction of rational identity which is not recognized
as actual by the logic of non-contradiction. The contradiction is
essential if its negation is to be determinate, and if its
determination is to be negative.
A reading of the master/slave dialectic which has recognition as
result, and is not taken to be a struggle for recognition, but for
independence, is one which does not resolve the contradiction of
dependence. It is in just such a reading, also, that the
master/slave dialectic reveals itself as the immanent educational
import of the dialectic of enlightenment. With the master
representing enlightenment, independence and domination, and the
slave representing myth and dependence, Hegel has already laid the
foundations for 'recognition' as the self-educating critique of
modernity, and as the comprehension of the actuality of, and the
educational import of, the dialectic of enlightenment.
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The master/slave dialectic has already begun as desire, and yet that
beginning can only be comprehended as the concept, or the truth of
philosophical consciousness. This contradiction, of the beginning
only being comprehended as the end and the end as the work of the
beginning, is the truth of phenomenology and belies any simple
chronological reading of the Phenomenology of Spirit. Self-
consciousness, in seeking its own certainty and independence by the
supercession of the other, has already entered a 'social' relation
with this other. Not only must self-consciousness prove to itself
that the other is unnecessary for it, but equally it seeks to
confirm its own independence from any objective existence or being
for the other. Thus independence would be gained in one of two ways,
either by overcoming the other, or by being overcome, since death
would also be an independence from the specific existence which
produces this experience of non-universality, that is, from life.
Self-consciousness, then, enters a life and death struggle where, in
seeking the death of the other, it also stakes its own life. This is
not a struggle for recognition, for that would be to concede a
relation with the other. Each combatant does not enter the struggle
to give up that which it is fighting for, but rather to achieve non-
relation at any cost. Nor is it a struggle for mutual recognition,
since it does not as yet admit the other to be like itself. The life
and death struggle is not political or ethical for the combatants,
although it is so for us who already know of the reciprocity of the
struggle. That political and ethical aspect has itself to be
comprehended by them as the result of the struggle, not its
precursor. [15]
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In risking its life, self-consciousness learns two things. Firstly
it learns that it can be independent of life, it can die. Secondly,
however, in becoming aware of that independence, it also realizes
that there is nothing within it which could not simply vanish. The
first lesson produces for self-consciousness the independence of
lordship or domination. Pure being-for-self (death) is absolute
independence from life, and is the autonomy which desire seeks for
itself as its own self-identity. But such an identity is
contradictory, for to be absolutely independent, the master must
literally not be itself, it must be unmoving, unmediated, and dead.
If the master is alive, then he is not independent.
Independence in death is a contradiction which the identity of the
master cannot survive. But this loss, or this contradiction, is the
second lesson produced in self-consciousness by the life and death
struggle. [16] This consciousness knows (or is the knowledge) that
the master, or independence, cannot survive death in order to be
independent. The contradictory claim of independence by the master
is known by the slave. The awareness of (the) death (of the master
as independent) is the condition upon which the slave depends for
its own existence. The master, on the other hand, simply because he
is not dead, is therefore not self-identity or independent, and
remains unsatisfied.
The slave exists as the consciousness which is of death, [17] whilst
the master vanishes into the contradiction that it cannot master
death and yet remain determinate or knowing. The truth of the master
-188-
is the contradiction of the dialectic between independence from life
and the dependence upon life which is 'always already' apparent in a
struggle for independence. Consequently, the truth of the master is
dependence, or the slave. His struggle for independence from life
has repeated itself as the contradiction of the necessity of
dependence upon life, and 'the object in which the lord has achieved
his lordship has in reality turned out to be something quite
different from an independent consciousness. What now really
confronts him is not an independent consciousness, but a dependent
one'. [18]
What, in the dialectic of enlightenment was the totalitarian
movement of enlightenment, is here the desire of the master for
independence and self-identity. Just as enlightenment reverted to
myth, so the master becomes slave. However, this has been looked at
only from the point of view of the master, and consequently is
interpreted only as loss, destruction and despair. Independence,
from the master's perspective, is always other than that which is
the truth of independence, that is, the slave, or being which has
(the loss of) its self for object. The contradiction of independence
results in being-for-self, a movement which (interpreted according
to Habermasian critique) reveals the slave to be the true identity
of dependence, and thus the determinate result of critique. But a
slave which is master is not, therefore, only a slave. If the truth
of the slave is the destruction of the master in self-contradiction,
and the master represents 'true identity', then the slave has no
enjoyment of self, only loss of self. For Adorno, the slave is
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absolutely not master, since it is always already the destruction of
independence as the critique of identity thinking. Yet the slave
consciousness is granted freedom from dependence by Adorno in the
presupposition that the slave is not its own absolute identity.
Recognition of misrecognition is thus only possible as the slave. In
the discussion of mutual recognition it was seen that the middle is
established only when each is also the other, which requires action
by one to be reciprocated by the other. The master does not negate
life for he alone performs no work upon it. His consciousness is not
of death, it is only the enjoyment of life itself, and thus is not
the independence he hoped to gain. There is, therefore, no mutual
negation of master and slave. The master is not negated, and thus he
does not recognize the other to be also himself. Such a recognition
is possible only for the slave.
The slave is the consciousness of death. In seeking to supercede the
other, this life was also at stake, and yet no independence resulted
from the life and death struggle. This trial by death 'does away
with the truth which was supposed to issue from it, and so, too,
with the certainty of self generally'. [19] The loss of certainty is
the slave consciousness, for it, and not the master, is the
consciousness which knows that 'there is nothing present within it
which could not be regarded as a vanishing moment, that it is only
pure being-for-self'. [20] To know of death is not to be dead.
Therein lies the dependence which is the slave. The slave is
dependent upon death, for it is the knowing of that which is not
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itself, that is, not life. 'Its whole being has been seized with
dread; for it has experienced the fear of death, the absolute lord'.
[21] It is not life which is object and other for the slave, but
death. Death is his absolute lord. It is what he will always be
dependent upon, and he is forever bound to (the experience of) death
for his own existence. But the slave, therefore, is pure negativity
and has absolutely no existence of its own, for it is wholly and
completely and always for another. Without the other, it has no
being. Thus, its existence is as fear, or the experience that it has
no stability, no identity of its own, and is totally dependent upon
the absolute sovereignty of death.
Here, then, the slave consciousness appears to be as contradictory
as that of the master. How can the slave be a slave? Is not the idea
of the identity of a slave a paradox, since if a slave is only and
always a slave, then seemingly it can only ever be itself when it is
not itself, or has no identity of its own? This is exactly the
contradiction which faced critical theorists of education, and
Habermas, in trying to assume critique as the identity of
enlightenment. Both critique and the slave are negative in character
and give rise to an aporia of reasoning that in order to be true
must also be false. Whereas Habermas took critique to be the truth
about that which was false, and Adorno took non-identity thinking to
be not true about that which is false, the slave, through
recognition, finds his own identity precisely in and as the work
which is the contradiction. This is the educational import of the
master/slave dialectic for the dialectic of enlightenment.
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The slave does not just have his own negativity implicitly within
him, as fear of nothingness, he also has it explicitly before him as
the master, for the master, as independence, is absolute
nothingness. Because the slave works on the object, or is activity,
the object has independence from it. It is his own work which
creates his dependence. The slave exists as the will to independence
or as desire. But the will to independence is already dependence and
has freedom or independence as its object. And yet, in the
experience of death, and in the contradiction of the master, the
slave has before it the truth of its own nature. Death is absolute
negation, and fear is of absolute negation. Thus, being-in-itself or
the independence of negativity, and being-for-self, the dependence
of negativity, are now the work and activity of one consciousness.
It is through work that desire is negated, and therein recognizes
its own truth to be negative. Its activity is also its identity. The
master/slave dialectic, therefore, describes and is the work of the
recognition of misrecognition. It is an educational process or the
comprehension of self-consciousness regarding its own self-identity
in the experience of its own negation. In the slave, self-
consciousness has the awareness that it is not independent and that
the slave is the result of the struggle for independence. Thus the
struggle for independence produces the recognition that self-
consciousness is not-independent. It learns what it is, by doing
what it is. Recognition is the recognizing of self through work, as
work, or as misrecognition. The result is an education of self-
consciousness regarding itself. Precisely because what it learns is
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that it is work or activity as self, that is not a completion. The
identity of self-consciousness, or desire, only is when it is not
independent and risks itself to attain it. Thus, although 'fear of
the lord is indeed the beginning of wisdom... (it is only) through
work, however, (that) the bondsman becomes conscious of what he
truly is', [221 and he only recognizes what he truly is when he
works. Thus, contradiction is contained here in the idea of
recognition. Recognition of self is only possible as loss of self,
for what is recognized is (the identity of) dependence by itself as
misrecognition. Activity comes to know itself through what it does;
this is the truth of philosophical consciousness. The identity is
not that of slave, but of the identity and non-identity of the
slave, or put another way, recognition is of the mastery of being
non-master, or the non-dependence of being absolutely dependent.
The dialectic of master and slave is the dialectic of desire and
work. Desire seeks independence, and in so seeking it, is already
the work which risks life, knows death, and is negative. The slave
is the identity of the negative as misrecognition. Work is therefore
what desire is, and desire is (or does) only as self-work. The work
which is already the identity of the slave is now recognized as a
self-activity, and misrecognition is recognized as self-production.
This activity is the work which is recognition of misrecognition,
and is the (self) education of self-consciousness. It is this
movement as actuality which is the educational and political import
of Hegel's philosophy.
-193-
The Dialectic of Subjective Substance.
The master/slave dialectic only represents the process of recognition
as an internal affair. What lies ahead in the Phenomenology is the
recognition for individual self-consciousnesses of their mutual non-
identity as subjective substance. The whole movement of which the
person in civil society is the result depends upon the other which
faced it in the life and death struggle. This abstract independent
personality now faces its own contradiction that its own independence,
and that of all other persons, is mutually dependent upon each other.
The free individual is not free, and the dialectic of independence and
dependence begins again, [23] this time as the dialectic of subject and
substance.
The logic of non-contradiction becomes universal reason when
consciousness takes itself to be all reality, and 'discovers the world
as its new real world...for the existence of the world becomes for
self-consciousness its own truth and presence'. [24] Enlightened
consciousness becomes self-certainty. However, this self-certainty is
merely abstract, and on reflection, returns to the dialectic of
enlightenment and to the uncertainty which has already been examined
above. The enlightenment of self-consciousness as universal reason, as
pure substance, holds 'an irresistable authority' [25] over myth,
faith, and the irrational, because it is the awareness that thought of
myth, of faith, of the irrational is always already the activity of
consciousness. 'In the believer's own consciousness, are found the very
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moments which enlightenment has established as valid'. [26] The nature
of enlightenment's victory is that by establishing the universality of
the logic of non-contradiction as its own self, faith 'has been
expelled from its kingdom; or, this kingdom has been ransacked, since
the waking consciousness has monopolized every distinction and
expansion of it and has vindicated earth's ownership of every portion
of it and given them back to earth'. [27] Yet the logic of non-
contradiction, or abstract universal reason, bears within it a 'blemish
of an unsatisfied yearning', [28] namely that it cannot overcome its
own internal contradiction that its own validity rests on the
presupposition that the 'test' of validity is its own self. This
presupposition of validity is thus the domination of reason, and is
itself only formally rational.
Reason as activity reveals its self-contradiction. The unsatisfied
enlightenment is the dialectic of enlightenment, that is, the
contradiction which the logic of non-contradiction produces for self-
consciousness. When enlightenment is pure immediate certainty, and is
not reflective or dialectical, and is not mediated, then it is the
violence of absolute freedom. In such circumstances, universality is
merely a formal principle, it has no self, and is domination over any
and all that are not itself, i.e. over everyone. This is the principle
of civil society, but not its actuality. Reflection is the antithesis
of this violence, and as will be seen below, recognition of
misrecognition is the actuality of ethical life.
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What Hegel refers to as 'the spiritual animal kingdom' in the
Phenomenology of Spirit [29] has this formal universality in law, such
that law is the universal formally existing in the world. The
universal, as the law of identity or independence (non-contradiction),
is the truth of all who have an identity or are independent. Its
substance is the establishing of the independence (and non-
contradiction) of each person as separate from and differentiated from
every other. Law is substantial because it applies equally to all. That
is its universality, its non-contradictory and hence rational
character. It is the universality of all persons, or is their
community, but since the universality it provides for them is only
formal independence, then it is merely the spiritual animal kingdom
where each person 'starts afresh from itself, and is occupied not with
an other, but with itself'. [30] Not only is this kingdom the
(contradiction of a) community of persons, presenting itself as the
middle term which is their unity, or the ground of intersubjectivity,
but each person is at the same time the substantial truth of the law of
non-contradiction. Thus, the person, simply by being itself, and having
reason (law) for its object, already embodies this universality as
itself. Thus law is both universal (or community), and the principle of
the universal or community. The nature of this kingdom of formal
independence is thus one of tautology and lack of substance, because
its activity is merely implicit. The spiritual animal kingdom is the
merely external state which is civil society.
The abstract law of this kingdom employs its own self-nature as the
criteria of universality and is able to prove its truth by employing
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itself also as the measuring instrument or criterion by which it is to
be judged because it is already (determined as) separated from that
which is merely particular. This is tautological because
individuality is in its own self actuality' (i.e. merely
implicitly actual)'....Action has, therefore, the
appearance of the movement of a circle which moves
freely within itself in a void...and is perfectly
content to operate in and with its own self. [31]
Substance is only formal universality, indeterminate because of a lack
of negation, a lack of the subject as its own self-activity. Just as
the dialectic of enlightenment produces the tautology of enlightenment
dominating myth by testing it according to itself as criterion of
universality, so reason as (the) law (of non-contradiction) produces
the tautology of reason as merely the testing of laws. The domination
inherent in the tautology is masked precisely in the illusion of its
universality, which appears because mediation is always already formal
and abstract.
Similarly, just as the dialectic of enlightenment revealed the self-
contradiction of reason which itself reverted to myth, so abstract law
produces its own self-contradiction. Enlightenment, in realizing its
tautology, could not avoid self-enlightenment and thus negation. The
universality of the spiritual animal kingdom is realized as also
undermining itself by those whose independence it guarantees. Whereas
the problem for enlightenment was caused when activity was realized
already to be reflection, and thus for it or negative, so, here, the
subject realizes that his own (actual) existence already contradicts
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the universality of the 'community' because that community, that law,
is that upon which his independence is already dependent. Universality,
or the independence of each in the community, is thus determinate and
dependent upon what is now known as an abstract universality or
community. Independence now is not, and independence becomes an object
for that subjectivity which now realizes its dependence upon that which
it is not, viz, the community. Subjectivity, in the dialectic of
enlightenment (and in the master/slave dialectic), and now in the
dialectic of subjective substance, is only negative. However, this loss
of certainty is already the experience of ethical substance. What lies
ahead for subjectivity is the recognition of its negativity as the
self-identity of that substance, or as spirit. The loss of the
community is the work and actuality of ethical life in civil society.
The legal recognition of the independence of each person establishes
the contradiction of law in civil society. The law, as universal,
recognizes each particular individual as a non-contradiction, an
identity. Yet the very fact that this applies to all individuals, and
requires their individuality for its own independence, it also
establishes this independence as dependent. Law which guarantees the
universal and non-contradictory nature of each person also produces the
activity which knows the dependency of each person upon that law, and
thus upon each other. The state in civil society is always
misrecognition.
The same contradiction arises in the law of private property. The
independence of each person, guaranteed by their right to exclusivity
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in overcoming (possessing) objects, masks the social determination of
this merely formal ethical tie. Ownership, or independence, requires
and is dependent upon others to whom an object does not belong. Whether
law recognizes the right of possession or identity (and identity is
only self-possession), it contradicts its own abstract universality by
the totality which is its own mediation.
The experience of this mediation is the dialectic of subjective
substance, and its constituent movements are duty and conscience. Just
as desire was already dependent upon the other, so subjectivity is
already dependent upon the universal. Subjectivity, as dependence, is
already subjectivity which reflects upon universality as a loss, and
hence is, as Habermas puts it, in need of self-reassurance. The
reassurance it takes from this crises, where law or the universal is
other than the negative existence of self, is precisely a self-
reassurance. It takes its own negativity, its own dependence, to be its
true existence, and conforms to the universal as duty. But duty is only
the immediate self-expression of dependence. Duty, in being performed,
is again an activity which only repeats the universal as abstract,
since the activity is performed by a subject who still has law over
against itself. The 'master' consciousness of duty, that which takes
itself to be independent and at one with the universal, is known by the
'slave' consciousness of duty to be the action of the subject and
therefore not substance. This latter consciousness has conscience as
its own truth, for it is the acknowledgement, like the slave, of its
own unsubstantiality. It is 'pure duty', [32] the self of duty. As
such, it has only itself as judge and jury, and in each self-activity
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finds itself guilty of being not universal, or not the communal good,
because it realizes its actions to be always selfish, always based on
self and not on substance. Just as the slave appeared eternally
shackled to the absolute lord, never to be free, so conscience appears
eternally guilty, destined always to realize that it is always activity
for self, and never for all (or in itself). 'It is itself in its
contingency...and knows its immediate individuality to be pure knowing
and doing...'. [33]
Such a society is a moral rather than an ethical order. The subject is
seen as both responsible for the good, and yet at the same time it
conscientiously acknowledges that it is also the impossibility of the
good. The good has to be done, but it cannot do it. The separation of
the subject from community - something brought about as the self-
activity of the state but which is yet to be recognized - is taken by
the subject to be an individual matter concerning the individual's own
action in regard to others. Thus, the subject misrecognizes mediation,
and takes the separation to be the result of its personal action rather
than the self-division of the universal. This identity of reflective
self-consciousness as being-for-self and as always already not being in
itself, is an illusory identity. The failure of critical social theory
to re-cognize subject as the work of substance is due to its remaining
uncritical about the identity of dependency itself, and the actuality
of critique as educational self-activity. Both Habermas and Adorno
repeat these notions as abstractions in the very fact that they attempt
to overcome them, or protect them from being overcome.
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The re-cognition of this illusory being is the recognition that the
negativity of the subject who is not universal is also the substance of
ethical life which is not-independent. The activity of the latter is
the becoming of the former, although it appears to natural
consciousness that the activity is its own or solely that of the
former. The contradiction of the universal, that its activity is
particular and undermines itself, is also the contradiction of the
subject whose activity (in the sphere of morality) repeats its non-
identity with substance. But subjective substance re-cognizes itself
only through the work or activity which is both of them.
In the discussion of the dialectic of enlightenment in chapter III,
dialectic and enlightenment were re-cognized as the absolute truth of
philosophical consciousness in its own activity. Their separation was
the negation of the absolute, and also a determinate negation by the
consciousness which produced its own dependent and negative self as its
independent and positive identity or substance. Philosophical
consciousness is recognized by itself to be self-educating work which
is as the (identity of the) contradiction between reason and thought.
Similarly, in the discussion of the dialectic of lordship and bondage
earlier in this chapter, the master and slave, or independence and
dependence, were re-cognized as the absolute truth of self-
consciousness in its own self-educating work as desire. The separation
of master and slave was the realization of independence and the loss of
independence, but this loss was recognized by self-consciousness to be
determinate, since what was for it (independence) was also the essence
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of being-for-self, or what it had become. Self-consciousness is thus
recognized by itself to be that which produces itself at the same time
as it loses itself. It is re-cognized as the identity of the
contradiction of dependence and independence, where contradiction and
its movement is its own work and becoming.
Finally, then, the dialectic of subjective substance is active in the
same way, through the recognition of itself as spirit. The separation
of person and community was the realization in both of the loss of
independence, a loss brought about by the same activity, that of
activity which aimed at universality and resulted in its opposite. The
person, as not-independent, is the result of its having community as
object; whilst the community as not-independent is the result of its
having only each particular person as its self or subject, or activity.
But the work or activity of separation produces as result the
consciousness which knows and has dependence as both its subject and
its substance. What is realized through the work of universal activity
is the true nature of the universal as activity. The subject recognizes
itself in its negativity as ethical substance, and ethical substance
recognizes itself in its negativity as subject. They are for the same
consciousness which knows them, and they are that consciousness, which
is their absolutely true state of mind. Recognition here is the work of
spirit, or the middle term, realizing itself as that which becomes or
is actual, or absolute, when and in the work which destroys its
immediate appearance. It is this work and activity, which appears in
all three examples, which is recognition of misrecognition. or
actuality as self-education.
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Recognition. Misrecognition. Education.
In the analyses which have so far been presented, of Habermas, Adorno,
of the master/slave dialectic, and of spirit, the experience of the
logic of non-contradiction for us has been found to be the dialectic of
subject and substance, or the movement of dependence and autonomy.
Whether the critique of the dialectic of enlightenment is seen as
overcoming (Habermas) or as not-overcoming (Adorno), the aporia of
education as method is not overcome. Yet in Hegelian phenomenology it
has been seen that this contradiction can be understood according to
itself, such that the 'choice' of positive or negative as result/non-
result becomes part of the movement itself. For Hegel, thought which
comprehends contradiction as negative, also comprehends the movement of
contradiction to be its own result, brought about by its own activity.
This comprehension is the recognition of misrecognition as the movement
of self-education. The experience of the logic of non-contradiction,
which determines the idea of education as method, is therefore a self-
education for us.
Education, now, is comprehended as the self-activity which is the
recognition of misrecognition or as determinate negation. Such an
education is both activity and result, and this is precisely its import
as a 'critique' of civil society. It is the recognition that the broken
middle is the actuality of ethical life in civil society. The middle is
(always) broken. The Phenomenology of Spirit does not culminate in
mutual recognition, because the Phenomenology is in history and is
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itself not an overcoming of the broken middle of social relations. But
as a phenomenology it does realize absolute knowing. Absolute knowing
is the work which realizes itself as the re-cognition of its own self
as misrecognition. This work is the activity and the result which is
subjective substance, or self-education. It is the work which knows
itself as not absolute ethical life, and has this negation as its own
absolute identity.
Recognition of misrecognition as educational self-activity is
misrecognized by Habermas because enlightenment as overcoming is never
realized as the self-work of subjective substance. As long as
misrecognition is not ours, then critique is not immanently reflective
or a phenomenology; the result is a theory of overcoming, (for example,
the theory of communicative action) which repeats misrecognition of
subjectivity by explaining its determination as the activity of an
unknowable lifeworld. There is no re-cognition in Habermas because the
idea of the lifeworld dominates the actual, or the broken middle of
social relations, by presupposing that it is overcome in and as the
self-result of communicative action; the lifeworld represents a middle
which is known as unbroken. As a domination of the actual, therefore,
it can only produce the dialectic of enlightenment, or the broken
middle, as our experience of the loss of the lifeworld.
Adorno does not recognize misrecognition as self activity and thus
denies the actuality of the determination which he therefore
misrecognizes, again, to be indeterminate. Critical theory is the
acknowledgement of subjective determination and dependency, but it is
- 204 -
not also its actual realization as the totality of that determination
and dependency. Man is known as result, but is never his own result.
The experience which is for us is never comprehended, it is only
dominated by the presupposition of its truth or untruth, or by its
reduction to methodology. Misrecognition is known but it is not
recognized as absolute knowing, and thus critical theory, which seeks
to educate subjectivity as misrecognition, itself misrecognizes the
very activity which is that education.
Recognition is only possible as misrecognition. 'Recognition is, by
definition, re-cognizing of non-identity', [34] a non-identity which is
now the self-work of philosophical consciousness which knows that
absolute ethical life is lost, or not attained. This is what is
recognized, and this is also the truth or absolute knowing of the self-
identity of subjectivity. It is as this education, therefore, that
dependency, non-domination and absolute ethical life are realized but
not presupposed. This unity of activity and knowledge, the determinate
result which is recognition, is what is actual. Recognition is the
self-work and result which loses the certainty and independence of non-
contradiction (as critique), and loses the uncertainty and dependence
of contradiction (as the dialectic of enlightenment) to re-cognize
itself as the newly produced result of that contradiction for us.
Actuality is education and politics as one activity and result.
Absolute knowing, then, is absolute self-critique, or the realization
of subjective substance as it is (misrecognized) in civil society and
it is only •enuinely educational, or absolute, as recognition of
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misrecognition. Education in Hegel is both immanently critical and
immanently political. To comprehend what is, is to recognize ethical
life as actual or as the broken middle but at the same time, not to
replace this loss with further domination. 'Absolute ethical life is a
critique of bourgeois property relations. It may be elusive, but it is
never dominant or pre-judged'. [35] Thus the broken middle is our
education. Mutual recognition has yet to appear in history, but its
truth has already appeared for us who experience it as loss, and who
recognize the loss as our own education and self-work. The actuality of
ethical life is (becomes as) self-realization. Ethical life is not
dominated (and thus is itself) only when recognized as actual, and when
that actuality is recognized as the activity or realization of
subjective substance. Thus, absolute ethical life is only realized in
our continually active self-education.
This self-education is the concept. It has its own self-expression as
self-education in the Science of Logic, for there it presents itself
according to its own inner logic and development, as the determinate
result of the dialectic of domination and freedom. But, as Rose notes,
'Hegel did not believe that freedom could be achieved in the pages of
the Logic, nor did he have the ambition or vocation to impose it'. [36]
Ethical life is as abstract in the Logic as it is negative and actual
in spirit, for that is the unity of contradiction which is ethical life
for us. The Logic has no natural beginning or utopian end, because
ethical life for us is the broken middle or actuality. Science, as the
expression of absolute ethical life, would be less than absolute and
mere domination, if it were only (pure mutual) recognition. It would
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lack substance as misrecognition, or movement, if it were not also
abstract. Habermas presumed communicative action as a beginning of
mediation and thus 'overcame' mediation. The Science of Logic does not
presuppose a beginning or an end for it is already result, and since
mediation has not been 'overcome', and since that is the truth of the
concept, then, unlike Habermas, the beginning and end must be abstract.
Rose states, 'Thus the beginning and the end of the system are
abstract. The end is both result, and it is just the same as the
beginning: an abstraction...He (Hegel) recognized the continuing
domination of formal law and that his recognition was not enough to
change it'. [37]
Thus the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Science of Logic re-cognize
the continuing domination of the abstract universality of the law and
logic of non-contradiction and identity. This recognition is already
critical because that universality is only for us. To preserve its
critical import, and to express the absolute nature of mutual
dependence as absolute ethical life, requires that the reflecting
subject recognize that even reflection, which appears critical and
dialectical, is uncritical with regard to its own determination by that
upon which it reflects. Recognition of this misrecognition is
philosophical consciousness which has its own negativity as determinate
result.
To comprehend the actual is to retain both the critical import of the
activity and its educational import as recogniton. Comprehending
determination is therefore immanently political activity when it is
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realized in and as self-education. Recognition of misrecognition is the
idea of enlightenment sought by Habermas in overcoming, and of non-
enlightenment by Adorno as non-identity thinking, but is realized, and
is genuinely self-critical only as absolute knowing. Thus, 'thinking
the absolute is the basis for the critique of different kinds of
property relations, and for the critique of different kinds of law, for
the social import of this philosophy'. [38]
Can recognition, then, be described as a means, an educational tool or
strategy, by which to realize absolute ethical life, in the way that
critical theorists of education have recently employed communicative
action? Put another way, should philosophical consciousness be the goal
of an education which seeks to realize absolute ethical life? To ask
the question is to misrecognize, again, the nature of absolute knowing.
Subjective substance is actual, and therefore subject is separated from
substance. That is the actuality of the question. Only in the
recognition of misrecognition is actuality realized in and as
philosophical consciousness. Philosophical consciousness is only
absolute in that dependent relationship. To seek to realize absolute
ethical life in any way which is not a self-determination is another
domination of the broken middle. To presuppose education as a method
separated from (itself as) result is to misrecognize and presuppose
(the idea of, the identity of) education, and results in theories of
overcoming and non-overcoming. Education is not a tool or a formal
means by which to produce absolute ethical life. Education is the
activity, the only activity, which realizes a sustainable critique of
domination, and which does not dominate its realization as actual.
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If education or philosophical consciousness are not methods, then of
what 'use' are they as 'critique' at all? What instructions can
philosophical consciousness give on how the world ought to be when
'philosophy in any case comes on the scene too late to give it. As the
thought of the world, it appears only when actuality is already there,
cut and dried after its process of formation has been completed'. [39]
Philosophical consciousness, as result, cannot give advice on how the
world ought to be, it can only comprehend the world as it is. What has
then to be recognized is that by comprehending what is, and
comprehending it as actual, philosophical consciousness is already more
than that which has been only abstractly understood. 'To comprehend
subjectivity as determined is to go beyond subjectivity. It is to
acknowledge determination: that we are determined and that the
determination is ours'. [40]
To comprehend actuality is to comprehend determination, and
	 still to
be determined. Actuality is not a method, it is rather the
impossibility of education and critique as method, and has that
impossibility as its own determination. Actuality is not an option, for
'the day of philosophy, of freedom, has not yet come...'. [41]
Philosophy cannot be imposed as absolute ethical life, for that is not
the truth of philosophy, nor the education which is actuality.
Domination always rebounds in a dialectic of enlightenment which
undermines such domination. Philosophical consciousness is our
education about the truth of non-freedom, not a substitute for that
education, or an immediate 'solution' to the non-freedom of civil
society. Education or philosophy, taken as a task or a tool for
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something other than itself, 'would be to turn ethical life into an
abstract ideal, an autonomous prescription, a Sollen, which would be
completely "unjustified" because not implied by the contradictions
between political consciousness and its social and historical bases'.
[42] The last two sections of this thesis, then, examine the actuality
of education as method in civil society, first with regard to the
identity of the teacher, and the misrecognition of education in the
teacher/student relationship; and second with regard to the identity of
critique, and its misrecognition of the state. Critical theory of
education attempted to unite education and critique by using
communicative action. These last two sections recognize both education
and critique as misrecognition in civil society, and shows how the
unity which is sought is actual as the concept.
B - RECOGNIZING THE TEACHER.
Education as Domination.
The programmes which Carr and Kemmis, and Young have produced for
reforming educational practice and organization in modern society, as
outlined in chapter I, dominate the idea of absolute ethical life which
they aim to attain. Carr and Kemmis presuppose action research as the
self-reflective method which is both comprehension and overcoming. It
not only serves as ideology-critique for those in education, but
'envisages a social order characterized by rational communication'. [1]
But their enlightenment regarding action research is only their
enlightenment for us and therefore not the unity and liberation which
was hoped for. This presupposition of action research, and its being
put forward as a programme for the organization of social
enlightenment, is already separated from the activity in which its
truth emerges. Thus the truth of action research is its non-truth as
the self-identity of educational activity and result, and produces
again the contradiction of education as method.
Presupposition of the identity of education as method dominates the
experience and activity which is education. The separation of
enlightenment as knowledge from activity or learning is not overcome in
action research. It is reproduced in the form of the teacher and the
student, because learning is again separated from those who are already
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enlightened. The action in action research belongs to those who have
already done the research, and can claim it as result or identity. Carr
and Kemmis, by presupposing critique, in the form of action research,
as overcoming, only repeat the impasse of the dialectic of
enlightenment, and reproduce it for those involved in educational
practice, theory and research. Their enlightenment dominates those in
education whom precisely they seek to liberate from education as
domination. Just as for critical theorists in general with regard to
critique, a presupposition of the identity of enlightenment as
overcoming is necessarily the claim to be enlightened, to have
overcome. In order to negate the abstract authority of education as
domination, and its representative - the teacher, they have to
presuppose themselves as just such an authority, or as teacher.
Young's programme suffers the dialectic of enlightenment in the same
way. Based much more directly on the application of the theory of
communicative action to the practice of teaching, Young claims that the
former provides 'a clear normative basis... (and) normative validity'
for critical education. [2] It undermines the illusion of educational
authority or validity as grounded in the school, the curriculum and its
teachers, and reveals the determination of the idea of (technical and
practical) education and enlightenment in and by particular social and
historical circumstances. But, as with action research, communicative
action as a programme for reform in education only repeats itself as a
domination of the education, the activity, which it seeks to realize. A
teacher who seeks to produce what Young calls the 'ideal pedagogical
speech situation' [3] has already presupposed enlightenment as (his
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own) result, and thus can only impose it upon those, in this case the
students, who have yet to become enlightened. Overcoming, in the form
of this critical Habermasian pedagogy, dominates those whose
enlightenment it is not and to whom education can only be understood
now as conformity or disobedience to it. This is precisely the aporia
of teaching which faces teachers wishing to produce in their students
critical reflection regarding domin+n in bourgeois society. The
teacher has to impose knowledge upon those who are unenlightened - even
if the lesson is about this domination itself - and thus is
contradictory and negates its own goal. Young's suggestion that
teachers can create critical reflection in students by rendering
explicit the rules of classroom communication as a determination of
both student and teacher, and the setting up of democratically arrived
at 'new rules', will only repeat the aporia of the dialectic of
enlightenment. It was still necessary for the teacher to impose this
lesson upon the unenlightened as their (as yet unrealized) truth, and
the new rules will therefore only reproduce the success of that
domination over the students.
Habermas's two volumes of The Theory of Communicative Action are
themselves work in which the identity of the teacher is presupposed,
for in communicative action there is contained the necessary condition
that what is to be known (or is being taught by Habermas) is already
known (by the enlightened teacher). It is his enlightenment regarding
the unconditioned which is his own authority to teach, an enlightenment
which, as has been seen, is abstract and not actual.
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The problem for critical theory is to find a way of teaching about
domination which does not itself reproduce domination. Put another way,
how can critical theory negate the (abstract) authority of the teacher,
or of those who are enlightened, without having to presume for itself
just such an identity? The dialectic of enlightenment is the
contradiction which faces those who would practise critique with a view
to enlightening others about domination. To be the teacher of critique
is to presume enlightenment, even if the subject matter is the negation
of enlightenment, or the dialectic of enlightenment itself. The teacher
is already a domination over those they would teach, including those
whose teaching is critical, dialectical and negative, and whose content
is critique. The aporia of the critical teacher becomes the
impossibility of critical education or critique in modern society, or
the plight of Adorno's 'best-intentioned reformer who.. .strengthens the
very power of the established order he is trying to break'. [4]
Critical education presumes enlightenment regarding its own identity,
and repeats the separation of activity and result in the form of
teacher and student. To produce (critical) enlightenment, or to teach,
is already to separate the enlightened as result from the activity
which is the becoming of enlightenment. Teaching is not, therefore, a
unity of activity and result because it is already their separation
into that which is to be taught and by who.
Action research or critical pedagogy, as the teaching about domination,
are always already a separation of themselves from the activity they
claim as their own educational unity, their own unconditioned activity
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and result. Critical theorists of education necessarily presume
themselves as teachers when they seek to organize enlightenment for
others, but they are already that result for their students. Thus, they
are not the unity of activity and result which they claim. This
separation is not overcome for the student in communicative action,
because its stance or position is already the determination of the
student, or the experience which is the student. It lies ahead for the
teacher to recognize this negation of himself as that education. The
question for critical theory of education is how can one be a teacher
and yet at the same time not dominate the activity of education if the
teacher is already the presumption of education for others. How is the
teacher to teach except as domination?
To teach about enlightenment as domination would appear to be a self-
contradiction. The teacher represents the identity of enlightenment in
civil society, but as has been seen, such an identity only repeats the
contradiction of education. The contradiction of the teacher is the
experience for us of the dialectic of enlightenment. This is the same
dialectic of independence and dependence that has been examined in the
previous section, and which is actual as recognition. It is therefore
possible to comprehend the contradiction of the teacher as the movement
which is our education, or as the educational identity of activity and
result which is the concept. The concept is the self-identity of the
critical teacher, and self-negation is that work. It is the negation of
the teacher which is our education regarding domination, and for the
teacher this can only be actual as self-loss realized through the
recognition of his 'position' as misrecognition. Without the loss of
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the teacher, there is no negation. The question remains: can this loss
be realized as the substantial work of the teacher. This is to ask
whether the critical teacher is possible in civil society.
The next two sections examine the teacher/student relationship as the
movement of the recognition of misrecognition. The first section deals
with the identity of the teacher in the pure terms of master and
student, that is, as the internal dialectic which is the contradiction
of the teacher. The second looks at the actuality of the
teacher/student relationship in civil society as ethical pedagogy. It
is a method of teaching which is ethical precisely because its own
methodological stance as the teacher is negated, and the teacher is
realized through its own work, and not merely presumed as the abstract
authority of the identity of the enlightened.
The Dialectic of Master and Student.
This section examines the contradiction of the teacher as domination
which critical theory of education reproduces. The teacher is both the
result of enlightenment, that is his identity, and yet he is also aware
that his truth as result is produced through the unity of activity and
result. This awareness is already the separation of result from
activity in the teacher. Whereas for self-consciousness this
dialectical self-movement was played out in the characters of master
and slave, here the self-education of the teacher with regard to his
own identity is played out as master and student. These terms reveal
the import of Hegelian philosophy for those whose work is education.
Hegel notes that abstract formal education or enlightenment has
resulted in the idea that,
especially in pedagogy, one is not so much to be
instructed in the content of philosophy as to learn
how to philosophize without any content. That
amounts to saying that one is to travel endlessly
without getting to know along the way any cities,
rivers, countries, men etc. In the first place,
one who gets to know a city and then comes to a
river, to another city, and so on in the process
also learns to travel. He not only learns to do so
but indeed really does so. Thus in learning the
content of philosophy one not only learns to
philosophize but indeed really philosophizes. [5]
This view of education as the separation of result and activity applies
to both the contradiction of the teacher as domination in critical
theory, and to the teacher/student relationship in civil society. The
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former is examined here, the latter, as ethical pedagogy, in the next
section.
The contradiction of the teacher is that he is both the identity in
himself of enlightenment as result, and also the non-identity of
enlightenment in that this result is only for him. The teacher contains
these two movements, of identity and activity, as his own uncertainty.
His identity is always also his despair that the identity has to be
performed (or lost). This relationship of identity and activity
produces in the teacher the dialectic of the master and the student, a
dialectic which will be recognized as the self-work which is teaching.
The master is the consciousness of being the identity of the teacher,
and includes as his independence the knowledge which is to be taught,
and his being known as already the result of enlightenment; that is, he
is educated in regard to what is to be taught. The master is the
abstract independence of the teacher, abstracted from the activity
which is his becoming, and which is his teaching.
The identity of the teacher as master is an abstraction which the
teacher cannot survive. The truth of the master lies not in what he is,
but in what he does. This consciousness in the teacher is that of the
student. It is the consciousness which has enlightenment not as
identity but as an activity or an object for it. The truth of the
master as identity is always lost as result precisely because its truth
has to be known as enlightenment by the student. The master is
therefore only for the student who knows him through his own activity,
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and is not therefore the master's own independent self-identity. The
master cannot be education in itself for he does not realize that
education, he is only the presupposition of its completion as his own
identity. Since the master is never a self-activity, but only ever an
education dependent upon its being enlightenment for another, then the
master is never independent. Indeed, his truth is that his independence
vanishes in a relation of dependence upon the student or upon the
activity which is not-enlightenment.
The student is therefore the experience of the loss of the teacher as
master, and appears to be the impossibility of the teacher as identity.
The implications of this are that teaching could never be a self
authority, or self-activity, because in order to teach, the master has
to be presupposed. Without the master, there is nothing to teach, no
method which is the truth of the teacher, and thus no teacher, or no
enlightenment, at all. However, the loss of the teacher has only been
looked at from the point of view of the master. It remains to be seen
how the consciousness of the student performs work which realizes the
teacher as both the student and the master, or as the self-identity
which is education.
The student is non-result when compared to the master. But,
just as lordship showed that its essential
nature is the reverse of what it wants to be, so
servitude (the student or activity) on its consummation
will really turn into the opposite of what it
immediately is; as a consciousness forced back into
itself, it will withdraw into itself and be transformed
into a truly independent consciousness. [6]
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The student has experienced the master in a relation of complete
dependence. What the student is, and does, is determined by his
relation to the master. The student owes his existence to the master,
for the unenlightened is dependent upon and defined in relation to the
enlightened. However, it has already been seen that the master, the
teacher who simply dominates as knowledge, produces a contradiction
that it cannot survive, and produces a consciousness, the student, for
which it always object and less than the identity of the teacher.
Because the truth of the teacher is always lost to the activity which
has enlightenment as object, the truth of the master can now be seen as
his dependence upon the student. The impossibility of the master, or
the contradiction of the teacher in critical theory, is not only the
work which is the student, it is also the identity of the student. The
student has the teacher as identity for it, and is itself the pure
activity which is non-enlightenment, or non-teacher. The student is
therefore both the work in which the master vanishes, and is the
identity of that which is the contradiction of, or is not the teacher.
The contradiction of the teacher as identity reveals the dependence of
the teacher upon the activity which is its own loss, or its being (its
own) student. The student now recognizes that the truth of
enlightenment as dependence is also his own being-for-self, and
moreover is produced as his self-work and identity.
The contradiction of the teacher in critical theory, as identity and
activity can now be comprehended as the self-activity which is the
teacher as self-taught. The contradiction is recognized as the work and
result which is the consciousness of the student. The student has, as
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its own existence, the knowledge that his own identity requires the
loss of the master, something which his own work (his own self-
teaching) brings about. This is its absolute lesson regarding its own
negative self-truth, and the negative self-truth of the teacher who
knows his own identity as domination and independence. Precisely
because the student works on the master, that is, has the identity of
the teacher as the loss of the teacher, the master can never be the
truth of the teacher. Thus, the lack of self-truth (or the self-doubt)
of those who would be teacher, and the lack of self-truth which is the
student, or the work of that doubt, are the same self-education of one
consciousness, that is, of the teacher. The teacher as self-taught, and
(therefore) as an educational (self) authority, is dependent for that
education upon its own loss. The negation of the teacher is the self-
work of the teacher whose self-activity is education, and not
domination. The student is both the negation of the teacher and is the
activity which is the production of the teacher who comprehends himself
to be self-taught. The student therefore, through his work on the
teacher, and his dependence upon it, is both the subjective activity
and the substantial knowledge which is the recognition of the teacher
as misrecognition. It is in the student that educational activity and
enlightenment are united as a self-production, and also where the
contradiction of the teacher is recognized as a determinate education
in-itself,
as much as philosophical study is in and for itself
self-activity, to that degree also is it learning; the
learning of an already present, developed science. This
science is a treasure of hard-won, ready-prepared, formed
content. This inheritance ready at hand must be earned
by the individual, i.e. learned. [7]
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Habermas misrecognized the student as master by assuming that the
awareness of dependence or non-enlightenment overcame itself. Thus, in
Habermas, the education of the student overcomes the student and
reproduces the domination and contradiction of the master. Adorno
misrecognized the student as not also the master by presupposing that
the awareness of dependence or non-enlightenment was not the self-work
of the teacher. Whereas the contradiction of the teacher as result and
activity, comprehended according to itself as recognition of
misrecognition, shows how in the work which is studentship or learning,
what is taught, and the activity of its being taught, are one and the
same, or the teacher who is master and student.
The aporia of modernity, of becoming enlightened about enlightenment,
is the impossibility of the critical teacher in civil society. This
aporia is now re-cognized and realized as an education. Recognition is
the self-education of the teacher producing himself as both knowledge
and activity. The truth of the teacher as master and student is the
concept, and requires the loss of the teacher in and as his own self-
work because the concept is that which is the activity of education as
self-production and self-knowledge. Recognition is the truth of that
activity as education, and is for self-consciousness the self-negation
of the teacher.
It remains to be seen, then, how recognition of misrecognition can be
the self-education which is actuality, or how the teacher as
misrecognition in civil society can be a self-education for both the
master and the student whom he would teach. How can the domination of
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education as method itself be an education, and how can the
contradiction of education be actual as self-work and self-result
without presupposing the result of that which is to be achieved? In
answer to the question: how can the critical teacher overcome the
contradiction that to teach is to dominate, this section has now
changed the approach that can be taken to this problem. The
relationship of the teacher is a relationship of domination. If there
is equality between master and student, then there is neither master
nor student - there is no relation which is the teacher. The teacher is
already a relationship of domination and dependence, but as has been
seen, is only truly educational when it is a self-domination, and when
the teacher is a self-education. What remains to be seen in the next
section is how the teacher in civil society can teach in order to
Produce his own negation, and to realize that loss as education. This
final section examines Hegel's own teaching method - his ethical
pedagogy; ethical because the dialectic of enlightenment, or in this
case the contradiction of the teacher, is recognized as the actuality
of the teacher/student relationship in civil society, a recognition
which comprehends the teacher as misrecognition and produces the truth
of that negation as his own activity.
Recognition as Ethical Pedagogy.
A pedagogy which realizes the teacher by negating him, can only make a
beginning with the abstract authority of teacher as master, or the
teacher as misrecognition in civil society. To incorporate this
contradiction into pedagogy is to . realize the unity of educational
theory and practice. Hegel himself struggled with this problem whilst
Rector of the Nuremberg gymnasium between 1808-1816, and developed an
ethical pedagogy as the actual activity of the speculative system. His
teaching 'method' enjoyed as its truth the unity of the contradiction
between the teacher as abstract authority and the negation of that
authority (by the teacher).
It would be a mistake to think that Hegel's career as a school teacher
was less important to his work than his later years as a professor at
the Universities of Heidelberg and Berlin. It was as a school teacher
that he was forced to reflect upon the pedagogical demands of
philosophy, and to work out a way of teaching philosophy which realized
the unity of subject and substance. As he himself noted in 1816, his
years as a lecturer in Jena were spent,
bound to the letter of my notebook. However,
eight years practice in gymnasium instruction at
least has helped me gain a freedom in my lecturing
that probably can be attained nowhere better than
in just such a position. It is an equally good
way of attaining clarity... [8]
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Nor would it be correct to think that Hegel thought less of school
teaching than university teaching. Although hard pressed by dreadful
working conditions, and with paperwork which fought for attention with
his own work - he wrote the Science of Logic during this period -
nevertheless he noted that eight years teaching in the gymnasium
'perhaps provides a more effective opportunity for acquiring freedom in
delivery than even the university lecture hall' [9] and is in this
respect 'more advantageous to me than even a university professorship'.
[10]
Since education is realized in negativity, that is, as the unity of the
subject which is not substance recognized as substance, then a pedagogy
which simply stated this, would not have achieved it, or produced it as
recognition. Hegel had to teach philosophy such that its own self-truth
appeared, or so that the truth of enlightenment as the work of the
student could be brought about, but not presupposed as already carried
out. Thus Hegel developed a pedagogy which did not abstractly teach
philosophy and impose the concept as knowledge, but rather produced its
substance and subject in the experience of educational movement and
contradiction. Within this, he developed a pedagogy which realized the
movement of the recognition of misrecognition as its own activity, a
pedagogy which was therefore, actual as self-work, a unity of content
and method. This was realized both in how he taught and what he taught.
His relationships with students and the content of his courses are both
active as the movement of contradiction. His ethical pedagogy is this
unity of content and method.
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In todays language, Hegel could perhaps be described as a teacher
advocating 'experiential' learning, and in one very important sense
this is the case. The concept is realized only when it is experienced
and knows the experience to be of itself and produced through its own
work. [11] Thus the experience is the work, and the truth of the
concept is realized in and as that activity. What Hegel is not
advocating, however, is what might be generalized as a 'child centered'
approach. That would be merely a one sided method of education, one
determined by the child and not by the concept.
It has become the prejudice not only of philosophical
study but also - and indeed even more extensively -
of pedagogy that thinking for oneself is to be
developed and practised in the first place as if the
subject matter were of no importance, and in the
second place as if learning were opposed to thinking
for oneself. [12]
The activity of thought, left to the child and determined solely
according to their particular fancies or sensory experiences, is not an
ethical education. 'The unfortunate urge to educate the individual in
thinking for himself and being self-productive has cast a shadow over
truth'. [13] It fails to take upon itself the responsibility of the
concept, and of the truth of the (child's) dependency which is spirit,
and is therefore an education purely in terms of abstract independence.
Hegel, as an 'experiential' teacher, seeks to ensure that what is
experienced is not left to chance, but is rational and part of the
systematic whole which is philosophy. The student does not, yet,
experience freedom, but rather its lack. This aspect of Hegel's
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pedagogy, its discipline, has to be seen as the discipline of the
concept, not of Hegel himself. So, in his school address of 1810 he
explained that, 'For those who attend our school we expect quiet
behaviour, the habit of continuous attention, respect and obedience to
the teachers and proper and seemly conduct both towards these and their
fellow pupils'. [14] He also introduced military drill for his
students, and discouraged duelling, fighting and smoking. [15]
The contradictory nature of Hegel's gymnasium gives rise to both a
traditional and a progressive interpretation of his pedagogy. [16] On
the one hand, he can be seen as not allowing his students any personal
expression or development, little freedom within the institution,
certainly no participation in the running of the school, and as
perpetuating the domination of, and conformity to, the state regime
over the individuality of his students. On the other hand, he attached
great importance to education as an activity, and criticized all forms
of education which separated knowledge from the learning process. [17]
He reproaches the District School Councillor because 'his only concept
of educating the young is the misery of endless inculcating,
reprimanding, memorizing - not even learning by heart but merely the
misery of endless repetition, pressure and stupefaction, ceaseless
spoonfeeding and stuffing'. [18] Against traditional views of education
as the uncritical and unreflective transference of (social) knowledge
from one generation to another, he is concerned to ensure that his
students are critical and reflective. What is crucial here is his
recognition that critique and reflection also require their own
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discipline, and that within this contradiction of domination and
reflection (master and student) the actual is realized.
He acknowledges the duality of his teaching method.
To regard study as mere receptivity and memory work
is to have a most incomplete view of what instruction
really means. On the other hand, to concentrate
attention on the pupils own original reflections and
reasoning is equally one sided and should be still
more carefully guarded against... Like the will,
thought must begin with obedience. But if learning
limited itself to mere receiving, the effect would not
be much better than if we wrote sentences on water;
for it is not the receiving but the self-
activity of comprehension and the pomex to use it
again, that first makes knowledge our own possession. [19]
That Hegel is not running the gymnasium with abstract, merely formal
discipline can be seen in his very progressive attitude towards the
welfare and development of his students. Abstract authority maintains
the identity of knowledge, and of those who have that knowledge, as
legitimate domination of the unenlightened. Ethical life demands the
critique of that abstraction in the actual recognition of the authority
of education itself, or the concept. Discipline outside of the
educational (self) relationship of master and student, that is, the
(non) relationship of the master only, is uneducational, fixed,
dogmatic, and hence totally lacking in ethical substance. 'A society of
students cannot be regarded as an assemblage of servants,' Hegel noted
in his third school address, 1811,
it has ceased to be the custom in the family, as
in the school, to induce in children a feeling of
subjection and bondage - to make them obey another's
will even in unimportant matters - to demand absolute
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obedience for obedience's sake, and by severity to
obtain what really belongs alone to the feeling of
love and reverence... [2()]
However, since education is the self-activity of the dialectic of
independence and dependence, subjection and obedience are integral to
an ethical pedagogy. When he notes that 'a young mind must in fact
behave independently' [21] if it is to become educated and fully
developed, the independence he refers to is not the abstract and
unspiritual independence of the legal person whose freedom is
misrecognition, but the independence of spirit where freedom is actual.
The independence produced here is that of subjective substance, or the
recognition of dependence as misrecognition. But it can only result
from being dominated, and from the experience of loss of substance.
Thus, an ethical pedagogy whose authority is the concept. demands the
experience of dependence as its own substance, which can then be
recognized as the truth of its becoming known. A pedagogy which seeks
to educate natural consciousness to philosophical consciousness has to
contain within it the unity of knowledge and learning, of content and
activity, in order not to dominate the educational process with its own
(presupposed) stance on the result which is to be achieved. It is the
development of such a (negative) ethical pedagogy which Hegel
established whilst Rector.
Hegel knew that he had to combine in his teaching the substance of
philosophy and the realization of the concept in such a way that did
not give a one-sided presentation of the absolute, either as knowledge
or as activity. Since the concept was the unity of content and
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becoming, he needed a way of teaching which would realize that unity:
he required a pedagogy which could unite what was taught, with its own
educational activity, and not merely separate education into its
dialectical components of domination and subordination (knowledge and
learning). Philosophy had to be taught in such a way that it was its
own education, and realized as such. Thus, Hegel's ethical pedagogy set
about imposing the discipline of the concept upon his students, to
ensure that knowledge became for them, and thus not theirs, so that the
experience of thought (the truth of philosophy) would be theirs, and
education would be their self-work, and not the formal property of the
teacher. [22]
In the spirit of contradiction, then, Hegel set about designing a
curriculum which would teach the concept by not teaching it. By
separating activity or experience from content in his curriculum
planning, he was able to realize their unity as educational result. The
process is that through which consciousness passes in the realization
of the concept, or as recognition of itself as misrecognition. The
first stage is abstraction or immediacy, merely formal content,
unreflective, fixed and non-contradictory. The second stage is
mediation or the dialectical, where content is known as an object for
consciousness, and therefore as separated from consciousness. The
dialectic of the independence of each from the other, and the
dependence of each upon the other, occurs here. This is the moment of
both the loss of independence and of dependence. In educational terms
it is the contradiction of the dialectic of enlightenment. The final
stage is the speculative or philosophical stage, 'and it alone is
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really philosophical'. [23] This movement from abstraction to unity in
philosophical consciousness is the movement which is education or
enlightenment; the third stage is the unity of the difference of
immediacy and mediation because it is the self-activity which knows
(produces itself as the knowledge) of that difference as its own
identity. The speculative stage is the stage of the recognition of
misrecognition, or that which is as the work of contradiction and non-
contradiction. The speculative is therefore the goal of the teaching of
philosophy, a goal which Niethammer had set for gymnasiums in Bavaria
in his Directive of 1808.
Hegel had great trouble interpreting the instruction for 'practical
exercises in speculative thinking' [24] which he was instructed by
Niethammer to perform. The process set out above was its own content,
but was not the immediate content of natural consciousness. The problem
Hegel therefore had was, with what should a speculative education
begin, given that it could not begin with itself, since its own truth
and content were realized only as result? Hegel noted in 1813 that his
whole philosophy is 'nothing but a struggle against the begining, and
annihilation and refutation of (my) starting point'. [25] In keeping
with this, he had to learn how philosophical education could be begun,
or was possible, and at first he followed the instructions of the
Directive to the letter and began straight away with philosophy as if
it were 'shot from a pistol'. [26] He wrote to Niethammer that in his
early years, 'I made a beginning with the basic concepts of logic,'
adding bluntly, 'I have not repeated the experience'. [27] This failure
prompted a reassessment of the content which was required to complement
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each stage of the educational process, and of the overall aim which the
teaching of philosophy in a school could hope to achieve.
With regard to the teaching of speculative thinking, Hegel faced the
contradiction of subjective substance, or spirit. It became clear to
him that the teaching of philosophy could not begin with philosophy.
'Abstract thinking, the understandable abstract concept in its
determinateness, can or must precede speculative thinking; but the
series of such concepts is once again a systematic whole. Gymnasium
instruction might be limited to this'. [28] He further noted that
'there is probably already too much philogiohy taught in the
gymnasiums', [29] and suggests later that perhaps the teaching of
philosophy at this early age is superfluous. But this is not to say
that he was not deeply concerned with encouraging students to think
philosophically. His recommendation that philosphy itself should not be
taught is balanced by a full curriculum designed to produce in students
philosophical activity and education. He replaces 'practical exercises
in speculative thinking' with content which is itself genuinely
philosophical. Hegel's pedagogy unites content and philosophical method
in a curriculum which is the actual unity of the theory and practice of
enlightenment. The content outlined below is chosen specifically
because it is already determinate philosophical content, but it is
taught according to the stages of its own development, stages which are
commensurate with the educational process which is recognition, and
constitutes the concept. His pedagogy is a constituent part of the
'systematic whole' which is philosophy as (self) education.
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Hegel begins his philosophical teaching with abstractions. Indeed, he
can begin nowhere else but with what immediately is (and is not).
Actuality has to be recognized and thus the beginning must be abstract.
He begins his teaching in the lower year with law, morality and
religion. [30] They are practical ideas which are commonly applied in
daily life, and yet simple enough to be accessible for the lower age
group. But they are also determinations of the concept. They are actual
and spiritual, although not as yet to the young mind which is not 'at
home in thought'. [31] Hegel notes that with 'these doctrines a
beginning will illfact be made', [32] one which is in perfect congruence
with the abstract nature of all philosophical beginnings. Education
will result from the contradiction of this abstraction, and is
therefore a necessary abstract starting point. 'Inasmuch as the pupils
grasp these concepts in their determinateness, formally speaking they
obtain training in abstract thinking, though I cannot yet call this
speculative thinking'. [33]
The second stage of philosophical development, the dialectical, cannot
be taught abstractly. This is precisely the misrecognition of education
that critique, and critical theory of education, work from. Yet also,
the dialectic can only be taught abstractly, because the dialectic is
always already self-movement. The dialectic requires not to be known as
movement, not knowledge of movement. Its truth is not the grasping of
abstractions, but of the loss of these abstractions, the work of
studentship, and thus its educational lesson is negative not positive.
This is not achieved in teaching the dialectic as a moment of logic,
for that is not yet the experience of the negative. Hegel notes that
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the Kantian antinomies [34] 'constitute all toopoor a dialectic.
Nothing beyond tortuous antithesis'. [35] The danger with the
dialectical stage of education is that contradiction becomes a formula
rather than movement or actual education. In some cases, education is
reduced to a compendium containing 'a few universal formulas that were
supposed to contain all'. [36]
Hegel is scathing in his condemnation of those who teach 'the critical
and sceptical path which possesses in material present at hand the
element enabling it to proceed, but which incidentally arrives at
nothing but the unpleasantness and boredom of negative results'. [37]
The movement of the negative has to be experienced, not simply
described. This dialectical stage has to be what it is - educational
movement. It is the education wherein the student 'must first die to
sight and hearing, must be torn away from concrete representations,
must be withdrawn into the night of the soul and learn to see on this
new level, to hold fast and distinguish determinations'. [38]
The unique educational character of the dialectic is noted by Hegel as
that which cannot be begun, requiring no introduction, and cannot be
dominated in the sense of presumed or finished. Dialectical reason is
dependent upon abstract content if it is to appear as the mediation and
contradiction of that content. It does not appear on its own except as
the movement of logic in science. It arises as the activity of
thinking, and can therefore be taught 'more through the deficiency of
this or that thought determination than according to its real
nature...' . [39] This is the critical import of Hegel's pedagogy and
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educational philosophy. The dialectic 'is the movement and confusion of
fixed determinateness; it is negative reason'. [40] His insight into
education as movement, and pedagogy as actual education, lies in his
comprehending that the dialectic is education when it is experienced or
realized, and not when it is abstractly taught. 'Since every new
concept in a systematic whole really arises from what precedes by
dialectic, a teacher acquainted with the nature of philosophizing
everywhere enjoys as often as possible the freedom to advance the
enquiry by means of dialectic'. [41] Hegel allows the contradiction to
emerge on its own account, by employing contradiction as his
pedagogical method. It is by not teaching the dialectic that
dialectical movement is realized. In this way education is not
domination or presupposition, but immanent self-development. [42]
Equally, by not presupposing education, its truth, or the third stage
of ethical/philosophical education, can be realized. With the self-
contradiction of ethical pedagogy, 'dialectical (reason) introduces
itself...on its own; and within it - insofar as what is positive in
(negative) dialectical (reason) is apprehended - lies speculative
(reason)'. [43] It appears in two forms: first, as representations of
the imagination, for example as God; second, speculative knowledge is
present as the concept, which is realized in the re-cognition of the
dialectic. However, 'this can be only scantily present in the
gymnasium. It will be generally apprehended only by the few...'. [44]
The third stage is the self-movement of education itself, for it is the
recognition of the misrecognition of the dialectic as loss and
negativity. The negative comes to be known as the work of the whole
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process of knowing, and the separation of thought and object to be the
work which is its own self-realization. The teacher here is recognized
as misrecognition, and the school master is merely the servant of this
movement, or the truth of its (self) work.
In Hegel's (contradictory) ethical pedagogy, the totality of the
determination of the teacher in civil society as contradiction is
itself the actuality and the educational self-work which is that
pedagogy. The content and method are a unity of educational movement,
or one could say of educational theory and practice. It is a pedagogy
which does not repeat the domination of the teacher as master precisely
because it recognizes it as misrecognition. That is the lesson which is
the education of ethical pedagogy and its education is actual because
the work of the teacher is a self-negation, rather than a repetition of
the presupposition of his independence.
The key to Hegel's pedagogy, therefore, is that it contains 'no talk of
the absolute.. .Quite generally, the aim should not be to teach youth at
this age the absolute standpoint of philosophy'. [45] To have done so
would have necessitated treating the absolute as other than self-
movement, and to have presumed for oneself the standpoint of the
teacher. Not to be teacher, but rather to have one's educational
identity as the negative of education as method, is the true
achievement and critical import of ethical pedagogy. It is in the
contradiction of ethical pedagogy that the domination of the teacher in
civil society is itself actual as education.
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C - RECOGNIZING CRITIQUE.
This chapter has so far presented the recognition of misrecognition as
the self-work which is education as activity and result. It has
examined the self-work and the self-result which is subjective
substance, and which is the self-education of the teacher, and it has
explored the actuality of the teacher in civil society in an ethical
pedagogy which has the contradiction of education as method for its own
form and content. In this final section, what is examined is the
educational content of critique as political education, the other half
of the broken middle in critical theory of education. The actuality of
critique as education is the recognition of the state, and therefore of
its own activity, as misrecognition. This actuality is termed here
comprehensive state education in a deliberate attempt to combine ideas
from politics and education, and to offer a critique of the idea of
'comprehensive' education as it is abstractly formulated in civil
society. It is argued that critique, in seeking to unify education and
politics, repeats the separation of education as activity from politics
or ethical substance as result, which is the misrecognition of both
education as method and misrecognition of the state as abstract.
Comprehensive state education is therefore the recognition of critique
as misrecognition of both education and the state in civil society, or
the actuality of critique as the self-education which is philosophy.
Bildung.
In the notes which accompany Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Bildunq is
described as 'a more or less untranslatable term. It means the actual
process of education and at the same time the cultured state of mind
arrived at through education'. [1] The duality of Bildunq, as it
appears in Hegelian philosophy, is the same duality that has been
examined in this work between the subjective activity of education and
the substance or truth of that activity; that is, between movement and
result. In Bildung, as in phenomenology, that duality is itself
educational. Bildunq refers to both the development of the state in
history and to the comprehension of that development in the philosophy
of history. The philosophy of history is arrived at through the self-
education of the state up to itself, and is still self-educating as
philosophy because it is now what is actual, or a self-activity and
result. Thus, critique is itself already the result of the self-
education of the state, and is the activity which is the self-
reflection of the state into the nature of itself as result. In this
sense, Bildunq contains the same contradictions of activity and result
as does the dialectic of enlightenment, subjective substance and
ethical pedagogy.
The problem, therefore, that obstructs a comprehension of Bildunq is
that it describes and refers to the duality which is one educational
process. It refers to both the educational movement and transformations
of the state in history before it is known to itself, or rational, and
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to the realization which is that self-knowledge in philosophy. Just as
the education of self-consciousness involved the loss of itself into
the contradiction of the master and slave before its educated return to
itself in recognition, and similarly just as the identity of the
teacher was lost in the contradiction of the dialectic of knowledge and
activity before re-cognizing that activity as its self-identity, so the
state as self-activity also loses itself before it re-cognizes itself.
This is its period of self-alienation or culture where subject and
substance are separated from one another, and where there is no
unification because the divide is not realized as self-work. This
period in history therefore represents the development of ethical life,
but not its actuality as self-work.
Prior to the stage of culture, the educational activity of the state
consisted of 'the beauty of ethical life', [2] or the immediate unity
of law and morality as custom. This undivided educational activity was
that of paideia. It was both culture and the cultural development of an
individual. In it were united both the truth of the community and the
(re)production of the community. Culture was not external to those
whose education it was. Indeed, in paideia there is no division between
internal and external, or content and activity. Paideia knows no
dialectic of enlightenment, has no separation of subject and substance,
and was simply a pure education. Its content and its activity were
Greek culture, performed through songs, poems and orations. Greek
literature 'was the expression of the process by which the Greek ideal
shaped itself', [3] and the stories of the heroes provided both the
ethics of custom, and custom as ethics. Through the educational
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activity of paideia, 'individuals are simply identified with the actual
order (and) ethical life appears as their general mode of conduct, that
is, as custom, while the habitual practice of ethical living appears as
second nature...'. [4]
The unity of paideia was disrupted by the time of the fourth century,
because the activity became self-consciously practised. When Jaeger
notes that the Greeks became 'the teachers of all succeeding
generations', [5] the truth of the statement lies in the development of
the individual self-consciousness, the person, for whom independence
meant separation from ethical substance. Jaeger notes that by the
fourth century the spirit of paideia 'was dangerously separated from
society, and suffered the fatal loss of its function as a constructive
force within the community'. [6]
Education began its self-activity and development to rational state
education with this separation of custom into law and morality. Hegel
remarks that it was in Socrates that educational activity began its
self-division.
Socrates is celebrated as a teacher of morality, but
we should rather call him the inventor of morality.
The Greeks had a customary morality; but Socrates undertook
to teach them what moral virtues, duties, etc were. The
moral man is not he who merely wills and does that which
is right - not merely the innocent man - but he who has
the consciousness of what he is doing. [7]
It is from this that the period of die Bildunq begins.
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The period of die Bildunq in the Phenomenology of Spirit is spiritual
self-alienation, the necessary educational precursor to the absolute
education which is recognition. For the single self-consciousness, this
alienabn is the unhappy consciousness which is 'the consciousness of
self as a dual-natured, merely contradictory being'. [8] The
contradiction appears in the separation of real consciousness from pure
consciousness, the cultural world opposed to a world of faith. Spirit
here, 'breaks up into two. The first is the world of reality or of its
self-alienation; but the other is that which spirit, rising above the
first, constructs for itself in the aether of pure consciousness'. [9]
The self-alienation of spirit is manifest as the Christian religion.
Subjectivity, or the legal person, is therefore opposed to spirit as
universal, but acquires for itself the character of universality in its
own world. The advice to render unto Caesar what is Caesar's, and to
God what is God's, not only acknowledges the separation of subject and
substance, but acknowledges the right of each to have authority in its
own world. But the second world, the world of God, is not the world of
actual consciousness; since 'thought is in the first instance (only)
the element of this world, consciousness only has these thoughts, but
as yet it does not think them, or is unaware that they are thoughts'.
[10] Thus, the contradiction between Caesar and God is not God's, but
ours, it belongs to the world of culture. The heavenly kingdom 'is for
that reason not free from it', [11] and is known as the act of faith,
not the self-action of absolute being in and for itself.
The worlds of culture and faith are antithetical to one another, but
the latter is always in a relation of dependence to the former because
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thoughts of the other world always emanate from this world. Thus, the
relationship is educational but this is not realized, or known as the
self-activity which is Bildunq, until its own (self) enlightenment. The
educational relationship between faith and culture is the period of die
Bildunq in history, the development of the rational state, but not then
realized as such. It is the antithesis, the dialectical movement,
between the two worlds which is die Bildung. The period from Roman
property law to the Enlightenment has been, notes Rose, 'the culture of
formation, die Bildunq, of the Christian religion and the state,
ethical life. It has been a series of formative experiences in which
religious and political consciousness' definition of itself comes into
contradiction with its real existence'. [12]
This period of die Bildunq or contradiction of state and religion comes
to an end with the Reformation. The self-alienation of subject and
substance is characterized by the separation of the absolute from its
being known. The dependence of the unchangeable upon this world as the
activity which is its being known, is realized as the world of the
Reformation. Indeed, what is re-formed is precisely the personal
relation of man to the unchangeable, for the relationship is itself
acknowledged and becomes object. The objective relationship on earth of
person to God replaced the myth of the priest as mediator. Through the
moments of surrender by the church of its property, its right to
legislate on the universal, and its own identity as the pure world of
faith, religion achieves the beginning of its own rational identity
within the state. 'Only through this actual sacrifice could it
demonstrate this self-renunciation'. [13] Thus, it now has 'the
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certainty of having truly divested itself of its "I"'. [14] Elsewhere,
Hegel notes that the harmony 'which has resulted from the painful
struggles of history, involves the recognition of the secular as
capable of being an embodiment of truth; whereas it had been formerly
regarded as evil only...'. [15]
The (absolute) substance of the Reformation is, however, ethical life.
The state can become the kingdom of heaven on earth because man's
rational will, rather than God's will, is now sovereign on earth, and
man's self-activity is also self-truth. Thus, 'consciousness turns from
fighting lawlessness (on earth) to becoming a law-giver (on earth)'.
[16] Rational moral man overcomes superstitious and unessential man,
and is now his own law and conscience. Commensurate with this
increasing rationality is the awareness that the truth of the movement
of reason is (our) rational education (or enlightenment), and is itself
a human and not a heavenly activity. In the period of formation, the
self-activity of thought gradually lost its dependency upon an
exclusively religious other, by realizing that this self-abasement and
renunciation (of the unessential consciousness) was its own work. As
the heavenly world gradually lost its influence over earthly matters,
as the power of faith was eroded by reason, and its representatives
lost their influence as mediators, so faith became known as a personal
activity, and the rationale was created for persons to become equipped
with the tools of reason in order to practice faith.
Both sides, Catholic and Protestant, began to give
considerable attention to the problem of how education
could be used as an instrument for securing their
particular religious persuasions....In essence, the
acceptance of a personal god, guaranteed by the
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incarnation, along with the belief that the way to
education and a heightened vision is potentially
available to all, was a radical departure. [17]
Education therefore becomes the means to re-forming the relationship
between God and man, and education itself becomes defined as rational,
earthly and purposive activity. Reason became not only the authority of
earthly government and law making, but that which constituted
education. Reason as testing of laws also became reason as the self-
expression of the universality of the state.
The period of die Bildung does not result in absolute ethical life on
earth as a unification of law (state) and morality (religion). The
harmony between 'state and church has now attained immediate
realization' [18] but that immediate unity is re-formed by the very
determination which is its own (immediate) truth. The satisfaction of
the reformation is lost because conscience is only self duty, and the
unsatisfaction of the Enlightenment as abstract universality can be
satisfied only as subjective activity, or through the activity of those
individuals whose independence from itself it has rationally
guaranteed. Thus, says Rose, 'the abstract spiritualism of the German
Enlightenment and the abstract materialism of the French Enlightenment
both continue to deny and not to re-form ethical life. They are
themselves re-formed by the ethical life which they fail to
acknowledge...'. [19]
The period of formation, although it ends with the Reformation and the
Enlightenment, the 'grandest and the last' cultures, [20] is not,
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however, the end of formation. Education or activity begins again here,
(as philosophy) this time aware that it is its own spiritual work, and
not an activity which merely divides, separates and alienates. Cultural
formation, the separation of the absolute consciousness from the
activity of its being known, is replaced by philosophy as the
recognition of Bildunq as determinate negation. Philosophy is now both
the activity and the result which is the development of the state in
civil society, a unity which is misrecognized in critique. It is now
philosophy which has the aporia of education as activity and result as
its own self-experience, because the separation of satisfaction and
subject in the last great cultures is now philosophy's own work, or
comprehensive as state (self) education. As the result of die Bildunq,
philosophy is the self-formation which is the philosophy of history;
this has been described above. As the activity of Bildunq, philosophy
is now the work of the state in civil society, but it is an activity
which is itself already the separation of itself as critique from
itself as determinate result. It is the recognition of critique as the
misrecognition of the state which is here referred to as the
philosophical self-activity of comprehensive state education. Education
does not cease with the state, for the state only is as the
comprehension of its own education. 'The final purpose of education,
therefore, is liberation and the struggle for a higher liberation
still', [21] and is the struggle, the continuing education which, as
philosophy, 'reveals education as a moment immanent in the absolute'.
[22]
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The State and Ethical Life.
The state, as it appears in the Philosophy of Right, cannot be
comprehended except as the the educational movement which is
recognition of misrecognition. Absolute ethical life (mutual
recognition) is realized only as determinate negation; and the state,
as the 'actuality of the ethical idea', [23] is the result and
education of the determinate negation of absolute ethical life and is
actual as the broken middle. The state is a logical category within the
science of philosophical consciousness, and requires to be comprehended
according to its place within the system as a whole. The state has
actuality 'as something thought'. [24]
Ethical life is the identity of morality and law, which, it has already
been shown, is not an identity in civil society. Thus, absolute ethical
life is realized as contradiction or as relative ethical life, as less
than itself, and the external state becomes the object of critique.
Absolute ethical life is actual as the broken middle, a self-work and
result which is the concept in philosophy. Its moments belong to
science, and 'the details of such a transition of the concept are made
intelligible in logic'. [25] Ethical life is presented in the
Philosophy of Right according to its own internal logic as
philosophical consciousness, or as the movements which are the whole,
the movement and the becoming of the concept. The state is the unity
and non-unity of the movements which make up the concept of ethical
life. It is the determinate negation of the loss of abstract and
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immediate unity (the family) to the division of individual
subjectivities from the substance which is the collective. The state
does not replace civil society, it results from its contradictions, and
is itself the non-truth of those contradictions. To desire the state to
replace civil society is to misrecognize and reproduce the divisions of
civil society in a way which is uneducational, and a way which
precisely does not realize ethical life as the broken middle, or
absolute ethical life as relative ethical life. Hegel is at pains to
point out that in presenting ethical life in the Philosophy of Right,
he is 'dealing exclusively with the philosophic science of the state'.
[26] Thus, 'the philosophic proof of the concept of the state is this
development of ethical life from its immediate phase through civil
society, the phase of division, to the state, which then reveals itself
as the true ground of these phases'. [27] The state cannot be
comprehended except as the self-education which comprehends the absence
of absolute ethical life. Ethical life, presented as philosophical
consciousness, is therefore 'poles apart from an attempt to construct a
state as it ought to be. The instruction which it may contain cannot
consist in teaching the state what it ought to be'. [28]
Civil society is only the 'appearance' of the state as ethical life.
[29] It is an external state,
an association of members as self-subsistent
individuals in a universality which, because of
their self-subsistence, is only abstract. Their
association is brought about by their needs, by
the legal system - the means to security of person
and property - and by an external organization for
attaining their particular and common interests. [30]
But these 'common' interests are not 'common' at all in the sense that
the universality provided by and embodied in the external state is the
independence of each subjectivity from another. What is common, mutual
dependence, is dominated by the universality of difference and the
autonomy of each subject with regard to others. 'Common interest' in
civil society is merely particular interest abstracted as a principle,
but lacking therefore precisely the activity or self-work which would
make it common. The transparent ethical relation of domination, which
is apparent in the activity of mere possession, is abstracted and
hidden by the formalizing of that relation in bourgeois property law.
The work which is the identity of the subject is appropriated by and
lost to the external state which claims itself to be the identity of
all persons. Thus the ethical relation, or human social interaction and
dependency become antithetical to a universal law of separation and
independence. The security (identity) of each person, by law, is also
the security of their right to own property, because it is universal
bourgeois property law which separates the activity of subjectivity
from the identity of subjectivity as result. The domination of
bourgeois property relations lies precisely in the fact that domination
appears to be overcome by the legal recognition of the (abstract) 
equality of all men.
The appearance of bourgeois property law to have overcome domination by
recognizing the equality of subjects has, in the presupposition of law
as overcoming particularity, only repeated a domination of subject, and
determined it externally, without the work which is self-activity. A
Person is already an individual who enjoys (bourgeois) property rights,
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and (bourgeois) property rights are already the separation and
independence of all persons with regard to each other. Dependence
(subject as activity or work) cannot be achieved under bourgeois social
relations because it is always already overcome. It is as
misrecognition that all political and social theorizing, including
critique, has to 'begin', and it is the comprehension of this failure
to begin which is the theme of this thesis.
Recognition of misrecognition is implicit in Hegel's treatment of the
state in the Philosophy of Right. In a 'philosophy', actuality is
already comprehended. Its presentation therefore appears abstract, but
the movement and mediation which negate it are contained in the
presentation. Equally implicit in a philosophical presentation of the
state, is that the state is already known, and can only be known, as
separated from the activity which is that knowing. The state does not
relieve us of the contradictions of civil society, but its actuality is
our comprehension of the state as misrecognition, and of education as
misrecognition. The state is only realized from civil society; that is
the actuality of the state, and that is the critical import of Hegel's
educational/political philosophy.
Only a comprehensive state education is the truth of critique as
actuality, and the non-domination of the broken middle by any
presuppositions of absolute ethical life. The state as it appears in
the Philosphy of Right is not a demand for the status quo because in
the presentation of the state as actual, the status quo has already
been transformed, worked upon. Bourgeois law is transformed in being
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known because its self-contradiction moves its abstract truth into
untruth. The recognition of the state as misrecognition does not
replace civil society, it is not another abstract imposition like
bourgeois property law. It is precisely the comprehension of mediation
which is the self activity and result of the actual, and which is
therefore the critical import of philosophy. Actuality is our knowing
of the untruth of bourgeois property law, and the state has that
untruth as self-knowledge, or its own comprehensive development and
education. Absolute ethical life cannot be imposed in civil society,
but its absence can be realized within it, as critique, and that is
Bildung as self-work, or the recognition which is comprehensive state
education. This education is critical because it does not reproduce
civil society, the society of domination, by futher domination, but
rather re-cognizes that domination and transforms it into the
determinate negation which is the state as self-activity and result.
The truth of critique is movement, not solution; the recognition of
critique as misrecognition is examined in the final section.
A philosophy of critique, a self-examination which is movement and
result, is only possible because the period of die Bildunq or of
alienation is behind us. Bildunq is now known as its own movement, and
critique can be comprehended. The day of philosophy has not arrived,
but its non-arrival is now recognized. 'The owl of Minerva has spread
her wings...we may now be prepared and readied for comprehension'. [31]
Philosophy as Comprehensive State Education.
Ethical life is the self-work of subject and substance. This unity,
however, falls within the work of thought, for ethical life has to be
known, in the sense of realized. How it is to be known, is the
educational import of Hegel's (political) philosophy, and the political
and ethical import of the crises of modernity which is the dialectic of
enlightenment. The state is not an immediate representation of ethical
life, a Sollen, it is rather the actual thought of ethical life, and
results from, and as, the contradiction which is civil society. The
state is not actual in critique for it is only and always presupposed
as independent of its being known.
In this last section, philosophy as self-activity is examined as
comprehensive state education. This involves the same movement of the
recognition of misrecognition which has already been examined with
regard to the master/slave dialectic, subjective substance and ethical
pedagogy, but in this case it refers to the separation of the state as
object from the (moral) subject whose universality it is not, and for
whom the state is therefore an object for critique. It is argued that
critique is comprehensive when it is the self-activity which is the
recognition of the state, and therefore of subjectivity, as
misrecognition. The very term comprehensive can only apply to an
education which is the totality of activity and result, and which in
this case, refers to the comprehension of critique as determinate
negation, or the activity and result which is the broken middle, or
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what is actual. Recognition of misrecognition is comprehensive because
it is that self-work, whether as ethical pedagogy or as political
education. Both contain the impossibility of education as method as
their own self-work and result, and both are therefore actual/ethical
education.
Comprehensive state education is the determinate result of the
contradiction which is the separation of the external state from the
subjectivity whose universal authority it appears as. This division is
no longer self-alienation for it is now known, or grasped
philosophically , and its being so comprehended is already the self-
activity (the self-education) of the state. What remains to be seen
here, then, is how comprehensive state education is misrecognized in
critique as moral self-consciousness; and how, and when, it is actual
as the work of subjective substance.
The idea of critique become possible with the comprehension of the
state as the authority or self-government of enlightened and rational
individuals. It is possible as an idea only when reason grasps itself
as 'all reality', [32] and establishes itself as the self-produced
authority and self-identity of the will. The authority of reason is
grounded in the formal notion of itself as the universal self-activity
of thought. Therefore a relationship between reason and the authority
of (self) government is established. The rational state required a
better educated, increasingly enlightened populace; and here, better
educated meant the growth of individuals' powers of reasoning. To 'dare
to know' [33] became the educational mission of rational societies. A
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well-ordered and rational state required individuals to understand the
state as its legitimate authority, and to train to perform functions
which would serve the state. Education satisfied both requirements
since it was provided hy the state, and for the state. [34] The idea of
'state education', therefore, replaced the control which religious
authorities had previously enjoyed over the provision of education.
Rational education, or education as the result of the Enlightenment,
and the development of further enlightenment, overcame the mythical and
merely superstitious religious education, and replaced it with
education as the maintainance of, and improvement of, mans own self-
government. It needed no external authority, for state education was
reason's own activity.
However, education by the state for the state is merely an abstract
education. The right of all individuals to universally available and
free state education is only an abstract (educational) universality as
duty. As the formal law of compulsory schooling, state education is
measured against reason as the logic of non-contradiction, and its
universality becomes merely a matter of numbers rather than substance.
Abstract reason regards state education in civil society to be
universal provided it is a right for all, and none are excluded from
its provisions, and that it has as its goal the rational development of
each individual subject. Its authority is this (formal) universality,
and this universality is its authority.
What is not understood in this merely abstract justification of formal
state education in civil society is the way in which it repeats the
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separation of teacher and student from each other, thus reproducing
education as misrecognition, and how it abstracts the process which is
state education from its social determination. With regard to the
former, the separation of knowledge from activity in civil society
provides abstract identities for teacher and student, which masks the
educational relationship which is both of them. In the latter case, the
activity of state education - formal schooling in civil society - does
not recognize its own social determination. It fails to comprehend how
it is the result of a particular set of social and historical
circumstances, and how its activity is already education as
misrecognition. It is precisely this experience which gives rise to
critique as the rational examination of a state which is not rational,
not the truth of subjectivity which it immediately appears to be. The
development of this experience itself consists in the movements of
ethical life which are detailed in the Philosophy of Right, from the
abstract ethical beauty of family education, to its destruction within
civil society and the moral consciousness which knows the social as
object, and has self-consciousness as its own authority and as the
self-activity which is conscience. It is i the recognition of the
activity of critique as misrecognition (or moral self-consciousness)
that philosophy is comprehensive state education, or actuality.
The immediate unity of family education is disrupted by the incursion
of the external state into the child's world. [35] It is a stage of the
state's own development that subjectivity comes to have the state as an
object for it, for the state has to reveal itself as the universal
authority of (or over) each individual. Schooling is the earliest
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manifestation of the state as object for the individual, for it is a
requirement of 'state education' that it be a social activity. Since
the state is the rational authority of all, then its truth cannot be
left to the non-social, purely immediate unity of the family. The right
of state institutions over the family in the matter of education as in
all other state functions, is already the determination and mediation
of subjectivity in civil society. The independence of the child's world
is lost to the universality of the adult world. It is, to use a more
recent term, the period of socialization, and it is (for us) where
subject has substance as object, and therefore as lost. Thus, 'civil
society tears the individual from his family ties, estranges the
members of the family from one another, and recognizes them as self-
subsistent persons.. .Thus the individual becomes a son of civil
society'. [36] As the authority of rational (social) education, 'civil
society has the right and duty of superintending and influencing
education, as much as education bears upon the child's capacity to
become a member of society. The right of society here is paramount over
the arbitrary and contingent preferences of parents...'. [37]
What does result from formal state education is the contradiction which
is moral activity or education. The abstraction of ethical substance as
law fom activity produces for consciousness the dialectic of duty and
conscience. The dialectic is itself, however, an educational issue. The
abstraction of state education in civil society produces for
consciousness the aporia of education as socialization - the immediate
unity of state education - and education as individual self-awareness
of the social as object - the separation of subject from substance. It
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is here that education becomes therefore a matter of critique, where
the object is now comprehended as the imperfect formation of the
activity which now examines it. Education becomes the question of the
moral self-consciousness with regard to duty and conscience.
Moral self-consciousness makes 'the person into a subject' [38] but
this 'subjective will, directly aware of itself and distinguished from
the principle of the will, is therefore abstract, restricted and
formal'. [39] 'At the standpoint of morality, subjectivity and
objectivity are distinct from one another, or united only by their
mutual contradiction'. [40] Thus morality, and moral education, are
characterized as 'mere appearance'. [41] Although their mutual
contradiction is known (for example, as the dialectic of enlightenment)
it is not comprehended according to the concept and thus is not
comprehensive. Morality, as activity, reproduces the separation of
subject and substance without determinate result, thus refusing
substance any ethical activity, and moral activity any substantial
content.
Enlightenment education sought to produce the perfect state and the
perfect citizen; the two conditions were seen as mutually dependent.
But a state education which merely taught of itself as its own truth,
became object for those whose education it was. What was intended as
self-education by the state became education about the state for the
individual. The latter used his powers of reason to know that
education, now, as object. Formal state education is therefore
experienced as contradiction. The two moments which constitute this
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movement are those of education as communal duty, transmission of
social values, beliefs and traditions; and, education as individual
development and reflection upon values, beliefs and traditions.
This experience constitutes the dichotomy in the sociology of
education, and sociological theory, between social function and
individual interpretation. It is one of the key questions in
sociological theorizing, and in critical sociology of education, as to
whether thought determines the social or the social is determinative of
thought. Sociology, however, as the consciousness which has the social
as object, makes no progress in this regard whilst it fails to
recognize that the question itself is already determined within the
broken middle, and is already therefore a misrecognition of the
dialectic of enlightenment. An idealistic solution does not contain the
half of this broken middle which is immanent negativity and
determinateness; a structural solution does not contain the other half
which is experience and activity. Sociology's treatment of the question
of social determination, and of the duality of actor (subject) and
structure (substance), is not itself recognized as misrecognition.
Sociology, as critique, is therefore a form of moral education and
activity, in that the contradictions of subject and substance
constitute its subject matter, but sociological resolutions of this
aporia 'can be no more than relative' [42] because the dialectic of
enlightenment returns as social determination to grant them only a
negative and dependent status. It is with this problem that critical
theory of education, and Habermas 'begin'.
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Moral education therefore consists of reflection upon the good by
individuals who, in the activity of reflection, have the good as object
and thus as not-themselves. But since they know that the good requires
activity, education becomes a matter of conscience over duty. The
result of moral education can therefore be duty or non-conformity, [43]
but the principle of education as the self-activity of the individual
conscience, and its overcoming of the separation through its reasoning,
remains the same in both.
It is this activity which is the dialectic of enlightenment, that is,
of experience and object, and its truth as movement is the realization
of ethical life as actual. But moral education does not recognize this,
its own truth. Moral education remains within the dialectic of
conformity and non-conformity, of duty to the community and duty to
self. Conscience can take the form of critique or piety, but both are
misrecognitions of the (non) identity of dependence. As critique,
conscience demands the untruth of state education be overcome by the
activity which is self-authority, or by critique itself. This is
already, therefore, the presupposition of critique as overcoming, which
is where critical theory of education and this thesis began. The
demand, or Sollen, for critique as the unity of education and politics
is already a separation of subject and substance. As piety, conscience
accepts responsibility for the untruth of the good but like critique,
this new understanding only repeats again the separation. Neither
critique, nor the piety of the beautiful soul, can realize an ethical
education, for their education rests in the impasse of dialectic, and
- 258 -
fails to recognize this dialectic (of enlightenment) as the self-
activity which is our philosophical consciousness.
The dualistic nature of moral education can be seen in Hegel's own
teaching, for his pupils received lessons both in duty and in
independent thought. For Hegel, what was important was the education
which is this contradiction. It is in the recognition of the dialectic
of moral education as the ethical education which is the dialectic of
enlightenment, that state education (critique) is actually realized.
Critique is comprehensive when it has itself for its own object, and
comprehensive education is actual as the recognition of the
misrecognition of education and the state in civil society.
Philosophy as comprehensive state education does not overcome the
separation of state from subjectivity in civil society. Rather, that
separation is comprehended as the effective critique of the absence of
absolute ethical life. The actuality of that separation is the
continued domination of bourgeois private property law known and
comprehended as not overcome. It is this self-education regarding the
domination of ethical life which is philosophy as comprehensive state
education, and which is itself actuality, or subjective substance.
CONCLUSION 
There are two educational activities developed in this thesis. One is
the negation or critique of natural consciousness, and of subjectivity
which is abstracted from its own determination, the other is the
comprehension of that negation or critique. In the former activity
natural consciousness is experienced as lost; in the latter, this
experience of loss is comprehended as the education of our
philosophical consciousness. The first three chapters of the thesis
examine the educational activity of critique and negation as
contradiction, the last chapter examines the comprehension of that
contradiction as self-activity or as education. It is the comprehension
of the relationship between natural consciousness and philosophical
consciousness which is the import of Hegelian philosophy of education,
because this self-determining activity - the concept - is the identity
of education as both activity and result.
The first education explores the idea of critique as it appears in
Habermasian critical theory of education, in Habermas, and then in
Horkheimer and Adorno. In critical theory of education, Habermas's
theory of communicative action is employed in an attempt to unify
educational and political activity as critique. The object of its
critique is the abstract and unreflective notion of education which
pervades educational research, the educational disciplines, and the
activity of education in various institutions including schools. It is
argued within this critical theory that in communicative action the
- 260 -
determination of education as an abstract identity in civil society is
no longer abstract. The comprehension of determination is seen as an
overcoming of the abstraction, and is produced in communicative action.
In Habermas's theory of communicative action this reflection is
intersubjective or social activity, and not abstract, because it is
reason's own work which realizes its own dependence upon, and truth in,
the lifeworld.
However, the idea of critique in critical theory of education was shown
to repeat a contradiction in its reasoning which it could not resolve.
In criticizing education as abstract, critical theorists employed an
educational method which had to be presumed as not itself also
abstract. To know education as mere abstraction is to be educated in
regard to this appearance; but in order to achieve this enlightenment
it was necessary to presuppose that the identity of non-abstract
education was already known, so that it could be used as the method and
the criterion by which non-abstraction was realized. Without the
presupposition of enlightenment as result, or as already known, there
is no method available by which to criticize education which is not
itself also abstract. Critique viewed as overcoming is this
presupposition. Critique as method already presupposes itself as the
result which it is intended to achieve in its activity, and is
therefore a presupposition of (absolute) unconditioned unity.
The issues raised here for a critical theory of education necessitate
that it return to the critical theory on which it is modelled, to try
and discover the source of the contradiction which critique repeats,
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and to better understand the activity of negation. A return to Habermas
in chapters II and III for this purpose, revealed that the same
presupposition of critique as enlightenment and overcoming is found
throughout his work, and is the basis for the emancipatory knowledge-
constitutive interest, for ideology-critique, for communicative
competence and ultimately for the theory of communicative action.
Habermasian critique aims to reveal how the negation of abstract
thinking is an overcoming of that thinking. In the theory of
communicative action, the abstract identity of subjectivity is overcome
in the realization of its social and intersubjective dependence upon
the lifeworld. Philosophies of consciousness have taken for granted the
appearance of the subject in their critiques of the subject, and this,
says Habermas, is to fail to grasp how critique, or self-enquiry, is
already more than the work of an abstract subject. Dialectic of
Enlightenment is just such an example, presupposing abstract
subjectivity in order to claim that nothing positive can be learnt
which is not already abstract. What Habermas does not do, however, is
to apply this insight precisely to the method by which he arrives at
this conclusion. His critique of philosophies of consciousness also
repeats the abstraction of the subject from the process by which
subjectivity is claimed to be known, because critique as overcoming
presumes an enlightenment regarding abstraction which is itself not
abstract. The basis of critique as overcoming is that the theory of
communicative action is already enlightened with regard to the identity
of non-abstraction, something which it then, from this enlightened
position, claims can only be achieved in the intersubjective self-
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activity of discourse. Critique is therefore the presupposition of
enlightenment as the method by which the unconditioned unity of
activity and result, or the absolute, is known. But it is this
presupposition which repeats the subject as abstract rather than
overcoming it, for presupposition is already not the unconditioned
activity which is claimed as its own unity.
It is when the idea of critique as method is examined in Habermas that
his relationship to Horkheimer and Adorno emerges. This relationship
was examined in chapter III. The contradiction which lies at the heart
of Habermas's work is that the separation of knowledge from activity,
and of subjectivity from critique, is repeated even when the separation
itself is known. Habermasian social theory repeats this contradiction
in its own critical activity, and the result appears as an impasse and
an aporia which prevents subjectivity an emancipation from its abstract
identity in bourgeois legal relations and capitalist relations of
production. This impasse is what is explored by Horkheimer and Adorno
in Dialectic of Enlightenment. They show how activity or critique is
always enlightenment and how enlightenment reverts to non-result, or to
activity. Horkheimer and Adorno do not seek to avoid or overcome the
contradiction of the dialectic of enlightenment, they seek only to
expose it as the totality of reason. The implications for critical
theory of education of the dialectic of enlightenment, are therefore no
more than have already resulted from the critique of Habermas's
educational method; but Horheimer and Adorno reveal the import of this
contradiction as a self-critique of critical theory, an activity which
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is not methodological because it arises out of the activity of critique
as a whole.
Dialectic of Enlightenment comprehends that the issue of education in
civil society lies at the heart of critique, and it is therefore a more
appropriate source for the development of a critical theory of
education than The Theory of Communicative Action. Whilst Habermas
employs presuppositions of enlightenment in order to explain and thus
overcome the separation of subjectivity and activity, Horkheimer and
Adorno investigate the nature of that repetition, and correctly
identify its source to lie in the contradiction of education. A
critical theory of education which employs Habermasian theory has not
yet understood that Dialectic of Enlightenment represents an
educational advance on Habermas, one which comprehends that even having
the dialectic of enlightenment as object is only another abstract
identity, and not an overcoming of it. Horkheimer and Adorno identify
that the contradiction of critique is a problem of education as method.
To become enlightened is already to presume the identity of educational
activity and result in itself, and to criticize this is only again to
repeat the presumption of enlightenment regarding its non-identity.
Education as method cannot be subjective self-mediation, or subject as
activity and result. This is the educational advance in critical theory
which Horkheimer and Adorno make, but which critical theory of
education has yet to realize.
For Adorno, the totality of the dialectic of enlightenment means that
critique is only possible as negative dialectics; that is, as the
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understanding that non-abstraction is not possible, and that identity
thinking is total. This impossibility of knowing activity in itself is
precisely what ensures that critique remains negative. Since the unity
of activity and result cannot be known as a totality outside of the
contradiction of the dialectic of enlightenment, critique is not
presupposed as an overcoming. The negative, for Adorno, is the movement
of the dialectic of enlightenment, a movement which undermines all
identities, including its own, at the same time as it knows and repeats
identities. The negative, therefore, as a critical education, is
developed in Adorno, but not in Habermas. Negative dialectics awaits
critical theory of education as the work which takes up the importance
of education in and for critical theory, and begins precisely with the
impasse that critical theory reaches with the theory of communicative
action.
In keeping with the nature of critique as the negation of identity, of
abstraction, Adorno would not claim that negative dialectics represents
an advance over the theory of communicative action, only a negation of
it. Negation is not an advance for Adorno because that would be to
credit the negative with an identity which would abstract it from
itself as movement. It is as if, therefore, the first education of this
thesis, in chapters I - III, is not an education at all. Nothing has
been learnt which would enable the comprehension of the subject in a
way which did not reproduce their separation as activity and result.
But this is exactly the problem which critical theory of education and
Habermas set out to overcome. Although Adorno's work is an educational
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advance on communicative action, it is not where the import of critical
education is to be found.
The second educational activity in the thesis, the work of chapter IV,
is the comprehension of the experience of the first educational
activity. By tracing the abstract presuppositions of enlightenment in
critical theory of education and in Habermasian critical theory, an
experience is created for us, the reader, regarding the contradictory
claims of critique as education. The question which therefore remains
for us is how this second education can be comprehended according to
itself, as dependent upon the object, in a way which does not remove it
from the relation of dependence which has produced it, and which is its
self-activity? How can this new consciousness know itself without
losing itself at the same time? Put another way, the question is, how
are we ever to know the absolute without presupposing its unconditioned
unity. To know the absolute is already to have employed that
presupposition as the method of inquiry. It is in response to these
problems, and as the comprehension of the impasse of the first
education noted above, that Hegelian philosophy of education is
developed in the second part of the thesis.
The first educational experience in the thesis, of critique, can now
been seen to be the experience of the loss of natural consciousness.
Natural consciousness, when it is known as object, or abstract
subjectivity when it is known as abstract, are both an experience of
loss. What is lost is the consciousness which is experienced. Natural
consciousness therefore cannot appear for us except as experience or
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our object. Natural consciousness is always separated from itself in
experience and thought becomes despair at its own inevitable loss and
negation. However, that loss is at the same time always an object for
the new consciousness which knows the loss. Each loss of natural
consciousness is accompanied by the new consciousness; therefore, the
loss of (natural) consciousness is also the development of another
consciousness, the consciousness which results from the activity of
thought, or philosophical consciousness.
The one characteristic of philosophical consciousness which is known,
then, is that it is dependent upon activity. But if philosophical
consciousness is known as dependent, then is it not an identity and a
result, something known independently from the activity which has
produced it? How can philosophical consciousness be comprehended as
dependent without dominating its dependence. The answer to this
question in this thesis is that philosophical consciousness requires to
be comprehended according to the movement and result which is education
or the absolute in Hegel.
The idea of the absolute as (self) education, including the notions of
ethical pedagogy and comprehensive state education, is itself a
critique of, and a recognition of education in civil society. Its
education is a critique of all education. It does not avoid or escape
the contradiction that education as method renders the absolute as
unknowable, it is rather the comprehension of the contradiction as its
own dependency, and its own identity and non-identity. Philosophical
consciousness does not appear as object or subject because it is itself
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the relation of knowing (the unity) by which they are already
separated. To know them as separated is already to have performed the
work which is their separation and their unity. It is for this reason
that critique, sociology, philosophy or any social reflection cannot
begin except with the work which is already itself, or already appears
as reflection (or illusory being). All such activity is already
dependent upon the experience of the separation of subject and object,
a separation which appears abstract to our natural consciousness but is
an education in itself for the consciousness which recognizes the work
as misrecognition.
What is actual is what is for us already the broken middle of subject
and substance. It is the totality of mediation and immediacy. Actuality
is therefore the educational and political import of the second
education in this thesis, for it is the comprehension of the dialectic
of enlightenment as subjective substance, or our absolute self-work and
result. The second education is an education precisely because its
activity and result are not presupposed, but are immanent in the
contradiction which is our education regarding the unconditioned. What
r
we learn, therefore, is that actuality is our education regiVng the
separation of subject and substance, for the activity of negation is
ours, and the result is a consciousness which is result as that
activity. The key to education as identity, or as the concept, is that
only in being performed, in being done, is it actual. Education
requires self-loss as its activity if it is to be our education. This
is the most important insight contained in Hegelian philosophy of
education, and one which critical theory of education will, as its own
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education, be forced to contend with. Ethical pedagogy and
comprehensive state education both contain that loss, of the teacher
and absolute ethical life respectively, as the truth of their
educational activity. They therefore represent a beginning to the task
of recognizing education in civil society, and re-forming critical
theory of education.
Education as self-loss is the reason why the development of Hegelian
philosophy of education did not begin with Hegel. The first three
chapters produce the work which is the loss of enlightenment and are
therefore this development of philosophical education as our work. It
is that experience which is the subject and substance of philosophy as
education in chapter IV. Hegel's philosophy of education has no import
if it is not performed.
Hegelian philosophy of education is therefore the import of Hegelian
philosophy as a critique of presuppositions of the absolute which
appear as methodologies for overcoming or not overcoming the
contradiction of knowing the absolute. The contradiction produced in
our trying to know the absolute is the dialectic of enlightenment. This
contradiction is already the critique of enlightenment as a method for
understanding the absolute. Thus, not knowing the absolute is our
education regarding the absolute. The absolute is our education. This
is Hegel's critique of both relative ethical life and the dialectic of
enlightenment. It is also the recognition of education in civil
society.
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Encyclopaedia is conpreheniedby and as philosphical consciousness; reoogliticn in
the PhenamEnologv is always misrecognitian, for it is the development of
philosophical consciousness.
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is, because it is the self-movelent and self-ident.tty of absolute knowing, of the
concept, and of spirit.
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essential nature of the dependent consciousness is 'simply-to live or to be for
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'Phenonenologv of Spirit', r4 22. But the whole import of the slave consciousness is
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sakes recoglition of (the) misrecrgnition (of independence) possible.
18. Hegel, G.W.F. (1977), Phenonenolocar of Spirit, pp. 176-177.
19. ibid. p. 114.
20. ibid. p. 114.
21. ibid. F4 117.
22. ibid. pp. 117 and 118.
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24. Hegel, G.W.F. (1977), Renomenology of Spirit, F4 140.
25. ibid. FL 348.
26. ibid. r4 348.
27. ibid. p. 349.
28. ibid. p. 349.
29. ibid. r4 237.
30. ibid. p. 237.
31. ibid. r4 237.
32. ibid. F4 384.
33. ibid. ID. 384.
34. Rose, G. (1981), Hegel Contra Socioloay, 124 60.
35. ibid. p. 91.
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Mbdernity: The Origins of Mbdern Social Thought frail Kant to Hegel to Marx
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37. ibid. r4 187.
38. ibid. r6 204.
39. Hegel, G.W.F. (1967), Philosophy of Right, pp. 12-13.
40. Rose, G. (1981), Hegel Cbntra Sociology, p. 183.
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41. Butler, C. and Seiler, C. (eds.) (1984), Hegel: The Letters, p. 281.
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truth of the preceding course. (These last two courses are found an pp. 65-123 of
the Propaedeutic.
43. Butler, C. and Seiler, C. (eds.) (1984), Hegel: The Letters, r4 264.
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CHAPTER IV. HEGEL AND EDUCATION.
C - RECOGNIZING CRITIOUE.
1. Hegel, G.W.F. (1967), Philosogy of Right, P. 315; this remark is made by the
translator of the voaume, T.M. Knak, utbo is quoting from Aris, History of Fblitical
Thought in Germany from 1789-1815, P. 144. The term Bildung is otNiouslycertral to
any educational reading of fle.-Jian philosophy, and discussicns of this term can be
found in Royce, Jr. (1964), Lectures on. Nbdern Idealism (Ned Haven, Connecticut: Yale
Uhiversity Press); Sall, I. (1972), 'Hegel as a Philosopher of EdUcation',
Educational Theory, Vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 26-33, and most recently in Smith, Jahn. H.
(1988), The Spirit and Its Letter; the last two refer to the point made hy r Etyce that
the Phenomenolodywes a Bildungsranan in the style of Gbethe's Wilhelm Meister. This
thesis uses the term Bildung to refer to the developmant of the state, in order to
separate it from the development of the ecbcaticnal sP1-F-identity- of the concept.
Bildunq and phenomenology are the same movement and result; they consist in the
experience of ocntradiction and return. Mat is lacking in the cammantaries upon the
educaticnal in Hegel is any examinatim of hag it is recognition which is the
educational import of both phenomenology and Bildunq. The lack of this recognition
renders interpretations of both terms nerely abstract,• and lacking as seLf-ocntralt
the very process they hope to describe. Without reccgliticn of Bildung and
phenomenology as misrecognition, each tends to be explained in terms of the presumed
identity of the other, but neither, therefore, curtain the ti-ralityhizid2js their
antradiction and !Ink/alert. It is the dUality of phermenalogy as movement and result
which has been re-cognized so far in this thesis, and it is the rinality of Bildunq as
the cevelopment of the state and its realization that is ncid examined in this last
secticn.
Smith's interpretation of Bildung in Hegel differs from that found in this work.
He argues that 'his concept of Bildunq reflects differing facets of rhetoric' such
that Hegel 'transforms a traditicnal concept of rhetorical BildUng into a
philoscchical concept', Smith, Jahn. H. (1988), The Spirit and Its Letter, p. )44. He
states that 'Hegel's interest in a proper mode of depicting truth "philosophioiLlr
cannot avoid rhetorical criteria for dealirg with the question of expressicn....The
parameters preestahlished for all discourse by-the ars thetorica still hold in a
philosophical discourse that would dispense with them' - ibid. P
.
 4. - and that
therefore, 'thanks to their rhetorical Bildunq, both the individual and philosophy,
regardless of their anti-rhetorical stanoe, have no other truth than the effective
reality of their rhetorical self-presentation' ,ibid. P. 277. Hbwever, SMith's
argument rests upon the idea that Bildunq, as dialectic (p. 258), and as a 'paradox'
(p. x.) of activity and inowanant is famed to adapt a style of re-presentaticn which
captures its own essence as movement whilst acknowledgingr that the re-pnasentatial
is all that can be kin. My reading of Smith is that he has perfonmed a postmodern
interpretation of Bildunq in Hegel, along the same lines as Adorno's critique
examined earlier in this uork, which sees rhetoric as the expression of the
negative which is mediation. Rhetoric as rrethod therefore overcomes actuality as
result; and is the presupposition, found in Adarno, of the separation of the content
of the absolute from its 'necessary' representaticn as activity. SMith dbes not
translate Wirklichkeit as actuality, but as 'effective reality', and argues that it
is the paradox created by rhetoric in presenting philosophical concepts which has
the 'effective reality'. The interpretation of Bildunq in Hegel as rhetoric is itself
a misrecopition of separation and of its actuality as &terminate negaticn. Sudh an
maxstimaling of peraddx and contradiction (i.e. of movement) is neither 'effective'
nor 'real' with regard to its own activity. Whereas Smith presupposes the negation of
actuality in rhetorical representation, this thesis recoglizes the (presupposed)
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non-admality of rhetoric as result, or as Bildung itself.
2. Hegel, G.W.F. (1977), Fhenanenplogy of Spirit, F4 265.
3. Jaeger, W. (1965), Paiceia: the Ideals of Greek allture. Volume 1: Archaic Greece.
The Mind of Athens, trans. G. Highet (Cmforct alackssell), F4 xxviii.
4. Hegel, G.W.F. (1967), FhiloscpiN_of Right, p. 108.
5. Jaeger, W. (1957), Feiceia: the Ideals of Greek CUlture. Volume 2: In Seardh of the
Divine Centre, trans. CL Highet (CkErad: Madmen), p. 5.
6. ibid. p. 10.
7. Hegel, G.W.F. (1956), The Philosaphy of History, trans. J. Sibree Mew York: Dover
Publidaticns), p. 269.
8. Hegel, G.W.F. (1977), Fhenananolocy of Spirit, F4 126.
9. ibid. pp. 296-297.
10. ibid. F4 321.
11. ibid. F4 297.
12. Rose, CL (1981), Hegel antra Sociology, p. 116.
13. Hegel, G.W.F. (1977), Fhencnenclzw of Spirit, p. 137.
14. ibid. Fu 137.
15. Hegel, G.W.F. (1956), The Fhiloswhy of History, F4 422.
16. Rose, CL (1981), Hegel Cbntra Sociology, p. 173.
17. Bowan, J. (1981), A History of Western Edication. Volume 3. The Mocern West. EurcCP
and the WwWbrld (London: Ptthuen and Co.), pp. 5-6. Refpnnation educatialwas
concerned to place the word of god directly in the hands of the pedple, whether
thrdugh reading or, as Luther stated, 'fran ordinary speech at home, in the nerket
place, and in the pulpit'; Boyd, W. (1969), lie History of Western Educaticn
(Lcndan: AcImn and Charles Black), F4 190. Hdwever, Luther hadavery wide ranging
view of education and adhered to a free system of universal educaticn; see Bruce,
G.M. (1979), Luther as an Educator (annectiout: Greenwood Press), and Eby, F.
(1971), Early Protestant Educators (New York: ?MS Press). For an account of the
struggles in this period between dhurdh and state, see Bowen, J. (1981), cp dit, and
Bqyd, W. (1969), cp cit.
18. Hegel, G.W.F. (1956), The Pniloscphy of History, p. 424.
19. Rose, CL (1981), Hegel Cbntra Sodiolcgy, p. 172.
20. Hegel, G.W.F. (1977), Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 362.
21. Hegel, G.W.F. (1967), Fininsophy of Right, p. 125.
22. Mi d p. 126.
23. ibid. p. 155.
24. ibid. p. 165.
25. ibid. F4 103.
26. ibid. p. 156.
27. ibid. p. 155..
28. ibid. p. 11.
29. ibid. p. 122.
30. ibid. FL 110.
31. Rcee, CL (1992), The Broken Middle, p.
32. Hegel, G.W.F. (1977), Fhencirenolocy of Spirit, p. 138.
33. See Kant, I. (1985), 'What is Enlightennent', in Fcundatiais of the Pttaphysids of
Marais, trans. it IC Smith (Lanian and /4307 York: Placndllan), p. 85.
34. Sudh a view can te found in the work of a recent philoscidler of ectratial, R.S.
Peters, who notes that the teacher performs this dUal role on behalf of the state.
'His jOb is to initiate others into What is regardsd as wcaftli4hile in itself. al the
other hand he is also appointed to train peTle for sane occupation and to act as an
at of selectial in the darpeti.ticn for jobs and for higher earaticre - reters,
R.S. (1966), Ethics and EdUcation (London: George Allen 84 Lbwin), p. 253. This view
of the teadher as agent or finctidnary isamisrecogniticn of the relaticnship
betwael nester and student ubidh is itself educaticn, and vhich has been examined
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earlier in this chapter.
35. The relationship between family and school in Hegel's educational philosophy is
exanined in Vincent, A.W. and Georg:, M. (1982), 'Eekelopient and Self-IdEntity:
Hegel's Concept of Education', abcational Theory, Vol. 32. nos. 3-4, pp. 131-141.
36. Hegel, G.W.F. (1967), Philosophy of Right, p. 148.
37. ibid. p. 148.
38. *rid. r4 75•
39 ibid. p. 76.
40. ibid. p. 78.
41. ibid. r4 78.
42. ibid.p. 78.
43. Fbrecomple, one philosopher of edUcatian has categccized the dichotany as the
'infcctrinatory' and the 'isolationist' approach. Ihe fonter inT*bas 'the training of
children to think and act in accordance with s3na first,ordernorm....the acoapted
public standards of acntemmmysocieby'; Wilson, J. (1967), Introduction to Wicral
Fobcation (Penguin Hooks), p. 20. Whereas qnaMbers of the "isolationist" group reject
"moral education" chiefly because it seems to than to imply this vied, and to involve
indoctrination and other suspect of illegitimate modes of training for calfannity',
(ibid. p. 20).
interesting exarple to note here is Eurkhehn's work an moral education. For
Darkheim, noraliby is society, and moral edUcation is socialization; but his work
does not simply reduoe to a crude theory of social reprodiction. 'here is a sense in
Etaidrzirn in which obligation is related to the activity vhich is science, or
sociology. The more cne understands the truth  of the social as the truth of
individual existence, the more the individual confers 'enlightened allegiance' to
society, purkheim, E. (1961), Mbral Education (slaw York: Ihe Free Press of Glencoe),
p. 115. For Durkheim, sociology was education regarding the truth of totality; 'ue
liberate ourselves through un:rstanding' the moral order which is society. (ibid. p.
116) This is not 'passive resignation' (ibid. p. 115) or fumtional reprocliction, for
it has as its oorrerstone the idea of edUcation as a realization of totality, a
realization of obligation as activity rather than a mrely abstract conformity to it.
Sociology as active self-education is oftan overlooked in interpretations of
Eurktelm's work- Cne stch recent interpretation can be found in Carr, D. (1991),
Edumting the Virtues (London: Routledge), who arges for individual moral
consciousness over the eacerience of deperklency which is Curkheim's scricangy as
active education. The criticism of Durkhehn's approach that he identified the good
with the social, to the exclusion of criticism, dbes not take sufficient account of
the fact that for him snriologirwasalready critical of the appearance of the
individual in society. Sociology, for Durkhehn, is an education regarding dependence.
HaAever, he is forced to presune the identity& dependence in the method of
sociological moral edUcathon because he does not comprehend the contradiction of
edUcation regarding the truth of totality; the actuality of a sociological edration
lies further dOwn the path of despair than Durideim allows for.
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